

CRRC-Georgia

ANTI-WESTERN RHETORIC ON FACEBOOK

from June 1 to November 28, 2025

December 2025

REPORT

Anti-Western Rhetoric on Facebook

from June 1 to November 28, 2025

2025

Authors: Mariam Kobaladze, Senior Researcher

Salome Dolidze, Researcher

CRRC-Georgia

1 Liziko Kavtaradze St., Tbilisi 0179, Georgia

<https://www.crrc.ge>

crrc.georgia@crrccenters.org

This report was prepared within the project “Countering Anti-Democratic Propaganda Through Engagement” implemented by CRRC-Georgia with the support of the Swedish International Development Agency (Sida).

The views expressed in this report belong solely to the author and may not reflect the position of CRRC-Georgia or the Swedish International Development Agency (Sida).

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Figures.....	iii
Executive Summary	1
Introduction.....	2
Context	3
Main narratives.....	5
Main narratives among the Azerbaijani-speaking audience.....	10
Main narratives among the Armenian-speaking audience	12
Main actors.....	15
Actors presented in Azerbaijani-language posts	18
Actors presented in Armenian-language posts.....	19
Main disseminators (post authors and sharers)	21
Main disseminators in Azerbaijani-language posts	23
Main disseminators in Armenian-language posts.....	24
The nature of anti-Western rhetoric.....	24
Conclusion.....	28
Appendix 1: Methodology.....	30

TABLE OF FIGURES

Chart 1: Main narratives from June 1 to September 1, 2025 (Number of posts).....	7
Chart 2: Main narratives from September 1 to October 4, 2025 (Number of posts).....	8
Chart 3: Main narratives from October 4 to November 29, 2025 (Number of posts)	9
Chart 4: Main narratives from June 1 to September 1, 2025 in the Azerbaijani-speaking segment (Number of posts)	11
Chart 5: Main narratives from September 1 to November 29, 2025 in the Azerbaijani-speaking segment (Number of posts)	12
Chart 6: Main narratives from June 1 to September 1, 2025 in the Armenian-speaking segment (Number of posts)	13
Chart 7: Main narratives from September 1 to November 29, 2025 in the Armenian-speaking segment (Number of posts)	14
Chart 8: Actors presented in posts by tone of their presentation, period from June 1 to November 29, 2025 (Number of posts, full data)	16
Chart 9: Actors presented in posts by tone of their presentation, period from June 1 to November 29, 2025 (Number of posts, Georgian-language segment only, excluding Adjara)	17
Chart 10: Actors presented in posts by tone of their presentation, period from June 1 to November 29, 2025 (Number of posts, Azerbaijani-language segment).....	18
Chart 11: Actors presented in posts by tone of their presentation, period from June 1 to November 29, 2025 (Number of posts, Armenian-language segment)	20
Chart 12: Post author/disseminator, full data, June 1 – November 28, 2025 (%)	22
Chart 13: Is there explicitly false information in the post? (%).....	25

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report is part of the project "Countering Anti-Democratic Propaganda Through Engagement," funded by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), and covers the period from June 1 to November 29, 2025. This is the second report of this study. The full monitoring covers a one-year period from November 29, 2024, to November 2025. Monitoring was conducted on 16 public Facebook pages and groups targeting Georgian-, Armenian-, and Azerbaijani-speaking audiences. In total, 1,756 posts were analyzed in depth.

Anti-Western narratives were systematically disseminated and closely linked to domestic politics, including the actions of the pro-European protest movement and the discrediting of political opposition leaders and organizations. On the other hand, the narratives spread among the selected pages and groups portrayed the government as the only defender of national sovereignty, and the West as an unreliable regional player.

In Georgian-language posts, the most frequently mentioned subjects were pro-European protests and their participants, the opposition, and their supporters, who were depicted as criminals, sources of destabilization, or agents of foreign influence. The main authors and disseminators were pro-government media, pages and groups openly or indirectly supporting the government, their "admins," representatives of the ruling party, and frequently anonymous and sometimes unidentifiable individual profiles.

Explicitly false information was rare in the analyzed posts; however, subjective interpretation of facts, events, and statements, alteration or omission of context, slander, satire, and visual manipulation was frequent. A considerable portion of video content was directed against opposition leaders and aimed at altering public perception.

In Azerbaijani-language posts, anti-Western messages were primarily disseminated in an informational format as official statements. These posts placed special emphasis on Georgia-Azerbaijan relations. Posts targeting Armenian-speaking audiences mainly carried pro-government narratives; however, elements of Russian influence were also present, where the West was portrayed as a source of destabilization and Russia as the defender of sovereignty. The monitoring results indicate that the dissemination of various narratives on pages with anti-Western content

is deliberate, serves to discredit pro-European protests and opposition activism, and is closely tied to the government's political agenda.

INTRODUCTION

Within the framework of the SIDA-funded project "Countering Anti-Democratic Propaganda Through Engagement," CRRC-Georgia conducted a monitoring of the social network Facebook. The objectives of the monitoring were:

- To identify the main anti-Western narratives spread on Facebook,
- To observe who or what is most frequently discussed within these narratives,
- To determine who disseminates these narratives, and
- To identify the information manipulation techniques present in posts containing anti-Western narratives.

The monitor examined 16 Facebook pages and groups, some of which focused on the Adjara region, as well as the country's Armenian- and Azerbaijani-speaking populations.¹

The monitoring covered a one-year period from November 29, 2024, to November 29, 2025. The starting point was the Prime Minister's statement, which a large part of society perceived as the suspension of Georgia's European integration, and which was followed by a massive wave of protests.

The current report covers the period from June 1 to November 29, 2025, and is based on 1,756 in-depth analyzed posts.² Data for this period is compiled on the website dash.crrc.ge, where it is possible to analyze the dynamics of anti-Western posts, as well as data regarding key narratives, themes, and actors.

¹ For the list of pages/groups, see the detailed description of the methodology in the appendix.

² The research methodology is described in detail in the appendix.

CONTEXT

From June through November 2025, [pro-European protest rallies](#) were held daily in Georgia. This movement began after the ruling party suspended the country's EU accession process at the end of 2024. Although the number of protesters varied from time to time, thousands of Georgians regularly took to the streets in Tbilisi and other cities demanding free elections, the release of political prisoners, and a return to the country's path to EU accession. On November 28, 2025, demonstrators marked the one-year anniversary of the continuous protest, underscoring the resilience of public mobilization against the government.

