



კულტურულ ურთიერთობათა ცენტრი

კავკასიური  
სახლი



THE CENTRE FOR CULTURAL RELATIONS

CAUCASIAN  
HOUSE



LEVAN MIKELADZE FOUNDATION

# Conflicts in Georgia: Perceptions, Attitudes and Expectations

## 2024

## Report

This research and report was commissioned by the Institute for the Study of Nationalism and Conflicts (ISNC), the Levan Mikeladze Foundation, and the Caucasian House and prepared by CRRC-Georgia.



UK Government

Taking COBERM further:  
UK in Support of Sustainable Peace (UK-SSP)



The research was conducted as part of the project “Towards Transforming Conflicts in Georgia: Getting Ready for the Time of Change”. The preparatory phase of the research involved representatives from the Institute for the Study of Nationalism and Conflicts (ISNC), the Levan Mikeladze Foundation, and the Caucasian House, along with a diverse group of experts working in the field.

*This report was published with the support of “Taking COBERM further: UK in Support of Sustainable Peace” (UKSSP), a joint initiative of the government of the United Kingdom (UK) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The content of this publication is the responsibility of the Institute for the Study of Nationalism and Conflicts (ISNC), the Levan Mikeladze Foundation, the Caucasian House, and CRRC-Georgia, and in no way reflects the positions of the UK or the UNDP.*

**Authors:**

**Tamar Khoshtaria (CRRC-Georgia)**

**Eter Gagunashvili (CRRC-Georgia)**

The authors gratefully acknowledge the valuable contributions of CRRC-Georgia's Junior Researchers Tamar Uzunashvili, Tinatin Gagoshidze, Nino Lobzhanidze, and Researcher Zachary Fabos, for translating and editing the report into English.

## Contents

Introduction .....	4
Key findings .....	5
Methodology.....	7
Quantitative Component .....	7
Qualitative Component.....	7
Research results .....	8
1. Information about the conflict.....	8
2. Relations with opposing sides/existing approaches .....	13
3. Social-cultural alienation .....	16
4. The cost of the conflict .....	19
5. Evaluating the past and perceptions of conflict .....	22
6. Actors and mechanisms of peace processes .....	25
7. The impact of outside factors and expectations.....	31
8. Perceptions of conflict resolution/transformation.....	33
9. The time factor in conflict resolution .....	38
10. Readiness for new approaches; Supporting and hindering factors.....	40
Annex 1 – Quantitative data tables .....	43
Annex 2 – Detailed methodology .....	71

## Introduction

Events that took place in Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region in the 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union and in 2008 remain a painful topic for the Georgian population. Since the early 1990s, the Russian Federation has promoted ethnic conflict and separatism in Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region, resulting in military confrontations between Georgian government forces and Ossetian separatists in South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region during 1991-92 and with Abkhazian separatists and supporting paramilitary units from Russia in Abkhazia during 1992-93. According to various sources, including a representative of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the war in Abkhazia killed more than 10,000 people and forced more than 200,000 ethnic Georgians to flee the region.<sup>1</sup> From 1992-93, the conflict in South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region killed about 1,000 people and forced 70,000 to flee from their homes.<sup>2</sup> Despite this prior conflict, the Georgian government maintained control over a significant part of South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region until the August 2008 war. However, that year, the conflict resumed and, as a result of full-scale military aggression and occupation by the Russian Federation, about fifty Georgian villages in South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region and surrounding areas were burned down and completely destroyed. About 130,000 people, mostly ethnic Georgians, were forced from their homes. According to current data, the number of internally displaced persons and refugees from the South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region and Abkhazia is close to 300,000.<sup>3</sup>

The international community does not recognize the independence of either Abkhazia or South Ossetia and calls on the Russian Federation to implement the six-point plan<sup>4</sup> brokered by then President of France Nicolas Sarkozy and for its troops to leave the occupied territories of Georgia.

In October 2008, after the adoption of the “Law of Georgia on Occupied Territories”,<sup>5</sup> Abkhazia and the South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region were officially declared occupied territories, controlled by the armed forces of the Russian Federation.

Considering this context, it is important to examine perceptions and attitudes of the population living in the territory controlled by the Georgian government towards the existing conflicts and the occupied territories. It is important to observe how the population perceives the passage of time in the process of conflict resolution: as a threat or as an opportunity. It is also crucial to understand to what extent the population distances Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian relations from the larger geopolitical picture and whether they see the possibility of the conflicts being resolved peacefully.

This report is based on a representative survey of the Georgian-speaking population of Georgia conducted in the summer of 2024 and aims to study the perceptions, attitudes, and expectations of the public towards these conflicts. It is worth noting that an in-depth study of such scale has not been conducted on conflicts in Georgia before.

Following the introduction, this report provides some key findings, the research methodology, and detailed research results. The latter includes issues covered by the survey: awareness of the conflicts,

---

<sup>1</sup> <https://www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/external/doc/en/assets/files/other/georgia.pdf>

<sup>2</sup> <https://www.unhcr.org/publications/refugees-magazine-issue-117-idps-particularly-complex-problem>

<sup>3</sup> <https://www.moh.gov.ge/ipd.php?uid=202312221453586198427466&lang=1&v=0>

<sup>4</sup> [https://iccn.ge/index.php?article\\_id=301&clang=0](https://iccn.ge/index.php?article_id=301&clang=0)

<sup>5</sup> <https://matsne.gov.ge/ka/document/view/19132?publication=7>

relations with opposing sides, issues of socio-cultural alienation, assessment of the past and perception of the conflict, actors and mechanisms of peace processes, influences of external factors, perceptions of the conflicts' resolution, and readiness for new approaches. At the end of the report, tables with the percentage distribution of respondents' answers and a comparison of the answers of the displaced and non-displaced populations are provided as an annex.

