

CRRC-Georgia

ANTI-WESTERN RHETORIC ON FACEBOOK

From November 29, 2024, to November 29, 2025

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REPORT

Anti-Western Rhetoric on Facebook

from November 29, 2024, to November 29, 2025

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Authors: Mariam Kobaladze, Senior Researcher

Salome Dolidze, Researcher

Kristine Jintchveleishvili, Junior Researcher

CRRC-Georgia

1 Liziko Kavtaradze St., Tbilisi 0179, Georgia

<https://www.crrc.ge>

crrc.georgia@crrccenters.org

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The views expressed in this report belong solely to the author and may not reflect the position of CRRC-Georgia or the Swedish International Development Agency (Sida).

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

With the support of the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), CRRC-Georgia implemented the project "Countering Anti-Democratic Propaganda Through Engagement," a portion of which involved researching anti-Western narratives on the social network Facebook. The study covered a one-year period from November 29, 2024, to November 29, 2025. Observation was conducted on the posts of 16 public groups and pages. These groups and pages targeted Georgian-speaking audiences, as well as Azerbaijani-speaking and Armenian-speaking audiences living in Georgia. In total, 4,017 posts were analyzed in depth.¹

The monitoring results showed that anti-Western narratives are strategically spread in Georgia and are closely linked to domestic politics, including the pro-European protests, opposition activism, political decisions, and elections. The main strategy consists of strengthening the government's positive image and discrediting pro-European or opposition actors. The Georgian Dream government is presented as the defender of the country's sovereignty and the sole guarantor of stability, while a negative perception of the West as an unreliable partner is frequently presented.

The format of anti-Western messages is diverse and relies primarily on emotional, visual, and editorialized information: half-truths, changing or omitting context, generalizing a single action or event, subjective interpretations, attaching emotional labels, satire, and audio-visual manipulation. Blatantly false information was rarely detected (in about 1% of posts). However, in about a third of the posts, it was difficult to assess the authenticity of the information due to editorialized presentation of content and audio-visual manipulation.

Stylistic differences across various segments were evident: narratives intended for the Georgian-speaking audience often carried an emotional, mocking, and discrediting tone, mostly directed at political opposition and protesters, and less frequently at international actors. It was in the Georgian-language posts that instances of photo and video manipulation, including the use of artificial intelligence, occurred most often. In the Armenian-speaking segment, both pro-government and Russian-influenced narratives were active. In the Azerbaijani-speaking content, anti-Western messages were mainly spread in a non-editorialized format, in the form of official

¹ The detailed methodology of the research is provided in the annex.

statements. This was partly due to the nature of the sample, as it was not possible to find a specifically anti-Western Facebook page/group, so the observation was conducted on popular news pages in that region.

Regarding the creators and disseminators of the posts, various types of actors were involved here as well. On the one hand, there were the pages/groups selected for monitoring and their "admins," who actively created, shared, and emotionally amplified the posts. Most frequently, the actors included: informational media outlets, pages and groups openly or covertly supporting the government, politicians representing the government, journalists, and also individuals.

Overall, anti-Western narratives on Facebook in Georgia represent a well-organized, targeted informational tool that serves to strengthen support for the government, discredit the opposition, and deepen polarization in society. Their structural characteristics indicate a complex and consistent informational environment where different technologies, authors, and audiences are closely intertwined.

INTRODUCTION

Within the framework of the SIDA-funded project "Countering Anti-Democratic Propaganda Through Engagement," CRRC-Georgia conducted a study on anti-Western narratives on the social network Facebook. The aims of the monitor were:

- To identify the main anti-Western narratives spread on Facebook.
- To observe who or what is talked about most often among these narratives.
- To identify who creates and spreads these narratives.
- To determine the information manipulation techniques in posts containing anti-Western narratives.

The research included 16 Facebook pages and groups, selected based on previous studies and recommendations from researchers working on this topic, including those focused on the Adjara region and the Armenian- and Azerbaijani-speaking populations of Georgia. However, partially in the case of Adjara, and even more so among the Azerbaijani-speaking community, it was not possible to find a page/group that explicitly spread anti-Western content. Consequently, non-editorial informational Facebook pages were included in the sample, which ultimately reflected on the monitor's results, as the information was relatively more balanced.