From the summer of 2025 until the end of November, the government actively began utilizing legislation against the protests. With the "[Law on Agents of Foreign Influence](#)" coming into effect on June 1, 2025, the civil sector and online media faced significant challenges. During the summer, civil society organizations were required to submit information about their activities and beneficiaries. Subsequently, investigations were launched under the sabotage charges, and on August 27, the accounts of seven organizations were [seized](#).

Concurrently, the Parliament adopted [amendments](#) to the Administrative and Criminal Codes, effectively criminalizing standard forms of peaceful protest. Blocking roads, covering the face with a mask, erecting temporary structures, etc., became subject to severe sanctions, prolonged administrative imprisonment, and, for repeat offences, criminal charges and imprisonment.

Judicial and parliamentary mechanisms also became tools for fighting the political opposition. During the pre-election period, under the pretext of failing to appear before the "[Tsulukiani Parliamentary Commission](#)," opposition leaders, including Zurab Japaridze, Giorgi Vashadze, Nika Melia, Mamuka Khazaradze, Badri Japaridze, and others, were sentenced to 7 to 8 months in prison. The repressive policy also affected media representatives: in August, journalist and media manager [Mzia Amaglobeli](#) was sentenced to two years in prison for slapping a police officer, which international actors assessed as a precedent for silencing critical media and an example of political persecution.

The state also utilized its repressive apparatus against dozens of activists and demonstrators. The justice system reclassified protest as a violent crime, resulting in disproportionately harsh sentences. For example, [activists](#) Giorgi Mindadze, Saba Jikia, and Anri Kvaratskhelia were

sentenced to 4.5 to 5 years in prison; [multi-year](#) sentences were also handed down to other prisoners of conscience.

The local elections of October 4, 2025, were held in this repressive environment. Due to mass arrests and unequal electoral conditions, major opposition parties [boycotted](#) the process. As a result, the ruling party secured [80.7%](#) of the votes and completely monopolized power at the local level. Parallel to the elections, a large-scale protest [rally](#) organized by Paata Burchuladze and Murtaz Zodelava was held, during which an attempt to storm the Presidential Residence occurred. Militarized law enforcement dispersed the rally through the mobilization of riot police and use of water-cannons and tear gas, and detained organizers and dozens of participants on the spot. In December, former minister Bacho Akhalaia was also sentenced to prison on charges of attempting a coup d'état and organizing the rally.

Against the backdrop of these events, Georgia's relations with [Western partners](#) reached a critical juncture. In the November 4, 2025, enlargement report, the European Commission unequivocally noted Georgia's deviation from its European integration course and pointed to the "capture of democratic institutions." Despite calls from European structures to cease political persecution and release prisoners, the Georgian government assessed the international criticism as interference in its sovereignty and continued its isolationist policy.

Overall, the political landscape of Georgia from June to November 2025 was defined by mass pro-European protests, systemic legal and extra-legal repressions, the imprisonment of opposition leaders and prisoners of conscience, restrictive protest legislation, disputed elections, and growing tensions with European institutions, all of which created an environment of prolonged political instability and democratic backsliding in the country.

Regarding the international situation, the period from June to November 2025 was defined by several , interconnected events: The Russia-Ukraine war dragged on without decisive changes. Although there were attempts to reach a peace agreement, including a meeting between the Presidents of Russia and the US in [Alaska](#), an agreement was not reached. Towards the end of the year, the US and the EU, alongside [sanctions and military aid](#), supported a [renewal](#) of peace negotiations.

In June, the [NATO summit](#) in The Hague instructed allies to increase defense spending and undertake long-term security planning. Furthermore, the [EU](#) deepened defense coordination, expanded measures directed against Russia, and developed a long-term economic support plan for

Ukraine. From October-November, the US government [shutdown](#) complicated any focus on foreign policy issues. Concurrently, tensions in the [Middle East](#) sharply escalated after Israel launched an attack on Iran, which was followed by Iran's retaliatory action.

Additionally, in August 2025, a [peace agreement](#) was signed between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which was considered as a historic step toward normalizing relations after years of conflict. The agreement also includes the restoration of regional communications, including the opening of the Zangezur transport corridor, which will connect Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan through the territory of Armenia. This decision significantly alters the regional transport and trade architecture and increases the geostrategic importance of the South Caucasus.

Overall, this period on the international arena was characterized not by conflict resolution, but by simultaneous crises, intensive diplomacy, and laying the groundwork for prolonged global instability.

The structure of the report is as follows: It presents the main findings of the monitor, focusing on key narratives, the actors most frequently discussed in the posts, the primary disseminators of anti-Western rhetoric, and the techniques these pages/groups use when disseminating information. Results for the Armenian-speaking and Azerbaijani-speaking segments are highlighted separately in each chapter. A detailed review of the research methodology is described in the appendix.

The current report covers the period from June to November 29, 2025. Due to the specifics of the narratives and communication, the summer months are highlighted separately, as this was when the trials of prisoners of conscience, the arrest of opposition politicians, and the enforcement of stricter legislation regarding freedom of expression intensified; as are the autumn months: the pre-election period, election day, the October 4 rally, and the remaining period until the end of November.

MAIN NARRATIVES

The monitor results reveal that during the summer and autumn of 2025, anti-Western and pro-government discourse on Facebook was strictly tailored to domestic politics and the electoral calendar. In the summer, discrediting the opposition dominated. In the pages and groups selected for monitoring,

the opposition was portrayed as a divided, ridiculous, and ineffective force, while the pro-Western protests were depicted as a laughable movement left without any public support. Concurrently, messages about the stability and inevitable victory of Georgian Dream were spread with moderate intensity. In autumn, ahead of the elections, the focus shifted to strengthening the government's legitimacy, highlighting socio-economic achievements, and emphasizing its framing as the only power in Georgia able to assure peace and neutrality. Following the October 4 protest rally, narratives criminalizing the protests and alleging the interference of "outside forces" were reintroduced.

In the ethnic minority segments, the discourse developed in different formats but with similar content-related goals: in the Azerbaijani-speaking audience, more space was given to informational content and material focused on regional cooperation, although, during crisis moments, the discrediting of protests was utilized here as well; in the Armenian-speaking space, the systematic dissemination of government legitimacy, anti-Western, and partially pro-Russian narratives was clearly evident. Overall, the discourse served to delegitimize the opposition, deepen distrust toward the West, and position the government as the only guarantor of stability, peace, and sovereignty.

Monitoring data shows that the main narratives change seasonally and are closely tied to the electoral calendar and domestic politics. The difference between the summer and autumn periods is particularly evident, both thematically and in terms of tone and the communication strategies employed.