## Key findings

- More than half of the population (56%) is “uninformed” (19%) or “less informed” (37%) about current developments in Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region. Only 9% stated that they are “fully informed” while about one-third (35%) are “partially informed.”
- The majority of the population (58%) believes that information provided to the public by Georgian mass media about current developments in Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region is “insufficient” (34%) or “completely insufficient” (24%).
- The majority of the population is “completely unfamiliar” (43%) or “almost unfamiliar” (25%) with socio-economic programs and/or peace initiatives created by the Georgian government for the well-being of the population living in Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region. As for the work done by non-governmental organizations or experts regarding issues of Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region, an even larger percentage of the population is “completely unfamiliar” (51%) or “almost unfamiliar” (25%).
- 17% of the population living in Georgian-controlled territory say that they personally know at least one person who currently lives in Abkhazia (other than those living in the municipality of Gali). While relatively fewer (13%) know at least one person who currently lives in South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region (other than those living in Akhagori).
- The survey results show that more than 80% agree they would have business relations with both Abkhazians living in Abkhazia (85%) and Ossetians living in South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region (83%).
- Almost 90% agree they would be friends with both an Abkhazian living in Abkhazia (89%) and an Ossetian living in Tskhinvali (88%).
- Almost 80% would agree that a representative of their ethnic group could marry both an Abkhazian living in Abkhazia (78%) and an Ossetian living in Tskhinvali (77%).
- While three-quarters of the population (75%) say that for them “an Abkhazian is a Georgian same as a Mingrelian, Kartlian, Kakhetian, Imeretian, Gurian, Adjarian, etc.,” two-thirds of the population (66%) say the same about Ossetians.
- We asked respondents who bears the responsibility for the armed conflict in South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region in 2008. Fifty-five percent of the population places the responsibility mainly on Russia. In addition, 15% say that the Georgia, South Ossetia, and Russia are equally responsible, while only 6% attribute this responsibility to Russia and South Ossetia.

- According to respondents, the following issues are of greatest concern to the displaced population: trauma caused by losing friends/family (93%), compensation for lost property (89%), barriers to free movement to Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region (85%), and the possibility of returning home (84%).
- The opening of a direct transport corridor between Georgia and Abkhazia and the South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region is “completely acceptable” for 52% and “rather acceptable than unacceptable” for 25%.
- 84% of the population thinks that the Georgian government should hold a direct dialogue with representatives of the de facto governments of Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region.
- A large share of the Georgian population (82%) “completely agrees” (46%) or “agrees more than disagrees” (36%) with the opinion that “to improve the relationship with Abkhazians and Ossetians, it’s necessary for Georgians, Abkhazians, and Ossetians to acknowledge mistakes made in the past.”
- Almost two-thirds (65%) of Georgians “completely agree” (32%) or “agree more than disagree” (33%) with the opinion that “to improve the relationship with Abkhazians and Ossetians, it’s necessary for Georgians to acknowledge mistakes made in the past.”
- For 35%, it is “completely acceptable” and for 30%, it is “rather acceptable than unacceptable” that people living in the territories of South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region receive social and humanitarian aid from the Georgian government.
- The majority of the population (73%) “completely agrees” (20%) or “agrees” (53%) with the opinion that “The participation of women in peace processes will change Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian relations for the better.” An even larger percentage (80%) “completely agrees” (23%) or “agrees” (56%) with the opinion that “The participation of the displaced population in peace processes will change Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian relations for the better.”
- A high proportion of the total population of Georgia (61%) believes that Georgia’s integration in the EU would have a positive impact on Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian relations. The results are roughly similar (56%) when respondents were asked about the impact of Georgia’s integration into NATO.
- According to the public, the most frequently mentioned factor that would improve relations between Georgians and Abkhazians/Ossetians is Russia’s non-interference (30%). At the same time, almost the same share of the population believes that the most favorable circumstances that would contribute to the improvement of relations are the improvement of people’s economic conditions (29%) and the development of new approaches and policies (28%).
- The majority of the population believes that Georgian-Abkhazian (59%) and Georgian-Ossetian (58%) relations can be improved before the restoration of Georgia’s territorial integrity.

## Methodology

This report presents the results of the study, which includes both quantitative and qualitative components. The quantitative component consisted of a representative survey, while the qualitative component included five focus groups conducted with displaced individuals. Detailed information on the quantitative component is provided in Annex 2.

### Quantitative Component

As part of the quantitative component, a face-to-face public survey was conducted using computer tablets from May 29, 2024 to July 2, 2024.

The target population of the study was Georgian-speaking adults (18 years of age and older) living in Georgia, excluding the population currently living in the occupied territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region. Face-to-face interviews were conducted in the Georgian language.

The sample is representative of both the Georgian-speaking population living in the controlled part of the country, as well as of residents of the capital, other cities, and rural areas separately. In total, 1,995 interviews were completed, and the response rate was 35.5%.

The report presents general frequencies of the questions asked within the framework of the survey, as well as differences between the displaced and non-displaced populations in cases where these differences were confirmed on the basis of a statistical test (chi-square test). The tables are presented in Annex 1. In some cases, differences by gender, age group, and type of settlement are also presented.

The quantitative dataset is available on CRRC-Georgia's website.

Remark: There might be slight differences in frequencies across online data analysis (ODA),<sup>6</sup> Stata and SPSS versions of the datasets, due to rounding of weight coefficients. The data presented in this report was processed using SPSS.

### Qualitative Component

In addition to quantitative data, the report also presents qualitative data based on five focus groups with the displaced population conducted in August 2024. All five focus groups were conducted online, using the Zoom platform. The focus group participants were internally displaced persons (IDPs) of various ages and genders, currently living in Tbilisi, Imereti, Samegrelo, and Shida Kartli:

Focus Group 1: IDPs from the 1990s, who were born before 1980 and now live in Tbilisi. Total 7 participants: 4 female, 3 male.

---

<sup>6</sup> <https://caucasusbarometer.org/en/ch2024ge/codebook/>

Focus Group 2: The children of IDPs from the 1990s, who were born in 1981 or later and now live in Tbilisi. Total 7 participants: 4 female, 3 male.

Focus Group 3: IDPs from the 1990s, who were born before 1980 and now live in Imereti or Samegrelo. Total 8 participants: 4 female, 4 male.

Focus Group 4: The children of IDPs from the 1990s, who were born in 1981 or later and now live in Imereti or Samegrelo. Total 8 participants: 4 female, 4 male.

Focus Group 5: IDPs from the August 2008 war, who now live in Shida Kartli. Total of 8 participants: 4 female, 4 male.

## Research results

### 1. Information about the conflict

The research shows that more than half (56%) of the population is “uninformed” (19%) or “less informed” (37%) about current developments in Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region. Only 9% is “fully informed,” while roughly one third (35%) is “partially informed” (Annex 1, Table 1).

No differences were observed in this regard by gender and displacement variables; however, there are some differences by settlement type. Compared to the population living in the capital, a larger share of the population living in rural settlements is either completely uninformed (25%, compared to 15% in the capital) or is less informed (37%, compared to 32% in the capital) about current developments in Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region. On the other hand, compared to the rural population, a larger part of the Tbilisi population says that they are “fully” (13%, compared to 7% in rural settlements) or “partially informed” (40%, compared to 30% in rural settlements).

As for the difference by age group, when asked where they get information about current developments in Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region,<sup>7</sup> respondents identified Georgian TV (76%), social media (31%), the Internet (excluding social media) (30%), family members, coworkers, friends (12%), and other sources (5%). Only 1% identified Russian TV as a source of information (Annex 1, Table 2).