The monitor analyzed posts on the selected pages and groups over a one-year period, from November 29, 2024, to November 29, 2025. The starting point was Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze's statement, which a large portion of the public interpreted as the suspension of Georgia's European integration, leading to a massive wave of protests.

This consolidated report is based on **4,017 in-depth analyzed posts**:

- From November 2024 to the end of May 2025 – 2,261 posts.
- From June 2025 to the end of November 2025 – 1,756 posts.

The monitoring results are displayed on the website dash.crrc.ge, where it is possible to analyze anti-Western posts, primary narratives, themes, and actors across different timeframes over this one-year period.

The structure of the report is as follows: it briefly describes the events unfolding in the country and abroad during this one year of monitoring; then, the main findings of the research are grouped into several chapters – main narratives, main actors, authors and disseminators of the posts, and the nature of the anti-Western rhetoric. A conclusion summarizes the main findings, while the research methodology is described in the annex.

CONTEXT

Following the 2024 parliamentary elections, which international observers, political opposition, and civil society declared fraudulent, the Prime Minister [announced](#) on November 28 that Georgia would not put European Union accession negotiations on the agenda until 2028. This decision was met with an immediate public protest, which continued for a year and is still ongoing. During the first weeks of the protest, the government used [force](#) to disperse the rally; hundreds of protesters were injured, including journalists.

Due to the opposition's boycott, only members of "Georgian Dream" accepted their parliamentary mandate and passed [laws](#) tightening sanctions for standard forms of peaceful protest, such as blocking roads or using facemasks. Dozens of protesters were fined, some were criminally arrested and sentenced to several years in prison. The arrest of journalist [Mzia Amaglobeli](#) was particularly high-profile; she was first arrested administratively and then criminally. In August 2025, she was [sentenced](#) to up to two years in prison.

In February 2025, the parliament created a temporary investigative commission headed by Tea Tsulukiani, which primarily worked on investigating alleged crimes of the previous government headed by United National Movement. Opposition party leaders, who largely boycotted the commission's activities, were summoned. Due to their failure to appear, several of them were sentenced to [prison](#). Simultaneously, [repressive legislation](#) was introduced to restrict the activities of non-governmental organizations and the media, including the "Foreign Agents Registration Act" and amendments to the [Grants Law](#); the accounts of seven organizations were [seized](#), and investigations were launched against them alleging their participation in state-sabotage.

Daily pro-European [protest rallies](#) took place throughout the entire monitoring period, with thousands of people regularly gathering in various cities. The government actively used legal instruments and force to restrict the protests. The justice system often reclassified protest actions as violent crimes, resulting in disproportionately harsh sentences, with activists, or prisoners of conscience, being [sentenced](#) to 4.5 to 5 years in prison.

The municipal elections of October 4, 2025, were held in this repressive environment. Due to mass arrests and expectations of mass fraud, major opposition parties [boycotted](#) the elections. As a result, the ruling party won more than [80%](#) of the votes cast. Parallel to the elections, a large-scale protest [rally](#) organized by Paata Burchuladze and Murtaz Zodelava took place, during which an attempt to storm the Presidential Residence occurred. Law enforcement officers dispersed the rally using water cannons, tear gas, and other equipment and arrested members of the protest's organizing committee and dozens of participants on the spot.

These ongoing events significantly strained Georgia's relations with its [Western partners](#). The European Commission noted instances of "democratic institution capture" in its November 4, 2025 report. Notably, the government assessed international appeals as interference in its sovereignty.

The regional and global context was also critical: the Russia-Ukraine war continued, and NATO and the EU were tasked with strengthening defense and financial support. In August, a long anticipated peace agreement was signed between Armenia and Azerbaijan, increasing the geostrategic importance of the South Caucasus.

Overall, the period from November 2024 to November 2025 is characterized by sustained pro-European protests, systemic legal and extrajudicial repressions, the arrest of opposition members and prisoners of conscience, tightened protest legislation, disputed elections, and strained relations with Western partners.