During the summer period of 2025, when new laws and legislative amendments had already come into effect, the trials of prisoners of conscience were actively underway, and verdicts for many, including opposition leaders, were announced, the most pressing topics on the Facebook pages and groups selected for the study were domestic politics and political opposition parties. The concentration on the country's domestic politics pushed significant global events – such as the war in Ukraine or the conflict between Israel and Iran – into the background.


The dominance of the domestic politics is demonstrated by the most frequent narrative, claiming that the opposition is ridiculous and inadequate (97 posts). Another narrative related to the opposition, which, according to the complete data, was among the seven most widespread narratives during the summer period, claimed that the opposition is divided and opposition representatives oppose one another (26 posts). The emphasis on domestic politics during the summer period also clearly illustrates avoidance of addressing global events in pro-government messaging. Events, including the war in Ukraine and other international conflicts, were pushed to

the background. The main focus was placed on the opposition's internal conflicts and the belittling of opposition media or experts.

The second most frequent theme, which remained consistently relevant throughout monitoring, was the pro-Western protest. In the summer, the selected pages and groups actively tried to spread the idea that the protest lacked broad public support (33 posts), that rally participants were weak/ridiculous (30 posts), and that the protest participants/opposition were violent, criminals, and should be punished (24 posts) (Chart 1).

However, notably while in the initial months of the ongoing protests, the Facebook pages and groups selected for monitoring emphasized the violent nature of the protest, portraying participants as criminals and conflating the protesters with the opposition, during the summer months, the narratives depicted them not as a political threat, but as a ridiculous, fragmented, and ineffective force. They were also portrayed as weak, comical actors left without public support, frequently insulted with terms such as: "unpatriotic" (უსამშობლო), "incompetent" (უწიათო), "pathetic/losers" (ფარჩაკი), "Akatsukis" (anime reference used derogatorily), and "immature" (ჩამოუყალიბებლები).

Chart 1: Main narratives from June 1 to September 1, 2025 (Number of posts)




Interestingly, parallel to portraying the opposition and protest participants in a negative light, the monitored Facebook pages and groups promoted positive attitudes toward the government, albeit with relatively less intensity. Among the seven most frequent narratives was the opinion that

Georgian Dream would win the local municipal elections. In this context, it was argued that Georgian Dream is supported by a large portion of the population and has no real competitors in the elections. Furthermore, it was asserted that Georgian Dream is the only guarantor of peace and stability in the country.

During the autumn period, narratives explicitly concentrated on the elections and solidifying the government's legitimacy. During this period (September 1 - October 3), the most frequent narrative again emphasized the comical and inadequate nature of the opposition (Chart 2). However, narratives supporting Georgian Dream were brought to the forefront: “Georgian Dream cares about the development of the education sector and infrastructure, it will win the elections, and the majority of the Georgian people support them.” During the pre-election period, the leading message became that Georgian Dream is a sovereign, stable force and a guarantor of peace that avoided war and regained public support.

Chart 2: Main narratives from September 1 to October 4, 2025 (Number of posts)




It is noteworthy that in the Adjara region segment – as we could not find a page/group specifically spreading anti-Western narratives – the group "Bidzina Ivanishvili's Support Group in Adjara" and the page "Newspaper Adjara" were selected. Their pre-election narratives (September 1 - October 3) were dedicated to praising the Georgian Dream government and were less concentrated on events taking place in the capital. The seven most frequent narratives in this segment were:

- Georgian Dream cares about the development of the education sector.

- Georgian Dream cares about the development of infrastructure.
- Georgian Dream supports the development of sports/culture representatives.
- The Georgian government pursues a policy of peace.
- The CEC ensures the transparency and accessibility of the elections.
- The government cares about the development of the regions.
- During natural disasters, the government does its utmost to help the population.

Parallel to the elections on October 4 – during which leaders of major opposition parties were in prison and which a portion of the opposition and voters boycotted – a large-scale protest rally was held. During the rally, some protesters attempted to storm the Presidential Palace. In connection to this, during the month of October, the Facebook groups and pages selected for monitoring reactivated narratives claiming that the protest is not peaceful (Chart 3). They claimed that the protesters and the opposition are violent criminals who want to overthrow the government by violent means and stage a “Maidan-style” revolution. Additionally, discussions that foreign forces and the West were behind the events again were brought to the forefront.

Chart 3: Main narratives from October 4 to November 29, 2025 (Number of posts)



Discrediting of the opposition continued, another significant message of which was the narrative that the arrests of opposition leaders were not political persecution, but rather the opposition's own deliberate strategy aimed at increasing Western pressure on the government. This narrative

shifted the responsibility entirely onto the opposition while simultaneously justifying or portraying the state's use of force neutrally.

The opposition and critical groups were depicted as executors of Western demands. While former of President Zourabichvili served the the former US Ambassador's interests, the accusation that international observers had revolutionary intentions, and the labeling of government criticism as a desire to join the war served to create the image of a fifth column. Under this logic, any internal dissatisfaction was transformed into a foreign-inspired attack on sovereignty, while the fight against opponents was framed as defending the homeland.

After the October 4 elections, the message that the vast majority of the public supports the government intensified (26 posts), accompanied by emotional, personalized posts expressing support for government leaders and their family members. At the same time, the opposition was presented as a defeated, uncoordinated force evading responsibility.

During the monitoring period, a clear marginalization of global issues, including the Ukraine war and conflicts in the Middle East, was observed. These topics rarely appeared and were primarily presented in cynically. An exception was the criticism of Western diplomats, particularly posts directed against the German Ambassador, which contained accusations of ties to the opposition and interfering in Georgia's domestic affairs.


MAIN NARRATIVES AMONG THE AZERBAIJANI-SPEAKING AUDIENCE

When studying anti-Western narratives on Facebook, the segment of Georgia's Azerbaijani-speaking population was separated. However, upon selecting the pages and groups to observe, one peculiarity emerged: we could not find a public Facebook group and/or page in Azerbaijani that prominently featured openly anti-Western posts. Consequently, we selected one page and one group that were popular among the Azerbaijani-speaking population. Both are news-oriented and lack editorialized messaging; therefore, in this segment, the content of the posts, the narratives, and the style of both texts and visual materials differed significantly.

During the summer and autumn of 2025, the selected media's Facebook page/group covered the arrests of opposition leaders, trials, elections, and protests as significant current events. This page/group typically conveyed the positions of the individuals involved in the news and avoided making assessments.