There are slight differences by demographic variables, such as sex, age, and settlement type. For example, compared to women (28%), a larger population of men (35%) named social media as a source of information. The youngest age group (18-34 years) named social media as a source of information more often than older generations (47% compared to 32% [35-54 years] and 15% [55 and older]). A large portion of those living in the capital (42%) named social media, compared to other urban areas (26%) and rural settlements (24%).

Younger individuals and those living in cities more often identified the internet as a source of information on current developments in Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region.


---

<sup>7</sup> This question was asked to those respondents who said that they are fully, partially, or less informed about the current developments in Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region. The question was not asked to those who said that they are uninformed.



In this regard, slight differences exist between the displaced and non-displaced population. For example, compared to the non-displaced population, a larger portion of the displaced reported receiving information from family members, coworkers or friends (20% compared to 11% of those not displaced) and from those who live in Abkhazia or South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region (11% compared to 3% of those not displaced) (Diagram 1).

Diagram 1.



Focus group participants also discussed the topic. Notably, responses of those displaced from Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region differed. While displaced people from Abkhazia have certain contacts and ties with those living in Abkhazia and, accordingly, receive information from them, displaced respondents from South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region note that they have no one left in the region and thus no longer have contact with anyone there:

*"I have a question. Who would I have [contact with]? Who do you think I would have there to be getting information from? Here, earlier it was said that they were wiped from the face of the earth. There's nothing left and I knew someone who was like a grandfather to me, who stayed, and later I learned that he was killed [intentionally] in a fire. They burned down homes. So, who could I be getting information from?" (Female, 53, displaced during the war in 2008, Shida Kartli)*

Other displaced people from South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region also confirmed that after the war, all relationships with those that remained were severed:

*“I had a course mate that looked me up and reached out. Then they asked if I could share pictures of my kids, asked if we could become friends, to remember the past. Then one day they called me and told me that their children wouldn’t allow them to contact me anymore, and asked not to send them my children’s pictures anymore and not to ever call them again, so I stopped.”* (Female, 50, displaced during the war in 2008, Shida Kartli)

In contrast to these findings, focus group participants displaced from Abkhazia note that their sources of information are those living there and social networks, which they use to contact people in Abkhazia and exchange information and pictures:

*“It has become much easier to communicate with them and we have contact with each other, but nearly all young people are no longer on our side, but we still receive information from social media. They send us pictures of our house, and so on. I, personally, have some kind of relationships.”* (Female, 48, displaced from Abkhazia, Tbilisi)

Some of the displaced from Abkhazia, such as doctors, also have direct contact with people who live and work in the Gali region, as they have met at conferences and trainings in territories controlled by Georgia. Others have friends living in Abkhazia and receive information from them: *“Well, we also have Abkhazian friends, who live there, with whom we have relations, we have not lost them. They have also reevaluated many things, similar to us. We mainly get information from them.”* (Male, 58, displaced from Abkhazia, Samegrelo)

As a part of research, the respondents also discussed what types of information they receive on current developments in Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region.<sup>8</sup> Most of the population (64%) receives information about political issues. Thirty-nine percent get information about people’s daily lives, 26% information on the economy, and 21% about cultural issues.

There are differences by settlement type: compared to rural areas (58%), people in the capital (69%) and in other urban settlements (64%) more often got information on political issues. In general, compared to other cities and rural settlements, people in the capital more often mention receiving information about the economic, cultural, or everyday life-related issues.

If we compare the results of the survey from a gendered perspective, we see that men (30%) more often mention information related to economic issues than women (23%).

There are slight differences between the responses of the displaced and non-displaced populations. For example, 53% of those displaced say that they get information on people’s daily lives in Abkhazia or South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region, while a much smaller percentage of the non-displaced population responded the same (38%) (Annex 1, Table 4).

This is supported by qualitative data. During focus groups, respondents displaced from Abkhazia say that people who remained in occupied territories often tell them about the situation there. According to one

---

<sup>8</sup> This question was asked to those respondents, who said that they are fully, partially, or less informed about the current developments in Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region. The question was not asked to those, who said that they are uninformed.

of the respondents, the situation in Abkhazia is not changing and is especially difficult in regard to human rights:

*“We get general information from our relatives on what’s going on. Basically, nothing changes. Human rights are the same as they were, they practically do not exist there, and therefore nothing changes. It’s the same as it always was. The attitude of the Abkhazians towards us [ethnic Georgians] is the same.”* (Male, 45, displaced from Abkhazia, Imereti)

Other respondents also note that among those living in occupied territories the attitude toward Georgians and Georgia is quite negative. Some mention that people who live in the occupied territories are afraid of Georgians.

It is also noteworthy that according to focus group participants, the public’s dissatisfaction with Russia has increased in Abkhazia:

*“The Abkhazians themselves are very dissatisfied with the government. There are very often protests against the fact that property is being sold [to foreigners and Russians], and that this is being done without consulting the people. They are against the fact that Russian funding is not reaching them.”* (Female, 57, displaced from Abkhazia, Imereti)

Respondents note that certain opinions and views are being reevaluated in Abkhazia as well. For example, if the young generation grew up hating Georgians, now their dissatisfaction with Russia has led to a rethinking of certain issues and a change in views:

*“It is like this: even the younger generation is reevaluating things. I say this because the generation that was born after the war, they grew up in this flood of hatred and propaganda, and a hostile attitude, the perception of us as enemies, has been ingrained in them from childhood. However, they are also reevaluating certain things. But this is relative, of course. It is not as much as we would like. [...] But the talk of giving the territories to Russia and seeing how the older generation protests, this probably has also caused them to reassess. [...] But this is a very slow process. This will probably require some other means as well.”* (Male, 58, displaced from Abkhazia, Samegrelo)

During the survey, we also asked the population to evaluate information provided by Georgian media. According to results, a majority (58%) of the population thinks that information provided by Georgian mass media about current developments in Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region is “insufficient” (34%) or “completely insufficient” (24%). However, one-third believe that the information provided is “relatively sufficient,” while only 5% believe that it is “completely sufficient”.

Compared to other cities (51%) and rural settlements (59%), in the capital (65%) more people think that information provided by Georgian mass media about current developments in Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region “is insufficient” or “is completely insufficient”.

Compared to the non-displaced population, a higher frequency of the displaced population thinks that information provided by Georgian mass media about current developments in Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region is “insufficient” (38% compared to 34%) or “completely insufficient” (33% compared to 23%) (Annex 1, Table 5).