MAIN NARRATIVES

During the period from November 29, 2024, to November 29, 2025, discourse on Georgian-language Facebook developed in several successive waves, corresponding to events unfolding at the time. The maximum number of posts was recorded on November 29, the day after the mass protest began. This trend persisted into the first week of December, when protest activities peaked, and demonstrators on Rustaveli Avenue were dispersed with water cannons and tear gas. In the initial stage, discrediting coverage of the pro-European protest dominated, and from December, anti-Western narratives began: rally participants were presented as violent, the protest as an attempted coup d'état, and the opposition and the West as instigators of instability. During this period, the use of religious narratives was striking, such as presenting the protests as being against the church and unchristian.

In January, anti-Western narratives integrated into foreign policy discourse: Donald Trump's inauguration, EU restrictions, and criticism of USAID's activities portrayed the West as unjust while supporting opposing political groups. At the same time, the tone toward the protest changed - if direct aggression dominated before, in January narratives mocking the movement became more common. Rally participants were presented as "mentally ill" and "ridiculous." During this period, anti-Western narratives supporting the legitimizing of Eastern economic ties, with Iran and China, among others, also emerged.


In February, following the adoption of repressive legislative amendments, discourse related to the restriction of freedom of assembly occurred. The focus was again placed on discrediting pro-Western protests and criticizing the opposition and Western actors. Separately posts focusing on the slander and discrediting of former President Salome Zourabichvili and opposition politicians became apparent. They were presented as enemies of the country and as serving foreign governments.

From March to May, the focus shifted to domestic politics: compared to previous periods, discussing political parties, especially the United National Movement, and delegitimizing groups critical of the government increased in frequency. Issues related to the temporary parliamentary commission headed by Tea Tsulukiani were circulated. Additionally, radical-conservative narratives appeared in the spring months, fighting against domestic political opposition parties, the "liberal West", as well as the Georgian Dream government - for allegedly lacking true conservative values.

From summer to fall, anti-Western discourse was again seasonally linked to domestic politics and electoral processes. In the summer, the opposition was presented as fragmented, ridiculous, and an unreliable force, while the pro-Western protest was portrayed as comical and lacking public support. This period was also characterized by the strengthening of positive narratives about "Georgian Dream," presenting the government as the sole guarantor of stability, peace, and development. In the fall, ahead of the elections, the emphasis was on legitimizing the elections, the government's achievements, and criticizing political opposition. Following the October 4 protest rally, the criminalization of protests and narratives of "foreign interference" were reintroduced, accompanied by expressions of emotional support for government leaders.

Looking at the full data for the year from November 29, 2024, to November 29, 2025, content corresponding to political events is less apparent among the most frequent employed narratives. In the selected pages and groups, primary narratives concern discrediting of political opposition and protest participants (Chart 1).


Chart 1: Main narratives from November 29, 2024, to November 29, 2025, full data (Number of posts)



Openly anti-Western narratives were less present among Azerbaijani-language media, which was partly due to the nature of the sample. It was not possible to find explicitly anti-Western pages and groups targeting the Azerbaijani-speaking population of Georgia; therefore, popular news pages were selected. During the one-year monitoring of these pages, informational-regional content, Georgia-Azerbaijan relations, and coverage of the government's positions largely


dominated. Periodically, a combination of pro-European protests and anti-Western messages was recorded, especially during high-profile events. Additionally, EU criticism toward the Georgian government and the promotion of statements from Donald Trump occurred, which shared information on global politics with Azerbaijani-speaking audiences. (Chart 2).

Chart 2: Main narratives from November 29, 2024, to November 29, 2025, the Azerbaijani-language segment (Number of posts)



Among Armenian-language pages and groups, narratives promoting the government, as well as anti-Western and pro-Russian narratives, dominated. Pro-Western protests were presented as violent, illegitimate, and inspired by the West, while political opposition was portrayed as serving the interests of foreign powers. Messages focusing on Georgia’s stability, positive evaluations of economic and diplomatic relations with Eastern partners, the need to deepen relations with Russia, and criticism of the West for unfair pressure and double standards were sharply emphasized (Chart 3). Meanwhile, messaging regarding the war in Ukraine favored Russian state framing of the conflict.

