Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC-Georgia and OC Media. This article was written by Zachary Fabos, a researcher at CRRC Georgia. The views presented in the article are the author’s alone and do not necessarily represent the views of CRRC–Georgia or any related entity.
Data from the 2024 Caucasus Barometer survey shows that supporters of the ruling Georgian Dream party are increasingly likely to distrust NGOs, suggesting that the party’s rhetoric regarding civil society is working among its followers.
The survey also showed that those who trust pro-government media outlets have moved towards distrusting NGOs, while those who trust opposition leaning outlets have become more trusting.
In April, Georgia’s one-party parliament passed the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), requiring individuals and organisations receiving foreign funding to register as ‘foreign agents’. The law punishes non-registration with fines and prison sentences of up to five years. Condemned by Georgia’s European partners and the US, the law is widely considered an attack on Georgia’s NGO sector and independent journalism. The introduction of FARA follows a slew of other actions by the Georgian Dream government aimed at discrediting and fomenting suspicion towards the country’s NGO sector.
Georgian Dream’s attack on civil society appears to have been effective in changing their supporters’ attitudes, with distrust in NGOs at an all-time high, according to Caucasus Barometer Georgia data.
According to CRRC–Georgia’s 2024 Caucasus Barometer, 32% of the Georgian public report distrusting the NGO sector. This is considerable growth since 2021, when less than a quarter (23%) of the population reported distrust.
Comparing the frequency of distrust and trust among party supporters between 2021 and 2024 further demonstrates the recent development of political polarisation around NGOs operating in Georgia. While distrust and trust towards the sector was about the same among both Georgian Dream and other party supporters in 2021, by 2024 trust and distrust developed a partisan character.
Distrust grew from 25% of Georgian Dream supporters in 2021 to 39% of Georgian Dream supporters in 2024. Among opposition party supporters, trust grew from 24% to 38%. Those who did not support any party did not experience a similar attitude shift.
An analogous dynamic is at play when looking at media consumption.
Between 2021 and 2024, distrust of NGOs among viewers of the pro-government TV channels Imedi, PosTV, and Rustavi 2 more than doubled from 20% to 41%. On the other hand, trust in NGOs nearly doubled among viewers of opposition-leaning TV channels Formula, Mtavari, and TV Pirveli, from 21% to 39%. The sharp divide in distrust and trust of NGOs points to the politically polarised narratives directed at the sector.
Although distrust towards Georgia’s NGOs hit an all-time high in 2024, time series data demonstrate that skepticism of the sector has grown most prominently among Georgian Dream supporters and viewers of Imedi, PosTV, and Rustavi 2, aligning with Georgian Dream’s promotion of anti-civil society legislation and conspiracy theories. The politicisation of attitudes surrounding NGOs is further shown in the opposite trend among those who support other parties and watch news from opposition-leaning channels.
The data used in this article can be found here.