This opinion is also shared by focus group participants. In their opinion, the discussion of the occupied territories is generally not given much attention in mass media:

*“It [Abkhazia] is discussed in society when neighbors sit down and talk about their problems. This is the biggest discussion about Abkhazia. As for the media [in Georgia] or some academic groups, no [there are no discussions]. When was the last time you saw anything about it on television? We have a public broadcast channel that is busy with God knows what and does not have a single program either related to Samachablo [South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region] or related to Abkhazia. They invite some experts, the ruling party or opposition to talk about current politics and host talk shows. They should do at least one program on these issues [occupied territories] once a week or a month. This public broadcast/channel is financed from our taxes, right? They should invite experts, local, international [experts], and discuss how these occupied territories can be returned. They do not do it. There is no talk about this anywhere and unfortunately, we, the displaced, have somehow gotten used to this silence regarding our problems.” (Male, 58, displaced from Abkhazia, Samegrelo)*

Displaced respondents from South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region also note that if the topic is being covered somewhere, “mainly the emphasis is more on the displaced from Abkhazia and the occupied territories there” (Female, 53, displaced during the war in 2008, Shida Kartli).

We also asked participants in the study about actions the Georgian government and non-governmental organizations have taken regarding the occupied territories. It is notable that the majority of the population is “completely unfamiliar” (43%) or “almost unfamiliar” (25%) with socioeconomic programs and peace initiatives created by the Georgian government for the well-being of the population of Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region. In this regard, no significant differences exist between the displaced and non-displaced population (Annex 1, Table 6). On the other hand, there are slight differences by age groups, almost half of the young age group (18-34) (48%) says that socioeconomic programs and peace initiatives created by the Georgian government are “completely unfamiliar.” The same figure among older generations is 41%. There are differences by settlement type — the most uninformed population lives in rural settlements.

A large percentage (51%) of the population is “completely unfamiliar” or “almost unfamiliar” (25%) with the work done by non-governmental organizations or experts regarding issues in Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region (Annex 1, Table 7). Like the previous variable, the level of awareness among different age groups varies. The most uninformed age group is young people (18-34), 60% of whom are “completely unfamiliar” with the work done by non-governmental organizations or experts regarding these issues. This result among older generations is 48%.

It is notable that 30% of the population is familiar with government programs and one fifth (21%) know about non-governmental organizations’ programs.

Focus group participants discussed programs and initiatives that they had heard of. Many of them mentioned the benefits that ethnic Abkhazians have in Georgia, including free medical care and education. According to several participants displaced from Abkhazia, in many cases, Abkhazians do not appreciate these opportunities and those who return do not express gratitude:

*"I have never met any Abkhaz who is thankful. Here [in Georgia], I know that they are treating many of them [Abkhazians], but when they [Abkhazians] are on the way back [to Abkhazia], I heard that they talk about us [Georgians] and insult us, saying they wish we [Georgians] would disappear."* (Female, 62 displaced from Abkhazia, Imereti)

It is also worth noting that the focus group participants were not aware of programs and initiatives such as "Step to a Better Future," the "Peace Fund," and "Inclusion without Recognition." The participants had only heard about the "Law of Occupied Territories", but said they did not remember the details of this law.

When the respondents were questioned about international programs, the majority of them (74%) noted, that they are familiar with European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) and more than half (55%) are familiar with the Geneva International Discussions (GID). Almost one third (32%) have heard of Incident Prevention and Response Mechanisms (IPRM). For all three international programs, men were more informed than women.

Also, the population from 35-54 years of age is more informed about the EUMM and IPRM than other age groups. It is also notable that those in rural areas and the capital are more informed about the EUMM and GID than in other urban settlements. Those in the capital are most familiar with the IPRM.

Also, compared to the non-displaced population, a larger proportion of displaced people say they have heard of the EUMM (82%, compared to 74%) and the GID (65%, compared to 54%) (Annex 1, Tables 8, 9 and 10).


## 2. Relations with opposing sides/existing approaches

As part of the survey, participants chose one of the following three opinions: 1. "Abkhazia is the historic homeland of both Georgians and Abkhazians;" 2. "Abkhazia is the historic homeland of only Georgians;" 3. "Abkhazia is the historic homeland of only Abkhazians." The majority of the population (54%) agreed with the first statement, 44% the second, and only 1% agreed with the third statement (Annex 1, Table 11). Notably, there are no differences by various demographic variables.

Respondents were also asked the same question about South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region. Forty-seven percent of the population agreed with the opinion that "South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region is the historic homeland of both Ossetians and Georgians," and exactly half (50%) agreed with the second opinion, that "South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region is the historic homeland of only Georgians." Similar to the previous question, only 1% agreed with the third opinion ("South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region is only the historical homeland of Ossetians") (Annex 1, Table 12). In this case, there are slight differences according to the gender of respondents. Compared to men (43%), a larger proportion of women (51%) agreed with the first opinion, while compared to women (46%), a larger percentage of men (55%) agreed with the second opinion. There are also very small differences between the displaced and non-displaced populations. Fifty-one percent of those displaced agreed with the first opinion (compared to 47% of non-IDPs), while exactly half (50%) of the non-displaced population supports the second opinion (compared to 44% of the displaced population).

To measure the attitudes of the population living in Georgia towards Abkhazians and Ossetians, as part of the survey, we asked respondents whether they would agree to business relations, friendship, or marriage with these groups. The survey demonstrates that 83-88% would agree to business relations with both Abkhazians (both those living in Abkhazia and in territory controlled by Georgia) and Ossetians (both those living in South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region and in territory controlled by Georgia) (Diagram 2).

Diagram 2.



Compared to women, men are more likely to agree to business relationships with both Abkhazians and Ossetians.

It is noteworthy that compared to the displaced population (78%), a larger share of the non-displaced population (85%) agrees that they would have business relations with Abkhazians living in Abkhazia (Annex 1, Table 13). Similarly, compared to the displaced population (71%), a larger share of the non-displaced population (84%) agrees they would have business relations with Ossetians living in South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region (Annex 1, Table 15).


As for other types of relations with Abkhazians and Ossetians, 88-91% would agree to friendship. There are differences between the displaced and non-displaced population. For example, 89% of the non-displaced population agreed they would be friends with Ossetians (who live in South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region), while 81% of the displaced population said the same (Annex 1, Table 19). Also, there are

differences by sex: compared to women, a slightly larger share of the men agreed they would be friends with Ossetians.