Chart 3: Main narratives from November 29, 2024, to November 29, 2025, the Armenian-language segment (Number of posts)



MAIN ACTORS MENTIONED IN POSTS

According to data from the full monitoring period, the central actor in the posts across the selected Facebook pages and groups is unequivocally the Georgian government / "Georgian Dream" (Chart 4). Government representatives, especially Bidzina Ivanishvili and Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze, were mostly presented in a positive context. They were portrayed as a stable, united force focused on the country's interests, protecting stability, peace, and national sovereignty. Positive coverage was particularly high for Bidzina Ivanishvili; he was frequently referred to as "the savior of the nation", a philanthropist, and a living example of "family values". It is also noteworthy that negative coverage of Kobakhidze was almost non-existent. The positive portrayal of the government was based on emotionally charged texts and visual materials, which aimed to promote a version of the government which is responsible for protecting the country and maintaining stability.


Conversely, participants in the pro-European protests, the opposition, and Western institutions were regularly presented negatively. Protesters were often discredited using collective terms such as "Maidan supporters," "revolutionaries," or "the mob," aiming to dehumanize them and present them as a group engaged in violent, radical actions. Criticism of the protestors was not limited to alleged acts of violence, but also their appearance, gender expression, and sexuality. Opposition

parties, NGOs, and critical media were somewhat grouped together as agents of Western influence who, according to the narratives spread in the posts, instigated instability in the country. The United National Movement and Mikheil Saakashvili were presented as though synonymous with all political opposition while blaming them for the 2008 war, human rights abuses, and criminal activity. This process shows that the strategy of discretization was managed in two ways: individuals associated with political opposition were targeted, while the movement as a whole was made synonymous with actors such as Saakashvili and the United National Movement.

Former Georgian President Salome Zourabichvili was frequently the object of criticism in anti-Western narratives. Her pro-Western statements were presented as dictated by Western countries, while her participation in protests and attendance of Trump's inauguration were associated with her being a threat to the country's stability. The narratives portrayed her as a leader with a "slave's mentality" or one "seeking foreign interference." American President Donald Trump, on the contrary, was often presented positively as the main opponent of Western liberalism and a protector of national conservative values. A similarly positive narrative applied to specific decisions of his administration, such as the abrupt closure of USAID, which local pro-government sources promoted as a fundamentally important step in reducing Western influence.


The European Union, the European Parliament, and other Western institutions were presented negatively among anti-Western themes. The EU was often associated with "punitive policies," highlighting its efforts to strengthen the protest. Western ambassadors and NGOs, including the "Soros Foundation," were presented as supporters of regime-change who dictated the actions of protesters. Ukraine and President Volodymyr Zelenskyy were frequently referred to as Western puppets.

Chart 4: Main actors mentioned in posts from November 29, 2024, to November 29, 2025, full data (Number of posts)




Among Azerbaijani-language posts, the tone was relatively neutral (Chart 5). Government representatives, protesters, the opposition, and the EU were often presented in a balanced, informational style that lacked clear editorializing. A moderately positive tone toward Russia particularly stood out. Narratives about Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, who supports the Georgian government and spreads anti-Western narratives, were highlighted.

Chart 5: Main actors mentioned in posts from November 29, 2024, to November 29, 2025, Azerbaijani-language segment (Number of posts)



Among the Armenian-speaking segment, pro-Russian content was more evident. The government was presented positively, while the pro-European protests and political opposition were presented in a negative light (Chart 6). Russia and Armenia were portrayed positively, whereas the West, the US, the EU, and other global institutions were depicted as forces threatening Georgia's sovereignty. Anti-Western messages among the Armenian-speaking segment often linked Western institutions to organizing protests and attempting to open a second front in the war in Ukraine in Georgia.

Chart 6: Main actors mentioned in posts from November 29, 2024, to November 29, 2025, Armenian-language segment (Number of posts)



MAIN DISSEMINATORS (AUTHORS AND SHARERS OF POSTS)

Regarding the authors and disseminators of posts, besides involving the pages and groups selected for monitoring (whose "admins" were often the authors and/or disseminators themselves), the posts were written and shared by a diverse range of actors: informational media outlets, politicians representing the government, activists, journalists, as well as unknown individuals.