During the summer period, the most frequent narratives in the Azerbaijani-speaking segment included purely informational narratives, for example, that an opposition leader was arrested, or that the opposition and protesters do not recognize the 2024 election results. They also included pro-government narratives (that Georgian Dream would win the municipal elections), anti-Western narratives (that the EU and the West are blackmailing the Georgian government), and pro-Western narratives (that the EU supports the Georgian people in their fight for a European future) (Chart 4).

Chart 4: Main narratives from June 1 to September 1, 2025 in the Azerbaijani-speaking segment (Number of posts)



The EU's attitude toward Georgia and its visa-free regime was one of the central narratives, and the highest number of posts was dedicated precisely to the threat of losing the visa-free regime.

During the autumn season, especially after October 4, the most frequent narrative in the Azerbaijani-speaking segment returned to discrediting the protests: the protesters/opposition are violent and criminals, and the protest is not peaceful (Chart 5). When covering these issues, the posts reflected the government's rhetoric, according to which the protests and the opposition were presented as sources of destabilization.

Chart 5: Main narratives from September 1 to November 29, 2025 in the Azerbaijani-speaking segment (Number of posts)



The selected page and group positively covered Georgia-Azerbaijan and Georgia-Turkey relations, which was presented as an example of strengthening regional ties and stable development. This narrative is particularly important for the Azerbaijani-speaking audience, as these countries are perceived by them as culturally and socio-economically close actors.


MAIN NARRATIVES AMONG THE ARMENIAN-SPEAKING AUDIENCE

Regarding the segment of Georgia's Armenian-speaking population, two pages were under observation: "Parvana TV" and "Javakh Diaspora in Russia." Parvana TV is a television station funded by the Ninotsminda municipality, which actively disseminates the ruling party's propaganda messages. Javakhk Diaspora in Russia has been promoting Russian propaganda for many years and openly spreads anti-Western messages. These two pages disseminated pro-government, pro-Russian, and anti-Western narratives that aligned with each other, though they differed in intensity and messaging. The content of both pages served to legitimize the ruling party's policies, deepen distrust toward the West, and normalize an alternative foreign policy course.

During the summer of 2025, the themes of the posts aimed at Armenian-speaking audiences differed somewhat from those of the Georgian and Azerbaijani-speaking audiences. The topics of the posts primarily concerned Georgia's domestic politics and political parties, the war in Ukraine, and Georgia's relations with Armenia. The main narratives also differed from other segments. The

most frequently disseminated narrative stated that cooperation between Georgia and Armenia should deepen, and that ongoing personnel changes in the government were not related to international pressure and that, despite everything, the country's economy was improving (Chart 6).

Chart 6: Main narratives from June 1 to September 1, 2025 in the Armenian-speaking segment (Number of posts)



Overall, several key narratives were developed in the selected Facebook page and group: on the one hand, strengthening the government's legitimacy and emphasizing stability and economic development, which included posting about issues such as regional and infrastructural projects, sports infrastructure development, and agricultural support. This content created a sense that the "Georgian Dream" government cares about both regional and rural development issues and implements a long-term socio-economic policy. A clear narrative emerged portraying the current government as the defender of national interests and the main guarantor of peace. For instance, Parvana TV's content highlighted: the participation of government officials in celebrating national holidays; the unveiling of a monument to King Erekle II as a symbol of patriotism and national identity; and the maintenance of a peace policy despite "external pressure".


The August 2008 war was unequivocally attributed to the previous government and Western influence, while restoring territorial integrity under Georgian Dream was presented as possible only through peaceful means. Parvana TV's page actively shared posts claiming that Georgian Dream had stepped up its fight against crime and corruption, including within its own ranks. Special

attention was given to investigative actions conducted against former high-ranking officials, which were presented as proof of anti-corruption policies.

The local municipal elections occupied significant space. Discussions revolved around claims that a Georgian Dream victory was inevitable, that the opposition was divided and inconsistent, and that the opposition and their supporting Western actors did not respect democratic institutions. Parvana TV's posts created the impression that there was a normal pre-election environment in Georgia, and that the request for OSCE/ODIHR observation was unfounded. In parallel, pro-European protests were portrayed as violent, law-breaking, extremist, and encouraged by Western diplomats.

During the pre-election period (September 1 to October 4), the narrative that protesters and the opposition are violent and criminals also appeared on these pages. However, narratives more aligned with a pro-government campaign were also disseminated: that Georgian Dream is fighting crime (including within its own ranks) and drug dealers, and that the government is taking care of regional and infrastructural development. These narratives partially continued after October 4. However, discussions also emerged claiming that the protest is not peaceful and that the opposition and protesters want to overthrow the government through violent means (Chart 7).

Chart 7: Main narratives from September 1 to November 29, 2025 in the Armenian-speaking segment (Number of posts)



MAIN ACTORS


An analysis of the monitoring during the summer and autumn periods shows that the central actor in the discourse is the Georgian government/Georgian Dream, which not only leads in frequency of mentions but is also mostly presented in a positive context, as the only guarantor of stability, peace, and national interests. Bidzina Ivanishvili's personalized and emotionally amplified positive image is particularly clear. Furthermore, negative coverage of Prime Minister Kobakhidze is practically non-existent. In contrast, the opposition, participants in pro-European protests, and the West are regularly portrayed as incompetent, divided, violent, and connected to "outside forces."

In the Georgian-language segment, this polarization is particularly sharp, and the share of a negative tone almost entirely covers opposition and pro-Western actors, whereas in the Azerbaijani-language space, a neutral, informational style dominates. In the Armenian-language segment, the discourse additionally contains a pro-Russian slant – Russia and Armenia are often presented positively, while the West, the EU, and the US (including through the influence of the "Deep State") are named as forces threatening Georgia's sovereignty and stability. Overall, the distribution of actors and their framing creates a clear narrative hierarchy aimed at strengthening the government's legitimacy and discrediting the opposition and the West.

Looking at the complete data and the entire summer and autumn periods, one primary actor emerges: the Georgian government/Georgian Dream, which is the clear leader in terms of coverage frequency. They were discussed in 417 posts in the pages and groups selected for monitoring and were mostly presented positively. In a quarter of the posts, we also encountered a share of negative representation, which, again, was mostly the result of covering pro-European protests or Western criticism of the Georgian government on relatively neutral, news-type pages (Chart 8). Posts with positive content about the government were supported by emotionally strong visuals and texts. The government was presented as a united, prioritizing the country's interests, "the only government during whose rule there has been no war."

In addition to discussions about the government itself and Georgian Dream, Prime Minister Kobakhidze and Bidzina Ivanishvili were frequently mentioned actors specifically. In Kobakhidze's case, no negative coverage was recorded, and in Bidzina Ivanishvili's case, the share of positive representation was the highest (74 out of 110 posts, or 67%). Bidzina Ivanishvili was often mentioned as the savior of the nation, a philanthropist, and a promoter of family values.