The percentages are lower (77-83%) when the question concerns marriage. Eighty-three percent of the population said they would agree to a person of their ethnicity to marrying an Abkhazian living in Georgian-controlled territory, while 78% would agree to a marriage with an Abkhazian living in Abkhazia. The result is the same concerning Ossetians. Eighty percent of the population agreed that a person of their ethnicity could marry an Ossetian that lives in Georgian-controlled territory, while slightly fewer (77%) agree to a marriage between someone of their ethnicity to an Ossetian living in South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region. There are no statistically significant differences in this regard between those displaced and the non-displaced population (Annex 1, Tables 21-24). However, differences were again observed according to the gender of respondents: men are more open than women.

The results of the survey on the coexistence of Georgians and Abkhazians/Ossetians are also worth exploring. A majority (83%) “completely agrees” (35/34%) or “agrees” (48/49%), with the opinion that Georgians and Abkhazians/Ossetians can peacefully coexist in one shared state (Diagram 3).

Diagram 3.



Notably, there are no statistically significant differences between the responses of those displaced and non-displaced individuals to these questions. There are also no differences between male and female respondents. However, there are differences by settlement type: compared to the capital, a larger share of people in other cities and rural settlements believe in the possibility of living together in one common state with Abkhazians and Ossetians.

### 3. Social-cultural alienation

Seventeen percent of the population living in Georgian-controlled territory say that they know at least one person currently living in Abkhazia (excluding the population living in Gali). Fewer (13%) know at least one person who currently lives in South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region (except for the population living in Akhagori). It is notable that more than half (52%) of the displaced population personally knows at least one person who currently lives in Abkhazia, and almost one-fifth (19%) know at least one person currently living in South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region (Annex 1, Table 27-28).

There were differences by settlement type: one-fifth of the population living in the capital and other cities say they know at least one person who currently lives in Abkhazia, while this figure is 12% in rural settlements. Fifteen percent of the population in the capital know the person living in Abkhazia, while outside the capital the result is slightly lower (9% in other cities and 13% in rural areas). Compared to women (10%), a larger share of men (16%) say they know at least one person living in South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region.

Also, almost one tenth of the population (11%) had face-to-face contact with a person currently living in Abkhazia (other than in Gali) in the past ten years, and fewer had contact through the internet (e.g. social media, using forums, etc.) (8%), or talked on the phone (7%). Accordingly, compared to the non-displaced population, a larger share of displaced people had communication with the population living in Abkhazia. Thirty-one percent of those displaced say that they have had face-to-face contact with a person currently living in Abkhazia in the past ten years, 30% had contact through the internet, and 24% talked on the phone (Annex 1, Table 29).

Small differences appear when comparing age groups: notably, 13% of the respondents 18-34 and 12% of those 35-54 say that they have had face-to-face contact with a person currently living in Abkhazia, while this percentage is relatively lower among those over 55 (8%). Compared to younger people, people aged 55 and older are also less likely to report having contact through the internet (5%, compared to 10%).

Unlike people living in Abkhazia, those living in Georgian-controlled territory have less contact with people currently living in South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region. Only 5% of the population says that they have had face-to-face contact with a person or people who are currently living in South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region (excluding those living in Akhagori). Additionally, 5% of the population has had face-to-face contact with someone there or talked on the phone with them. Compared to the last question, in this case there were no differences between the displaced and non-displaced population (Annex 1, Table 30).

Similarly, there were small differences between age groups. Results demonstrate that compared to other groups (4%), more people from the 35-54 age group (8%) had face-to-face contact with a person or people who are currently living in South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region. Also, 7% of those 35-54 say that they have had contact through the internet, which is slightly higher than the figure in other age groups.

Respondents were asked if they had Abkhazian and Ossetian friends. Only 6% of the Georgian population reported having an Abkhazian friend who currently lives in Abkhazia, while 13% reported having an Abkhazian friend who currently lives in Georgia-controlled territory. The same percentages were observed for those reporting to have an Ossetian friend. Six percent of the population has an Ossetian friend who currently lives in South Ossetia, and 13% have an Ossetian friend in Georgia-controlled territory.




There were small differences according to age group. Results demonstrate that compared to older generations (11%), a larger share of young people (18-34) have an Abkhazian friend (18%) who is currently living in Georgia-controlled territory. Also, having such a friend is more common in the capital (17%) and other cities (16%), compared to rural settlements (8%).

While only 5% of the non-displaced population has an Abkhazian friend living in Abkhazia, 19% of those displaced say the same. Also, 12% of the non-displaced population say that they have an Abkhazian friend who is living in Georgian-controlled territory, while 30% of the displaced have such a friend.

As for Ossetian friends, 11% of the displaced population has a friend who currently lives in South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region, while 21% have a friend who lives in Georgian-controlled territory (Diagram 4).

Diagram 4.




It is noteworthy that higher percentage of men (16%) have an Ossetian friend who lives in Georgian-controlled territory, compared to women (11%). Having such a friend is more common in Tbilisi (18%) compared to other cities (9%) and rural settlements (11%).

The perception of Abkhazians and Ossetians is quite different among the Georgian population. While three-quarters (75%) of the population says that for them “an Abkhazian is a Georgian same as a Mingrelian, Kartlian, Kakhetian, Imeretian, Gurian, Adjarian, etc.,” two-thirds (66%) of the population says

the same about Ossetians. Compared to the non-displaced population, the displaced share these opinions less often.

The share of people who believe that Abkhazians and Ossetians are of a different nationality from them is relatively small. For 22% of the population, an Abkhazian is a member of a different ethnic group, while 31% believe that Ossetians are of a different ethnic group. These opinions are shared more by the displaced population than by the non-displaced population (Diagram 5).

Diagram 5.



There are also slight differences by type of settlement: compared to Tbilisi (71%), people in other cities (75%) and villages (78%) agree more with the first opinion. The same picture is observed about Ossetians: compared to Tbilisi (54%), the first opinion that “an Ossetian is a Georgian same as a Mingrelian, Kartlian, Kakhetian, Imeretian, Gurian, Adjarian, etc.” is more widely agreed upon in other cities (67%) and villages (74%).

The results show that the majority of the population (53%) says that the culture and traditions of Georgians and Abkhazians are “more similar than different” (46%) or “very similar” (7%). Also, 31% say that they are “more different than similar” and 5% “very different”. For 12% it is difficult to answer the question. Different opinions were held between the displaced and non-displaced population in this regard. Compared to the displaced population (45%), a larger share of the non-displaced population (54%) speaks of similarities (Annex 1, Table 33).

Differences were also observed by gender, age, and type of settlement. Compared to women (49%), a larger share of men (57%) talk about similarities in the culture and traditions of Georgians and Abkhazians. Also, compared to young people (18-34) (49%), a larger share of older generations (55%) mention similarities. Compared to the capital (50%) and other cities (53%), a larger share of the rural population (55%) highlights these similarities.