According to the monitor, the main authors and disseminators among the Georgian-language segment were the following pages/groups: "პოლიტიკოსები 1 ლარიდან" ("Politicians from 1 Lari"), "POSTV - ანალიტიკა" ("POSTV - Analytics"), "Gogaggg", "არ აგარევენებო" ("We won't let

you mess things up"), and "შიგ ევროპაში" ("In the middle of Europe"). These pages regularly spread anti-Western and pro-government narratives, often through satire and misinformation. Page "admins," such as Davit Tordia ("ლიდერი 41" [Leader 41]), Leila Tsintsadze-Melikidze ("ბიძინა ივანიშვილი და მომავალი თაობა" [Bidzina Ivanishvili and Future Generation]), and Gega Giorgi Khvedelidze ("წმიდა მამები და მათი გამონათქვამები" [Holy Fathers and Their Teachings]) not only managed the pages but were also content creators and disseminators, publishing photos and videos while emphasizing pro-government messages.

Informational media outlets ("TV Imedi", "მედია კავშირი ობიექტივი" [Media Union Obieqtivi]) and conservative groups ("ქართული იდეა" [Georgian Idea]) created content that was then passed on to pages and "admins." Regional media and pro-government groups ("ივანიშვილის მხარდამჭერები აჭარაში" [Ivanishvili's supporters in Adjara], "top-news.ge", "გაზეთი აჭარა" [Newspaper Adjara]) used a more neutral tone, though they frequently spread pro-government messages, especially regarding infrastructure projects during the pre-election period, promoting an image of stability and development under Georgian Dream's government.

Among the authors of the posts were anonymous profiles that may have been involved in a targeted informational campaign: for example, Giorgi Farava, Elena-Lena Tepnadze, Darejan Meparishvili, and Tite Natutari. Also, Georgian Dream politicians, such as Irakli Kobakhidze, Dimitri Samkharadze, Nino Latsabidze, Kakha Kaladze, Irma Inashvili, and Rima Beradze, frequently spread anti-Western narratives through their posts, which reinforced the party's positive image and facilitated the discrediting of the opposition.

Among Azerbaijani-language posts, primary actors were the Azerbaijani-language news outlets, Aktual.ge and 24news.ge, which were selected for the monitoring. They disseminated information on Georgia's internal political processes, protests, and government statements, as well as Western policies, the Georgian government's positions, relations with Azerbaijan, and global politics. Due to the language barrier regarding Georgian, these media outlets serve as a primary source of information for the Azerbaijani-speaking population in Georgia.


Among the Armenian-speaking segment, two pages were selected for monitoring: "Parvana TV" and "Javakh Diaspora of Russia". The "Parvana TV" Facebook page had 13,000 followers; most posts received a few shares, while some important posts were spread more widely. The "Javakh Diaspora of Russia" page had 1.7 thousand followers, and its posts were mostly shared in various groups by the organization's head, Aghasi Arabian, though engagement was limited (about ten

shares). These pages and groups were primarily characterized by the dissemination of pro-government messages, government legitimization, and anti-Western sentiments.

THE NATURE OF ANTI-WESTERN RHETORIC

During the monitor, attention was paid to whether the information presented in the posts was explicitly false, or if it contained subjective interpretation and misinformation. Within the framework of the research, the monitors did not conduct a full "fact-checking" investigation but observed only the information cited in the posts, the referenced sources, and, in cases of doubt, verified their accuracy against public data. As a result, it was revealed that blatantly false information was not found in the majority of the examined posts; information that did not correspond to the truth was detected in only a small percentage, about one percent (Chart 7). For example, such posts contained slanderous content such as accusations of Emmanuel Macron using cocaine and blatantly false reporting of Salome Zourabichvili being evacuated from Georgia by Western powers.

Chart 7: Is there explicitly false information in the post? (%)




In about a third of the posts, it was difficult to assess the authenticity of the information, as the content often contained elements of truth, was created as part of a conspiracy narrative, or represented a subjective interpretation of public information. During the monitoring period, attention was devoted to techniques used to amplify disinformation and editorializing. Across various pages, tactics appeared such as delivering information through half-truths, taking real footage out of context, presenting one person's opinion as fact, slander, satire and caricaturing, and manipulating videos and photos, including through the use of artificial intelligence.