Chart 8: Actors presented in posts by tone of their presentation, period from June 1 to November 29, 2025 (Number of posts, full data)




Among the remaining top actors are: participants of pro-European protests, the opposition, the EU / Europe, and the United National Movement (UNM). In their cases, negative messaging prevails, and, aside from the EU, the share of positive coverage is almost entirely absent. Protesters were presented differently at various stages of monitoring. In the summer, they were covered more as comical, weak figures left without support, unlike previous periods when they were depicted as criminals and violent. After October 4, the image of protesters as violent and criminal returned to some extent. The following phrases were used to describe them: slaves of the West/EU, “მანქურთები” (mindless slaves), “აკაცუკები” or “ოლე-ოლა აკაცუკები”, a mob of witches, radicals, abusers, unpatriotic people, faithless, those without love, pitiful and zombified children, crazy, and abnormal. There was also frequently a suggestion that the rally participants were members of the LGBT community or held liberal attitudes in this regard.

Interestingly, if we look only at the Georgian-language segment and exclude the Adjara page and group (which, like the Azerbaijani-language page, is a news page and conveys information without editorializing), the list of the most frequently presented actors changes, and participants of pro-European protests move to first place, with the vast majority of coverage (98% of posts) being negative (Chart 9). The same applies to other actors: the UNM, the opposition in general, former President Mikheil Saakashvili, and the EU/Europe. In the case of the EU/Europe, the share of

positive and neutral coverage slightly exceeded one-fifth of the posts. The representation of specific or general opposition members was negative in almost all posts (95% or more).

The opposition was primarily presented not as a structured political force, but as specific individual figures who were the subjects of negative posts and slander. The targets of slander were particularly frequent: the "Lelo" and "Gakharia for Georgia" parties, and their members such as Aleko Elisashvili as well as representatives of the "street opposition." Opposition actors were often characterized as unprincipled, mutually exclusive, and antagonistic individuals or forces. To characterize them, both the use of old statements and quotes taken out of context were used to demonstrate evasion of responsibility or a change in policy positions.

Chart 9: Actors presented in posts by tone of their presentation, period from June 1 to November 29, 2025 (Number of posts, Georgian-language segment only, excluding Adjara)



Among the top seven most frequently mentioned actors, the Georgian Dream government and Bidzina Ivanishvili were presented positively. This difference highlights the aim of these pages/groups to criticize and negatively portray the pro-Western protest, the opposition, and the West itself.

Although they did not make it onto the list of the most frequently mentioned actors, religious figures and groups associated with them played a significant role in spreading anti-opposition and anti-government narratives in the pages and groups selected for monitoring, especially those targeting Georgian-speaking audiences. The group "Holy Fathers" (Tsminda Mamebi) frequently

criticized the government for false patriotism and corruption, which created space for an ultra-conservative alternative discourse.


Father Dorote Kurashvili, who openly supports the ongoing protests, appeared in the monitor as an object of frequent criticism. He was referred to with the following phrases: Priest of the Akatsukis, Mishist [Supporter of President Mikheil Saakashvili, often called Misha] Priest, impostor (samazvanetsi), servant of the devil, and heretic. LGBT themes were used against him as a tool for slander. In parallel, the same theme was used by ultra-conservative forces against Georgian Dream itself, demonstrating that value-related issues were utilized by various actors.

International actors were mostly mentioned in a general sense, as countries or their governments; coverage of specific actors was rare. An exception in this regard was the German Ambassador Peter Fischer, who was presented as being connected to the opposition and a symbol of interference in the country's domestic affairs. The West, in general, was mentioned as a covert supporter of protests and political destabilization, especially in the context of October 4.

ACTORS PRESENTED IN AZERBAIJANI-LANGUAGE POSTS

The list of actors presented in Azerbaijani-language posts was somewhat similar; however, unlike Georgian-language posts, more representatives of the Georgian Dream government made it into the top seven most frequently mentioned actors, such as Parliament Speaker Shalva Papuashvili and Tbilisi Mayor Kakha Kaladze (Chart 10).

Chart 10: Actors presented in posts by tone of their presentation, period from June 1 to November 29, 2025 (Number of posts, Azerbaijani-language segment)



When mentioning specific actors, a neutral tone prevailed regarding both government officials and opposition groups, protest participants, and the EU. This, again, is at least partially explained by the fact that the Azerbaijani-language page and group under observation belong to news outlets rather than editorialized content creators and, compared to more sharply anti-Western pages and groups..


ACTORS PRESENTED IN ARMENIAN-LANGUAGE POSTS

The list of most frequently presented actors in Armenian-language posts mostly matched the Georgian- and Azerbaijani-language posts. However, unlike the Georgian-language posts, we found Russia as the second most frequently mentioned actor, which notably was positively presented in over half of the posts (Chart 11). Also, among the frequently mentioned actors, unlike other groups, was Armenia – also mostly presented positively – and US President Donald Trump.

Particularly in content from the Javakhk Diaspora in Russia group, Russia was presented as a constructive and peace-oriented actor ready for peace negotiations with Ukraine and supported by other global players, while Ukraine and its Western partners are disconnected from reality.

In other respects, the trend was similar. The most discussed topic in the Armenian-language page and group was also the government. The tone of coverage was positive for the vast majority of posts. However, the role of the government differed. In Parvana TV's content, the government was presented as an active, effective, and protagonist fighting Western pressure and internal destabilization attempts. In the case of the Javakhk Diaspora in Russia group, the government appeared more as a legitimate actor and was mentioned as defending the country's sovereignty from Western interference.

Chart 11: Actors presented in posts by tone of their presentation, period from June 1 to November 29, 2025 (Number of posts, Armenian-language segment)



Among the most frequently mentioned actors on the Armenian-language group and page were also participants of pro-European protests, the opposition, and the West, who were presented negatively in the vast majority of posts.

The primary target actors of anti-Western posts were: the EU, the European Parliament, and the United States. The EU was presented as an entity that does not respect Georgia's sovereignty, blackmails the government, and attempts to influence the country's domestic politics by suspending visa-free travel. The EU and the European Parliament were often mentioned as biased and "anti-Georgian" institutions promoting unrest, radicalization, and protests in the country.