When asked how similar or different the culture and traditions of Georgians and Ossetians are, 45% of the population answers that the two are “more similar than different” (40%) or “very similar” (5%). In addition, 34% say that they are “more different than similar” and 6% believe that they are “very different”. For 14% it was difficult to answer the question. In addition, a larger share of the non-displaced population (47%) speaks of similarities compared to the displaced population (28%) (Annex 1, Table 34).

Similar to the previous question, statistically significant differences were found by age group, gender, and settlement type. Compared to women (42%), a larger share of men (49%) talk about similarities in the culture and traditions of Georgians and Ossetians. Also, compared to young people (18-34) (36%), a larger share of older age groups (48% in the 35-54 age group and 51% in the 55+ age group) mention similarities. Finally, compared to the capital (41%) and other cities (43%), a larger share of the rural population (51%) talks about these similarities.

#### 4. The cost of the conflict

Survey respondents were asked what impact the current unsettled Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts have on the Georgian economy. A majority (74%) believe the impact to be negative, while 19% think it is neither positive nor negative (Annex 1, Table 35). It is also worth noting that a larger percentage of men (76%) assesses the impact negatively compared to women (72%).


Respondents were also asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with several statements regarding the impact of the unsettled Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts on relations with NATO, the European Union, and Russia. The survey results show that 66% of the population “agree” (47%) or “completely agree” (19%) with the notion that the unsettled conflicts hinder integration into NATO (Annex 1, Table 36). Also, 63% believe that these conflicts hinder EU membership (“agree” 46% and “completely agree” 17%). No statistically significant differences were found between the internally displaced and non-displaced populations (Annex 1, Table 37).

However, differences were found by age group and type of settlement. Compared to older generations, a larger share of young people agree that the unsettled Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts hinder integration into NATO and the European Union. For example, 71% of young people aged 18-35 believe that conflicts hinder NATO integration, while 64% of people aged 35-54 and 62% of people aged 55 and older believe the same. A similar picture is seen in the case of integration into the European Union. As for differences by settlement type, compared to other cities and rural settlements, the capital has the most significant percentage of people who think that unsettled conflicts are hindering integration into NATO and the European Union. For example, 76% of those in Tbilisi think the conflicts hinder NATO integration, while the percentages are lower in other cities (65%) and villages (56%).

With regard to Russia, more than half of the population (52%) “agrees” (41%) or “completely agrees” (10%) with the notion that the current unsettled Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts make normalizing or regulating relations with Russia impossible. A larger share of the internally displaced population (63%) agrees with this notion compared to the non-displaced population (51%) (Annex 1, Table 38).

We also asked respondents participating in the survey to what extent they think internally displaced persons from Abkhazia and the South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region are concerned or not about several issues. Survey results demonstrate that the most common concerns of internally displaced persons are the trauma caused by losing friends or family (93%), the issue of compensation for lost property (89%), and the issue of returning to their homes (84%). According to respondents, the internally displaced population is also concerned about the barriers to free movement to Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region (85%), post-conflict traumatic conditions (78%), and current living conditions (55%). Less than half of the population reported concerns about integration into Georgian society (46%) and the problem of stigmatization or being labeled as “different” by society (49%) (Diagram 6).

Diagram 6.



Some differences were observed when disaggregating the data by place of residence and age groups. For example, the problem of free movement to Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region was more frequently mentioned by residents of the capital (90%) than by residents of other cities (83%) and rural

areas (82%).<sup>9</sup> Citizens aged 35-54 were more concerned with compensation for lost property (92%) than young people aged 18-34 (86%).

Key differences were observed between the responses of internally displaced and non-displaced respondents. For example, compared to the non-displaced population, a larger share of the internally displaced population cites the issue of free movement to Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region (94%), the issue of returning home (93%), post-conflict trauma (86%), their stigmatization by society (59%), and current living conditions (59%), as issues that are “very” or “more” concerning among the displaced population. (Annex 1, Tables 39-46).

Focus group participants also discussed this issue. They said that, along with the issue of returning territories and returning home, the displaced population is concerned that the issue of their housing and former homes has not been resolved in any way. Respondents say that even when the displaced population is provided with housing, this housing is of poor quality and needs further renovation. In addition, the displaced community is also concerned that those who have migrated from Abkhazia or Ossetia receive more benefits and privileges from the Georgian government than they do. They believe this is unfair and unjust.

Those that are displaced also believe that integrating into Georgian society to be a challenge:

*“For example, I am a citizen of Georgia, I am Georgian by nationality, and I don't know why locals should call me a refugee. [...] It's a psychologically difficult. [...] This is the attitude of locals towards us. This is a societal problem. The state has nothing to do with it or any institution. This is an attitude. [...] Integration processes cannot be properly ensured. [...] It's a negative attitude [towards us]. It seems like they are looking down on us.”* (Male, 45, IDP from Abkhazia, Imereti)

Others also talk about social and economic problems. They say that the issue of unemployment worries them a lot: *“The issue of employment, of course, affects IDPs. Because the population is fit for work, but IDPs can't find a job and therefore they are struggling economically”* (Male, 36, displaced during the war in 2008, Shida Kartli). In addition, one of the IDPs from South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region mentioned that some IDPs receive 45 GEL a month in benefits, which they consider shameful:

*“Do you know what the problem is? The ridiculous 45 Lari [GEL] they give to IDPs, not even to every IDP. I personally work and have a salary. [...] I work and earn for my effort, why don't they compensate me for what I lost? IDPs should not be divided in this way, whether they work or not. First, what even is 45 Lari worth and still they are withholding it [from those who are employed]? They did not provide me a home, do not give me any financial support, but support some other people with everything? This is discriminatory.”* (Male, 37, displaced during the war in 2008, Shida Kartli)

---

<sup>9</sup> Sum of the response options “Very concerned” and “More concerned”

## 5. Evaluating the past and perceptions of conflict

Respondents were read several statements and asked to what extent they agreed or disagreed with each of them. Among the listed statements, the largest share (82%) of the Georgian population “completely agrees” (46%) or “more agrees than disagrees” (36%) with the opinion that “to improve the relationship with Abkhazians and Ossetians, it’s necessary for Georgians, Abkhazians, and Ossetians to acknowledge mistakes made in the past.” Compared to the non-displaced population (81%), IDPs (91%) are more likely to agree with this statement (Annex 1, Table 48). Compared to the population of other cities (41%) and rural areas (45%), the capital has a higher share (51%) of people who “completely agree” with this statement.