Georgian pages and groups were particularly prominent in terms of emotional manipulation. Photos used in the posts often described events subjectively or represented out-of-context images, while short, video clips gave the viewer a ready-made interpretation to quickly spread misleading imagery. Examples of manipulated video included content mocking opposition leaders, humiliating coverage of actors participating in the October 4 rallies, as well as AI-generated photos and videos where real political events or actors were presented in a demeaning or comical context (photos from several such posts are included in the text). Some AI-generated photos or videos included labels noting that the content was generated with artificial intelligence. However the captions were in fine print and only in English, and thus ineffective.

Overall, during the period from November 29, 2024, to November 29, 2025, 65% of the 4,017 posts analyzed on the selected Facebook pages and groups had an accompanying photo, and 32% had a video, of which 2% of the photos and 17% of the videos were manipulative in nature. More cases of video manipulation were recorded in the summer and fall of 2025. In the posts during this period, 20% of the videos analyzed by the monitor contained video manipulation.



Azerbaijani-language posts differed from Georgian pages. Here, content lacked editorializing; mostly direct quotes from the statements of Western leaders, the EU, the US, and Azerbaijani Presidents, and Georgian government representatives were published. Blatantly false information was not detected; however, due to a lack of context, it was sometimes difficult to assess the accuracy of the information.

Among the Armenian-language page and group, the majority of posts also included texts, short and lengthy quotes, photos, and short videos. Some posts were created in Armenian, some in Russian, and occasionally posts in Georgian would also appear. Coverage of government statements was predominant here as well, often using out-of-context quotes. The proportion of

false or manipulative content was very small, less than 12%. Posts in this format allowed the audience to easily receive information, while manipulative techniques were mainly characterized by presenting one-sided events and strategically leaving out context.

However, a common feature everywhere was that the audience was provided with a ready-made interpretation, often using editorialized or subjective evaluations, slander, manipulated visuals, and artificial intelligence. This practice was most prevalent among Georgian-language posts, less common among Azerbaijani-language ones, and observed in a few instances in Armenian-language content.

CONCLUSION

The monitor revealed that among Facebook pages and groups promoting by anti-Western content, core narratives function systematically in Georgia as an instrument of political influence, aimed at strengthening pro-government attitudes and fueling mistrust toward the West and its institutions. During the observation period from November 2024 to November 2025, it became evident that internal Georgian processes, pro-Western protests, political opposition, and actors associated with the protests were mainly presented in a negative context, while the government – "Georgian Dream" – was presented positively, as the sole defender of Georgia's sovereignty and its guarantor stability. This sentiment was consistently expressed across the Georgian-language, Armenian-language, and Azerbaijani-language segments; however, a more factual, informational style often dominated the Azerbaijani-language content.

The format of anti-Western messages was diverse: in the Georgian-speaking segment, materials frequently involved editorializing, slander, and narratives meant to discredit the opposition, conveyed through short texts, clips, taking real footage out of context, and selectively using quotes. On Armenian-language pages, especially "Parvana TV," posts were mostly short texts and quotes accompanied by video materials, where the government's position was amplified, while anti-Western messages appeared in a more toned-down, factual context. Unlike "Parvana," the "Javakh Diaspora of Russia" actively used Russian propaganda and pro-government narratives, emphasizing discrediting of the West and attempting to present Russia as a necessary foreign partner. In the Azerbaijani-speaking segment, the content was largely informational, presenting quotes and official statements, within which anti-Western messages could be discerned.

Although blatantly false information was rarely detected (up to 1%) in the monitored Facebook pages and groups, a significant portion of the posts (about a third) were presented subjectively using the following techniques: one-sided context, half-truths, generalizations, subjective interpretations, satire, and manipulated video.

Thus, anti-Western propaganda in Georgia actively utilizes social media and takes into account language and context to target specific audiences when publishing content. Its primary strategy is not in producing overtly false information, rather to manipulate its presentation, to mislead the public, stoke distrust in institutions, and establish the Georgian Dream government as the only stable and reliable institution in the country.

ANNEX 1: METHODOLOGY

Within the framework of the SIDA-funded project "Countering Anti-Democratic Propaganda Through Engagement," to study anti-Western narratives on the social network Facebook, we selected a one-year period following November 28, 2024, when Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze announced the suspension of Georgia's European integration, sparking massive pro-Western protests.