The US was presented in a dual role: on the one hand, government rhetoric emphasized the desire to restore strategic partnership, while on the other hand, anti-Western narratives argued that Washington treats Georgia unfairly, does not support its territorial integrity, and that real decisions are hindered by the "Deep State." Within the framework of anti-Western narratives, Western ambassadors and NGOs emerged as significant target actors. According to statements by government officials and media messages, ambassadors were violating the Vienna Convention, supporting opponents of the government, and fostering hatred and strife.

Non-governmental organizations, including Western foundations (for example, the Soros Foundation), were presented as funders of anti-state activities who encourage protesters to engage in disobedience and violence.

Ukraine and its President Zelenskyy were often referred to as puppets of the West. Posts related to them argued that Ukraine is a tool of the West, whose goal is to expand the conflict in the region and drag Georgia into the war.

In the case of the Armenian-language page and group, we particularly encounter the "Global War Party" / "Deep State" conspiracies which, according to the messaging, unite Western institutions and individual countries against Georgia. This actor was presented as the entity responsible for attempts to drag Georgia into the war and plans to open a "second front" in the country. In this context, the role of the Baltic states was particularly highlighted, presented as one of the active driving forces of the "Global War Party" and "Deep State".


MAIN DISSEMINATORS (POST AUTHORS AND SHARERS)

Monitoring data shows that the authors and disseminators of the posts are diverse, including news media outlets, specific Facebook pages and groups, pro-government and opposition actors, as well as unknown individuals. In the Georgian-language segment, openly or covertly pro-government pages and "admins" were notably active, creating, disseminating, and emotionally amplifying anti-Western and pro-government narratives; news media and regional groups often operated in synergy. In Azerbaijani-language posts, news media outlets emerged as the main sources, disseminating information. In the Armenian-language segment, the selected page and group spread posts emphasizing government legitimacy, pro-government messages, and anti-Western sentiments.

Regarding the authors and disseminators of posts, they include the pages and groups selected for monitoring, which are often the disseminators of information themselves or through anonymous "admins"; however, they frequently reuse materials from various media outlets. For the sake of sample diversity, some pages/groups represented openly pro-government platforms, some were covert supporters, some were "mainstream" or "non-mainstream" media outlets, and some were representatives of ultra-conservative groups. Therefore, the categories provided below were to some extent predefined in the selection itself.

During the summer and autumn period of 2025, from June 1 to November 29, the author or disseminator of the analyzed posts was most often: a news media outlet (in 48% of posts), another Facebook page (27%), and an anonymous individual (18%) (Chart 12).

Chart 12: Post author/disseminator, full data, June 1 – November 28, 2025 (%)



In the case of Georgian-language pages and groups, both authors and post sharers are often anti-Western Facebook pages themselves. For example: "პოლიტიკოსები 1 ლარიდან" (Politicians from 1 Lari), "შიგ ევროპაში" (Right into Europe), "POSTV - ანალიტიკა," "არ აგარევენებთ" (We Won't Let You Mess Things Up), "Gogaggg." These pages regularly disseminate anti-Western and pro-government narratives.

Page administrators, or "admins," play a significant role in anti-Western messaging. Several active admins in this regard are: Davit Tordia ("ლიდერი 41"), Leila Tsinadze-Melikidze ("ბიძინა ივანიშვილი და მომავალი თაობა" - Bidzina Ivanishvili and the Future Generation), and Gega Giorgi Khvedelidze ("წმიდა მამები და მათი გამონათქვამები" - Holy Fathers and Their Sayings). Admins often create and disseminate posts, publish photos and videos, amplify the emotional effect, and share pro-government narratives.

In the monitored pages and groups, the creators or disseminators of posts are frequently news agencies: "TV Imedi," "Media Kavshiri Obieqtivi," as well as conservative movements like "Kartuli Idea" (Georgian Idea). They spread anti-Western information, develop conservative narratives, and create content which is then shared by pages and "admins."

Regional media and government support groups represent an important group of actors, disseminating pro-government messages under conditions of lower aggression and formally neutral tone. Their main focus is on infrastructural projects—the rehabilitation of roads, water systems, bridges, and schools. Examples include "ივანიშვილის მხარდამჭერები აჭარაში" (Ivanishvili's Supporters in Adjara), "top-news.ge," and "გაზეთი აჭარა" (Newspaper Adjara). Although such posts are often presented without editorializing, however, they systematically highlight the involvement of local government and central government representatives. Daily messaging creates an image of a working, legitimate, and effective government and functions as indirect political propaganda. Posts offering emotional support to Bidzina Ivanishvili and his family are also common in these networks, emerging as a consistent feature of these groups.

The creators or sharers of posts are often anonymous who may appear as regular Facebook users or do not reveal their identity at all. According, we sometimes encounter profiles that raise suspicions of having a vested interest in sharing specific messaging, or act as "trolls." One such user during the monitoring period was "[Giorgi Farava](#)", whose real identity is unknown. He has no personal photo or information. The profile uses photos of Bidzina Ivanishvili and government members and shares pro-government narratives. Such profiles may be used to manipulate information spaces or to amplify the dissemination of a specific narrative.

Representatives of the ruling party also appear as authors of posts, whose content is frequently shared by pages with anti-Western messaging. Such politicians include, for example: Irakli Kobakhidze, Dimitri Samkharadze, Nino Latsabidze, Kakha Kaladze, Irma Inashvili, Rima Beradze. Their activities, statements, or messaging are widely disseminated on Facebook, which strengthens the ruling party's image and helps discredit the opposition.

MAIN DISSEMINATORS IN AZERBAIJANI-LANGUAGE POSTS

In the case of Azerbaijani-language posts, the selected news page and group, and Azerbaijani-language media outlets (Aktual.ge, 24news.ge) are the primary disseminators. They primarily share information on ongoing political processes in Georgia: protest rallies and statements by the government and opposition. They also cover Western positions regarding Georgia; the Georgian government's positions; relations with Azerbaijan, and global politics. These media outlets are the main source of information for the Azerbaijani-speaking population, in which many face a Georgian language barrier, and it is through these sources that they familiarize themselves with Georgia's

domestic and foreign policy. Their goal is to provide information to the Azerbaijani-speaking audience.

MAIN DISSEMINATORS IN ARMENIAN-LANGUAGE POSTS

Two pages were selected to analyze Armenian-language posts: "Parvana TV" and "Javakh Diaspora in Russia." "Parvana TV" publishes posts on a Facebook page opened under the name of its news program "Anarekli" (Reflection), which has 13 thousand followers. The majority of posts have one or two shares, with a few posts having more depending on the importance of the issue. The Facebook page of the non-governmental organization "Javakh Diaspora in Russia" has 1.7 thousand followers. The majority of its posts have no reactions and about up to ten shares, frequently distributed by the head of the organization, Aghasi Arabian, in various Facebook groups.