The second opinion, with which 80% of the population also “completely agrees” (45%) or “more agrees than disagrees” (35%) regards resetting relationships: “we need to start relations from a new page, only focused on the future” (Annex 1, Table 50). There are no statistically significant differences between the displaced and non-displaced populations regarding this attitude. However, there are small differences by settlement type. Compared to the capital (71%), this opinion is more widely shared in other cities (82%) and rural settlements (86%).<sup>10</sup>


The majority of the population (73%) also believes that “people living in Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region are the victims of the conflict the same way Georgians are.” One-third of the population “completely agrees” with this opinion, while 40% “more agrees than disagrees.” However, only 3% of the population “completely disagrees” with this opinion, while 8% “disagrees more than agrees.” It is also worth noting that a larger share of the IDP population (14%) disagrees with this opinion compared to the non-IDP population (10%) (Annex 1, Table 47). There are also differences in age groups. Compared to people aged 18-34 (68%), a relatively larger percentage of older generations (three-fourth) agrees with the above statement.

Finally, almost two-thirds of the population agrees with the notion that “to improve the relationship with Abkhazians and Ossetians, it’s necessary for Georgians to acknowledge mistakes made in the past.” It is worth noting that compared to the non-displaced population (18%), a larger share of the displaced population (26%) disagrees with this opinion. However, 39% of those displaced still express full agreement (Annex 1, Table 49) (Diagram 7).

---

<sup>10</sup> Sum of the response options “I completely agree” and “I agree more than I disagree.”

Diagram 7.




Differences are also noted by age group and type of settlement. Compared to young people aged 18-34 (59%), a relatively higher percentage of older generations (68%) “completely agree” or “agree more than disagree” with the statement that “to improve the relationship with Abkhazians and Ossetians, it’s necessary for Georgians to acknowledge mistakes made in the past”. Compared to the capital (56%), people in other cities (71%) and rural settlements (68%) agree with this opinion more.

When asked who bears responsibility for the armed conflict in Abkhazia in the 1990s, almost half of the population (46%) believes that responsibility primarily falls on Russia. Twenty-two percent believe that this responsibility falls on Georgia, Abkhazia, and Russia equally, while 11% faulted Russia and Abkhazia. Russia is most often blamed by men, young people aged 18-34 (along with people aged 55+), and residents of Tbilisi.

There are also different opinions among the displaced and non-displaced population. While 47% of the non-displaced population points to Russia, this share is relatively lower (39%) among the displaced population, more than a quarter (26%) of whom equally blame all three sides (Diagram 8).

Diagram 8.



Similar results were observed when we asked respondents about the armed conflict in South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region in the 1990s. Here too, almost half (48%) said that the responsibility lies primarily with Russia, and 38% of the displaced population said the same. Similar to the previous question, 22% place equal responsibility on Georgia, Ossetians, and Russia, while 10% place equal responsibility on Russia and Ossetians (Annex 1, Table 52). Russia is primarily pointed to by men, those 55+ (along with young people aged 18-34), the displaced population, and residents of the capital.

A slightly different picture emerged when we asked respondents about the armed conflict that occurred in South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region in August 2008. In this case, 55% of the population places responsibility primarily on Russia, 15% say that Georgia, Ossetians, and Russia are equally responsible, while only 6% place this responsibility on Russia and Ossetians. Here too, no statistically significant differences were observed between the displaced and non-displaced population (Annex 1, Table 53). However, it is still notable that compared to other groups, a larger share of young people, men, and residents of the capital blame Russia for the armed conflict in South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region in August, 2008.

When we asked survey participants how long they thought the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts would take to resolve, almost half (48%) found it difficult to answer the question, while 24% believed that it would take more than 10 years to resolve the conflicts. Ten percent believe that these



conflicts will never be resolved. No statistically significant differences were observed between the displaced and non-displaced populations (Annex 1, Table 54).

It is worth noting that after this question, respondents were asked the same question with a different formulation: “If Russia isn’t a preventive factor, how long will it take to resolve the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts?” In this case, one-third of the respondents found it difficult to answer and 28% chose the answer option “1-5 years.” Thirteen percent said that in such a case the conflicts would be resolved within one year. At the same time, 13% noted that in this case, the conflicts would take more than 10 years to resolve. In this case, the displaced population turned out to be more optimistic than the non-displaced population. Twenty-one percent of the displaced population (compared to 12% of the non-displaced population) believe that if Russia was not an obstacle, the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts would be resolved within a year, while one-third believe that the conflicts would take 1-5 years to resolve (Annex 1, Table 55).

Focus group participants also discussed the issue of conflict resolution in the near future. Respondents generally noted, that “*most likely nothing will change in ten to fifteen years*” (Female, 59, IDP from Abkhazia, Samegrelo). IDPs from South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region also note that as time goes by, it becomes more difficult to sort out relations with Ossetians. The situation is also complicated by the fact that there is resentment and hate of Georgians among Ossetians, as noted by the respondents. A similar opinion is also expressed by IDPs from Abkhazia, who have repeatedly mentioned hatred and fear of Georgians among the population living in Abkhazia.

## 6. Actors and mechanisms of peace processes

Respondents were also asked who, in their opinion, is currently actively working on regulating the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts in Georgia. Respondents could provide several answers. Thirty-eight percent of respondents believe the Georgian government and ministries are actively working on this issue. Meanwhile, 26% pointed to international organizations and donors, as well as their programs, and missions (e.g., USAID, the UN, the European Union, and EUMM). A portion of the respondents believe that today the population (14%) and the civil society (e.g., non-governmental organizations) (13%) are working most actively on conflict resolution issues. It is worth noting that one-fifth of the population believes that no one is working on these issues today, while 18% found it difficult to answer the question.

There are some differences among age groups. For example, the Georgian government and ministries were more often named by those 35-54 (39%) and 55+ (41%) compared to the younger generation (34%). Also, compared to the capital (28%), in other cities (45%) and villages (42%), the Georgian government and ministries were more often named as the party that is actively working on issues of regulating the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts. International organizations, donors, their programs, and missions were more frequently mentioned in the capital (26%) and rural settlements (28%) than in other cities (22%). Also, a slightly higher percent of women (27%) compared to men (24%) stated the same.

Differences between the displaced and non-displaced populations are also noteworthy. For example, while 39% of the non-displaced population identifies the Georgian government and its ministries, this

percentage is only 28% of the displaced population. Also, 26% of the displaced population say that no one is working on conflict regulation, while a smaller percentage of the non-displaced population (19%) say the same. Also, compared to the non-displaced population (13%), a slightly larger share of the displaced population (17%) believes that the population is actively working on conflict resolution in Georgia (Annex 1, Table 56).

