Iakobashvili on the Current State of the Conflict
Iakobashvili’s main points (in note format) are as follows
1. Russia is in a state of decay. This decay will take time, but things are bad in Russia. They lost political and economic ground and the war revealed Russia’s military weakness. According to Iakobashvili.
- Over 2,000 Russian soldiers were killed
- The 60 number quotes by Russians were only from Yamadayev’s troops
- Georgia destroyed Khrulyev’s column included 30/35 armored vehicles each carrying at least 8 people for a minimum of 240 dead from this column alone
- Russia suffered major hardware losses including: 17 airplane, 1 strategic bomber, 3 helicopters
- Russian soldiers are starving in Akhalgori and have resorted to raiding local Ossetians
From an economic perspective
- Gas prices have led to major budget shortfalls in Russia
- Europe will not ultimately be reliant on Russian gas
- No liquefied natural gas terminal and no ports for them in Russia
- China can get gas from Central Asia
From a political perspective
- Demographic tides are promoting separatism
- Only Moscow, St. Petersburg and Muslim dominated parts of Russia are growing. Muslim areas in Russia are demonstrating more ethnic homogeneity and anti-Russian sentiment
- High birth rates in Muslim Russia are leading to more unemployment and dissatisfaction
- 15% of Russian conscripts from the North Caucasus—many refusing to eat pork and stationed in Siberia
- Ingushetia has all signs of civil war
- Ossetians and particularly Abkhaz are angry at Russia
- Russia has upset Abkhaz political dominance by either 1) Installing a Russian second in command 0r 2) Directly taking over certain operations
2. Russia is angry now and was angry before and this is particularly dangerous for Georgia in the coming winter months
- Sanakoyev and Upper Kodori were successes
- “Boney M, swimming pools and cinemas” were a success
Russia is angry now because of all the bad results of the war
- This makes Russia very dangerous in the short term
3. Georgia’s strategy going forward – “Crisis gives you opportunity”
- Georgia has a mission to save Abkhaz and Ossetians from Russian domination
Georgia is not a member of NATO and doesn’t have the “goddamn plan” MAP
- But MAP was only created recently under specific circumstances and should not be for Georgia
- A special GAP or specific technical goals should be given to Georgia – it should be a political decision
- Better than NATO, however, would be two American brigades in Georgia
- Georgia should “fight when the fight makes sense” – Georgia should not argue with the EU resuming talks with Russia – but should seek to influence the process
Q & A and Other issues
Q: Why didn’t the Georgian Government heed the European Commission’s recommendations about Upper Kodori and South Ossetia?
Q: What about Georgia and Georgia’s future image and what about Swiss inquiry?
A: Russia saw they were getting beat in the press. Iakobashvili has a list of PR agencies Russia has engaged in. Russia allowed the NYT to swallow a story from a guy who no longer works for the OSCE. Russia is also influencing press freedom abroad. Berlusconi has censored debate in Italy.
Q: Does government have scenarios, even worse case scenarios?
A: Yes. The government learns quickly. Reservist system needs to change. The war showed MANAGEMENT problems. The reservists were not the problem. The war showed us “who is worth what”
Q: What about the Armenians in Abkhazia. Who do they support?
A: They leave the politics to the Abkhaz, though the status quo has been good to them, since they generally live in the north of Abkhazia. 30 or 31 out of 35 members of Abkhaz parliament are ethnic Abkhaz. This is called “apartheid.”
Q: What about the EU Monitors?
A: It would be better if they were armed and in Tskhinvali, But they are much better than the OSCE or UN, because they are free from Russian influence. UN cannot help solve the problem.
Q: What about the Geneva negotiations?
A: Georgia expects 3 countries (US, Russia, Georgia) and three int’l organizations (EU, UN, OSCE). They will not accept SO or Abkhazia. Russia can have whatever technical experts they want on their team. But there should be parity, so if Kokoity is attending, so should Sanakoyev.
Q What is with the UN?
A: UNOMIG was asked to leave Kodori. To justify this, they issued a “ridiculous report.”
Interview by Dustin Gilbreath
By: Dustin Gilbreath
CRRC’s third annual Methodological Conference: Transformations in the South Caucasus and its Neighbourhood
შიდა მიგრაცია საქართველოში: რა ვიცით მის შესახებ CRRC-ის კავკასიის ბარომეტრის მონაცემების საფუძვლეზე?არსებული შეფასებების თანახმად, მსოფლიო მასშტაბით შიდა მიგრანტთა რაოდენობა ბევრად აღემატება საერთაშორისო მიგრანტთა რაოდენობას. სამწუხაროდ, საქართველოში ძალიან ცოტა მონაცემი არსებობს შიდა მიგრანტების რაოდენობისა და მათი გეოგრაფიული განაწილების შესახებ. საქართველოს სტატისტიკის ეროვნული სამსახურის შინამეურნეობების ინტეგრირებული გამოკვლევები რეგულარულად აგროვებს ინფორმაციას ქვეყანაში შიდა მიგრაციის შესახებ. სახელმწიფო სერვისების განვითარების სააგენტო კოორდინაციას უწევს მოსახლეობის რეგისტრაციას საცხოვრებელი ადგილის მიხედვით.
By Till Bruckner
By Nino Zubashvili
By Dustin Gilbreath
In terms of the business findings, CRRC's Media Survey (undertaken in September/October 2009) generated extensive data that is available to help media make good business decisions. One recent presentation, summarized here, focused on showing the diversity of data that is available.
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CRRC’s previous blog posts have shown that the population of Georgia had rather moderate expectations of the recent visa liberalization with the Schengen zone countries, especially when it comes to the question of how much ordinary people will benefit from it. Europe Foundation’s latest survey on Knowledge of and Attitudes towards the European Union in Georgia, conducted in May 2017, provides a more nuanced understanding on how people in Georgia feel about this process and to what extent they are familiar with the conditions of visa liberalization.
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