THE NATURE OF ANTI-WESTERN RHETORIC


During the monitoring period, explicitly false information was not recorded in the majority of the posts; however, a significant portion – approximately one-third – contained manipulative or editorialized content, particularly directed against the opposition, participants of pro-European protests, and opposition media. Manipulation carried out through photos and videos exaggerated their messaging, while some were generated using artificial intelligence (AI). The specifics varied by language: manipulation was more frequent in Georgian-language groups, whereas in Azerbaijani-language posts, the content lacked editorializing and was primarily fact-based. In Armenian-language posts as well, the share of false or manipulative content was minimal.

Alongside the collection of other data, when analyzing the posts, attention was paid to whether the post presented explicitly false information. This refers to information that does not require investigation similar to that of "fact-checkers." When making this assessment, monitors observed only the information conveyed in the post and the cited source of information, and, if available, verified the accuracy of the information in public sources.

In the case of all pages/groups, no false information was found in the majority (67%) of the analyzed posts. Such instances were recorded in only 1% of the posts (14 posts) – where the post entirely or partially did not correspond to the truth (Chart 13). Most of these posts already had a

tag from Facebook indicating that the information had been verified by a third party or that the post presented unreliable information. However, in several cases, there was no such indication. During the given monitoring period, in the summer and autumn of 2025, examples included AI-generated photos or videos; for instance, a [video](#) depicting a meeting between Putin and Trump in one frame and Ukrainian President Zelenskyy crying in another. Or a [photo](#) where a rally participant had stepped on a Georgian flag and held a Molotov cocktail, while a police officer tried to pick up the flag. Other examples included a [post](#) claiming that Bidzina Ivanishvili had expelled US ambassadors from Georgia, or that the Americans had [evacuated](#) President Zourabichvili.

Chart 13: Is there explicitly false information in the post? (%)



However, in about a third of the posts, the monitors were uncertain whether the post contained false information and found it difficult to make an assessment. In such cases, the post might have contained elements of truth, or even a truth subject to heavy editorializing. During the summer and autumn of 2025, posts utilized techniques such as altering the context or presenting information out of context, sharing subjective opinions as though they are facts, and frequent use of insults and slander – for example, "Natsi" (UNM supporter), "traitor," "unpatriotic," "LGBT pack." Photo and video manipulation was also frequent, which had a particularly strong emotional impact on users and were mostly directed against three actors or groups of actors: the [opposition](#), protest participants, and opposition media journalists; they relatively rarely targeted [foreign](#) actors.

Looking at the percentages, in the complete data, among the posts that had photos (which were 68% of the posts), the share of photo manipulation was only 3%. Regarding videos, generally, 30% of the posts contained a video, and about a fifth of them (21%) contained video manipulation.

During the given monitoring period, in terms of video manipulation, we encountered comical or ironic presentations of real video footage with added sound effects, music, or dialogues from movies or other media. Interestingly, the page "["შოკ ევროპაში"](#)", which was deleted in the monitoring period and can no longer be found, demonstrated manipulated video specifically directed against opposition leaders. However, another such page, "["არ აგარევიებთ"](#)" (We Won't Let You Mess Things Up), is still active and frequently shares [manipulated videos](#) of organizers of the October 4 rally; mocks young politicians (e.g., [Levan Sanikidze](#)); [candidates](#) of opposition parties participating in the October 4 elections; and [journalists](#) of [opposition-supporting](#) channels. On other pages, we also encounter the [mocking](#) of pro-European rally participants and their portrayal as [abnormal](#).

In the realm of video manipulation, AI-generated photos or videos deserve special mention. They serve the same purposes: mocking, belittling, or discrediting various internal or external political actors. For example, a [video](#) where, against the backdrop of an Imedi TV post headline stating "Gedevan Popkhadze joined Elene Khoshtaria and started a hunger strike," they are shown eating khachapuri. Or a video showing Salome Zourabichvili [feeding](#) the hunger strikers. In this case, the video has a label indicating it was created with AI. However, this label is small and in English; not all users can read or understand it, and the video creates a negative impression of these opposition politicians. Such labels were not always present on AI-generated videos. For instance, a video post where [Zelensky](#) is crying next to Joe Biden while Putin and Trump meet.

Posts containing both explicitly false information and non-false but manipulative content or subjective opinions presented as facts were more frequently found in Georgian-language groups and pages. In posts aimed at the Armenian-speaking population, the share of false or manipulative posts was the smallest and did not exceed 12%. In Azerbaijani-language posts, no explicitly false information was found; however, there were posts where, due to the incomplete presentation of information, it was sometimes difficult to assess its accuracy. To some extent, this stems from the sample, as the selected Azerbaijani-language group and page represent news outlets that lacked editorializing. Conversely, the Georgian and Armenian-language groups and pages were selected precisely because they share anti-Western content.

In the case of Azerbaijani-language Facebook pages, posts used an informational style, conveying facts and often using direct quotes. They published statements from Western leaders, the EU, the Presidents of the US and Azerbaijan, and the Georgian government without commentary. Statements with anti-Western content were mostly presented without verifying sources. Alongside other topics, posts touched upon conspiracy theories, the "Deep State," and its influence on the actions of powerful countries and leaders. Such statements aimed to increase distrust toward the West and form the opinion that only the Georgian Dream government protects Georgia's sovereignty.

Regarding the selected Facebook page and group aimed at the Armenian-speaking population, in the case of Parvana TV, posts were formatted in two ways. The main part consisted of texts, short and extensive quotes, almost all of which concerned statements by government officials, and their photos were used in the posts. The page also published short video materials prepared in Armenian—for example, about visits and meetings of government officials—which were also accompanied by text. Some posts were created in Russian, and some in Armenian. The majority of the posts represented the position of government officials, and in many cases, their goal was to present events differently and cover the position of only one side, providing the audience with an incomplete picture.

In the group Javakh Diaspora in Russia, the majority of posts were published with texts and photos. The posts were primarily created in Russian; however, sometimes certain statements were also disseminated in Armenian and Georgian. The group also shared materials from various Russian news agencies discussing events developing in Georgia, the Caucasus, and relations with the West and Russia. The page also actively used openly anti-Western posts by government officials. Although no false information was recorded in this group, and there were few instances where the monitor found it difficult to make an assessment in this regard, there were posts that shared information without evidence, quoted out of context, or selectively presented information..