To study anti-Western narratives, we selected 16 public pages/groups characterized by anti-Western and anti-EU integration rhetoric and which enjoy high popularity (having many followers/members). Out of these 16 pages/groups, 12 are Georgian-language. Two of these 12 focus specifically on the Adjara region. Furthermore, we observed 2 Armenian-language and 2 Azerbaijani-language pages/groups aimed at ethnic minorities living in Georgia and mostly consumed by them. To select these pages or groups, we used reports from organizations studying anti-Western propaganda and disinformation in Georgia, as well as CRRC-Georgia's social media study [report](#).

Additionally, we shared our initial list and received advice from organizations currently working on identifying disinformation and studying anti-Western propaganda. The selected groups/pages include platforms openly supporting "Georgian Dream," anonymous/indirectly supporting groups/pages, mainstream and alternative media outlets, including local news pages and an ultra-right-wing page.

Interestingly, the selected pages in the Azerbaijani-language segment do not feature notably anti-Western content, as we were unable to identify any. The same applies to the page selected in the Adjara region. These act more as local media outlets and do not publish overtly editorialized content.

The selection of posts on the chosen pages/groups is done using several approaches. In the case of Georgian-language pages/groups, posts from each page/group are selected mostly via simple random sampling. Additionally, the 10 most popular posts for each group/page were included in the sample.

During the monitoring period, the list of the 16 selected pages/groups changed once, and two pages were replaced by other pages with similar content, as one of them was blocked by Meta

itself, and the other stopped actively publishing posts on Facebook. Below is the list of pages/groups selected for monitoring:

#	Language	Group / page	Name of the group / page	Number of followers
1	Georgian	Page	ლიდერი 41	42,000
2	Georgian	Page	ანტი-მაიდანი ²	6,600
	Georgian	Page	არ აგარევენებთ	20,000
3	Georgian	Group	ბიძინა ივანიშვილი და მომავალი თაობა#official	20,100
4	Georgian	Page	სირცხვილის კორიდორი ³	56,000
	Georgian	Page	შიგ ევროპაში	7,500
5	Georgian	Page	Gogaggg	602,000
6	Georgian	Page	პოლიტიკოსები 1 ლარიდან	26,000
7	Georgian	Group	წმინდა მამები და მათი გამონათქვამები	36,000
8	Georgian	Page	პატრიოტული გვერდი	46,000
9	Georgian	Page	POSTV - ანალიტიკა	274,000
10	Georgian	Page	News.mcvane.ge	152,000
11	Armenian	Page	ფარვანა ტვ „ანარეკლი“	12,000
12	Armenian / Russian	Page	Джавахкская диаспора России	1,700
13	Adjara	Group	ბიძინა ივანიშვილის მხარდამჭერი ჯგუფი აჭარაში	2,000
14	Adjara	Page	გაზეთი აჭარა	5,800
15	Azerbaijani	Group	24News.ge	16,800
16	Azerbaijani	Page	Aktual.ge	34,000

As a result of the primary filtering of posts, a portion of them serve as the subject of in-depth study. Posts are considered relevant to the research if they:

- In any way voice or relate to anti-Western discourse - damage / question / negatively portray / criticize Georgia's European integration, attack actors/politicians supporting European integration, and support actors/politicians opposing European integration;
- Concern Europe, the US, the West, or their representatives;
- In any way voice pro-Russian discourse;
- Concern the pro-Western/anti-Russian protest.

From June 1 to November 28, 2025, a total of 4,017 posts were analyzed in-depth.

² After February 22, 2025, the page "Anti-Maidani" was replaced by the page "Ar Agarevinebt," as "Anti-Maidani" was blocked by Meta.

³ After February 22, 2025, the page "სირცხვილის კორიდორი" was replaced by the page "შიგ ევროპაში," as "სირცხვილის კორიდორი" ceased activity.

Limitations

This study does not claim to examine the content of all anti-Western groups/pages operating on Facebook. However, the research reveals the main picture. Facebook posts are dynamic, meaning the text of a post might be edited by the author themselves, or blocked/restricted by Meta, rendering it unavailable after a certain period.