CONCLUSION

Based on the monitoring and data analysis of the selected Facebook pages and groups from June to the end of November 2025, it became apparent that anti-Western narratives systematically served as an instrument of political influence. The most frequent subject of coverage was the Georgian government/Georgian Dream, whose positive image was bolstered by emotionally loaded visual materials and texts, while the pro-European protest, the opposition, and Western institutions were predominantly presented negatively. The goal of the narratives were to foster distrust toward the West among citizens and strengthen pro-government attitudes.

The monitoring materials reveal that the style of presenting narratives differed across various language segments. For the Georgian-speaking audience, the focus was often placed on emotional, mocking, and discrediting content; in the Armenian-speaking segment, positive illustrations of Russia and the government were noted; while on the selected Azerbaijani-language pages, the main attention was on informational, practically neutral materials. These differences underscored that the monitored pages/groups operated differently, taking into account the linguistic and regional specifics of the audience.

The analysis of authors and disseminators showed that news media, active Facebook pages and their admins, and unknown or completely unidentifiable individuals played a significant role in spreading narratives. They created and disseminated content, including AI-generated photos and videos, featuring slander, mockery, and exaggerated content promoting political biases. . Such strategy contributed both to the discrediting of the opposition and to the deepening of societal polarization.

The use of factual manipulation and subjective interpretations was not ubiquitous in the monitored posts; however, it was regularly disseminated and aimed to degrade the reputation of specific groups, primarily the opposition and pro-European actors. Photo and video manipulation, altering contexts, quoting out of context, and attaching negative labels are actively utilizing techniques employed to achieve political goals.

The rate of explicitly false information was low; nevertheless, the monitoring results show that the primary effect of anti-Western narratives lay not in falsifying the truth, but in exaggeration, slander, and manipulation. This effectively promoted distrust among the public, contributed to

the establishment of the Georgian Dream government as the only legitimate and stable political force in the country, and intensified political polarization.

Thus, the monitoring conducted on selected Facebook pages from the summer to November 2025 confirms that anti-Western narratives were a political tool utilizing various techniques to generate a positive public disposition toward the government, while discrediting opposition and pro-Western actors. The nature of anti-Western messaging its authors, audience, and the strategies used were closely interconnected, illustrating a complex, targeted, and organized informational environment focused on controlling political processes and shaping public opinion in Georgia.

APPENDIX 1: METHODOLOGY

Within the framework of the SIDA-funded project "Countering Anti-Democratic Propaganda Through Engagement," to study anti-Western narratives on the social network Facebook, we selected a one-year period following November 28, 2024, when the Prime Minister announced the suspension of Georgia's European integration, sparking massive pro-Western protests.

To study anti-Western narratives, we selected 16 public pages/groups characterized by anti-Western and anti-EU integration rhetoric and which enjoy high popularity (having many followers/members). Out of these 16 pages/groups, 12 are Georgian-language. Two of these 12 focus specifically on the Adjara region. Furthermore, we are observing 2 Armenian-language and 2 Azerbaijani-language pages/groups aimed at ethnic minorities living in Georgia and mostly consumed by them. To select these pages or groups, we used reports from organizations studying anti-Western propaganda and disinformation in Georgia, as well as CRRC-Georgia's social media study [report](#).

Additionally, we shared our initial list and received advice from organizations currently working on identifying disinformation and studying anti-Western propaganda. The selected groups/pages include platforms openly supporting "Georgian Dream," anonymous/indirectly supporting groups/pages, mainstream and non-mainstream media outlets, including local news pages and an ultra-right-wing page.

Interestingly, the selected pages in the Azerbaijani-language segment do not feature notably anti-Western content, as we could not find any. The same applies to the page selected in the Adjara region. These act more as local media outlets.

The selection of posts on the chosen pages/groups is done using several approaches. In the case of Georgian-language pages/groups, posts from each page/group are selected mostly via simple random sampling. Additionally, the 10 most popular posts for each group/page were included in the sample.

During the monitoring period, the list of the 16 selected pages/groups changed once, and two pages were replaced by other pages with similar content, as one of them was blocked by Meta itself, and the other stopped actively publishing posts on Facebook. Below is the list of pages/groups selected for monitoring:

#	Language	Group / page	Name of the group / page	Number of followers
1	Georgian	Page	ლიდერი 41	42,000
2	Georgian	Page	ანტი-მაიდანი ³	6,600
	Georgian	Page	არ აგარევენებთ	20,000
3	Georgian	Group	ბიძინა ივანიშვილი და მომავალი თაობა#oficial	20,100
4	Georgian	Page	სირცხვილის კორიდორი ⁴	56,000
	Georgian	Page	შიგ ევროპაში	7,500
5	Georgian	Page	Gogaggg	602,000
6	Georgian	Page	პოლიტიკოსები 1 ლარიდან	26,000
7	Georgian	Group	წმინდა მამები და მათი გამონათქვამები	36,000
8	Georgian	Page	პატრიოტული გვერდი	46,000
9	Georgian	Page	POSTV - ანალიტიკა	274,000
10	Georgian	Page	News.mcvane.ge	152,000
11	Armenian	Page	ფარვანა ტვ „ანარეკლი“	12,000
12	Armenian / Russian	Page	Джавахкская диаспора России	1,700
13	Adjara	Group	ბიძინა ივანიშვილის მხარდამჭერი ჯგუფი აჭარაში	2,000
14	Adjara	Page	გაზეთი აჭარა	5,800
15	Azerbaijani	Group	24News.ge	16,800
16	Azerbaijani	Page	Aktual.ge	34,000

As a result of the primary filtering of posts, a portion of them becomes the subject of in-depth study. Posts are considered relevant to the research if they:

- In any way voice or relate to anti-Western discourse - damage / question / negatively portray / criticize Georgia's European integration, attack actors/politicians supporting European integration, and support actors/politicians opposing European integration;
- Concern Europe, the US, the West, or their representatives;
- In any way voice pro-Russian discourse;
- Concern the pro-Western/anti-Russian protest.

From June 1 to November 28, 2025, a total of 1,756 posts were analyzed in-depth.

³ After February 22, 2025, the page "Anti-Maidani" was replaced by the page "Ar Agarevinebt," as "Anti-Maidani" was blocked by Meta.

⁴ After February 22, 2025, the page "Sirtskhvilis Koridori" was replaced by the page "Shig Evropashi," as "Sirtskhvilis Koridori" ceased activity.

Limitations

This study does not claim to examine the content of all anti-Western groups/pages operating on Facebook. However, the research reveals the main picture. Facebook posts are dynamic, meaning the text of a post might be edited by the author themselves, or blocked/restricted by Meta, rendering it unavailable after a certain period.