Respondents were also asked who they trust the most to correctly carry out peace processes regarding Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region. Respondents could select only one answer. One-third of the respondents mention the Georgian government and its ministries, while almost one-fifth name international organizations, donors, programs, and missions (e.g. USAID, UN, EU and EUMM). Sixteen percent say they trust no one to correctly carry out the peace process regarding Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region, while 14% find it difficult to answer the question. Finally, 11% say they trust the population the most to properly conduct peace policies. Differences were also observed by age and type of settlement. It is noteworthy that young people aged 18-34 trust the government and ministries the least (27%, compared to 36-37%). Also, trust in the government in the capital is much lower (23%) than in other cities (35%) and rural areas (42%).

Differences were also observed between the displaced and non-displaced populations. Compared to those displaced, the non-displaced population has more trust in the government and its ministries (34%, compared to 27%), as well as in international organizations and missions (19%, compared to 12%), while a larger share of the displaced population reports trusting no one (22%, compared to 16%), or finds it difficult to answer the question (22%, compared to 14%) (Annex 1, Table 57).

As for which governmental institution should be leading the process of regulating Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts, 23% name the Office of the State Minister of Georgia for reconciliation and civic equality; 14% name the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7% name the Temporary Parliamentary Commission on the Restoration of Territorial Integrity and De-occupation, and 7% the Ministry of Internally Displaced Persons from the Occupied Territories, Labour, Health and Social Affairs of Georgia. No more than 3% name any other state structure. However, 24% say that all state structures should be involved in conflict resolution processes together. Notably, 14% find it difficult to answer the question or refused.

Similar to the previous question, differences in these results were observed by age and type of settlement. The Office of the State Minister for Reconciliation and Civil Equality is most often mentioned by people aged 35-54 (27%). On the other hand, compared to other cities (12%) and rural settlements (12%), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is mentioned most often in the capital (18%). Some differences were observed between internally displaced and non-displaced persons. For example, a larger share of the non-displaced population names the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (15%, compared to 9%) and the Office of the State Minister for Reconciliation and Civil Equality (23%, compared to 19%), while a larger share of IDPs name the Temporary Parliamentary Commission on the Restoration of Territorial Integrity and De-occupation (11%, compared to 7%) and also choose the answer option “all of them together” (32%, compared to 23%) (Annex 1, Table 58).

To measure to what extent it is acceptable or unacceptable to the Georgian population that people from Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region received benefits in Georgia, respondents were asked to assess several statements. Overall, for three-quarters of the population it is “completely acceptable” (47%) or “rather acceptable than unacceptable” (29%) that “people living in Abkhazian and South

Ossetian/Tskhinvali Region territory receive free medical services in Georgia” (Annex 1, Table 59). This statement was found to be more acceptable to the rural population (84%) compared to the capital (69%) and other cities (73%).<sup>11</sup> Also, almost 80% say it is “completely acceptable” (52%) or “rather acceptable than unacceptable” (27%) that “students living in Abkhazian and South Ossetian/Tskhinvali Region territory have an opportunity to receive stipends in our universities” (Annex 1, Table 60). This opinion, like the previous one, was found to be more acceptable to the rural population (88%) compared to those in the capital (72%) and other cities (76%).<sup>12</sup>

In addition, the opening of a transport corridor between Georgia and Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region is “completely acceptable” for 52% and “rather acceptable than unacceptable” for 25%. Here too, compared to the capital (65%) and other cities (77%), higher acceptance is recorded among the rural population (86%).<sup>13</sup>

Notably that in the case of these three provisions, no differences were observed between the displaced and non-displaced populations (Annex 1, Table 61).

As for the statement, that “the population of Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Regions travel without barriers in Georgia (whether or not Georgians have the ability to travel without barriers to Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region)” is “completely acceptable” (37%) or “rather acceptable than unacceptable” (27%) for more than 60% of the population. This opinion was found to be more acceptable for the non-displaced population (65%) than for the displaced population (60%) (Annex 1, Table 62). Differences were also observed when dividing the population by age groups and settlement type. Compared to the capital (53%), higher acceptance was observed in other cities (67%) and among rural settlements (73%)<sup>14</sup>. However, this provision is more unacceptable for young people aged 18-34 (29%) than for other ages (21-24%).

Similar to the previous question, 61% of the population “completely accepts” (34%) or “rather accepts than not accept” (27%) the idea of “allowing the sale of products produced in Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region in Georgia (whether or not Georgian products are sold there).” Even in this case, this opinion is acceptable to a larger share of the non-displaced population (62%) than to the displaced population (49%) (Annex 1, Table 63). Also, compared to the capital (52%), this provision is acceptable to a larger portion of the population living outside Tbilisi (62-67%), as well as to older generations (62-63%), compared to young people aged 18-34 (57%).

Compared to older generations and the population living outside Tbilisi, young people, as well as Tbilisi residents, are more skeptical towards statements concerning social and humanitarian aid to people living in the territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region. However, there is still a positive attitude towards the following statement: 35% of the population “completely accepts” and 30% “rather accepts than not accepts” the notion that people living there would receive social and humanitarian aid from the Georgian government (65% in total). It is noteworthy that only 57% of the displaced population find this acceptable, compared to 65% of the non-displaced population (Annex 1, Table 64) (Diagram 9).

---

<sup>11</sup> Sum of the response options “completely acceptable” and “rather acceptable than unacceptable”


<sup>12</sup> Sum of the response options “completely acceptable” and “rather acceptable than unacceptable”

<sup>13</sup> Sum of the response options “completely acceptable” and “rather acceptable than unacceptable”

<sup>14</sup> Sum of the response options “completely acceptable” and “rather acceptable than unacceptable”

Diagram 9.

**How acceptable or unacceptable are the following: People living in Abkhazian and South Ossetian/Tskhinvali region's territory receive social and humanitarian aid from the Georgian government BY IDPs (%)**



During focus groups, internally displaced respondents discussed opinions on and feelings towards programs that benefit those living in occupied territory offered by the central government of Georgia. Most of them approve of helping those living in occupied territories. However, some of them also mentioned a lack of gratitude and thankfulness among benefactors of state support:


*"I think it's right. If someone is sick, we need to help them. [...] But I'm just saying, they should look into their hearts. We should support and help any sick person, no matter what their nationality is. Even if they were our enemies, just saying. That's my opinion."* (Female, 53, displaced during the war in 2008, Shida Kartli)

Respondents also mentioned dialogue with the de facto administrations of the occupied territories. When asked whether the Georgian government should hold direct dialogues with representatives of the de facto governments of Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region, 84% of the population answered positively. In this case, no differences were observed between the displaced and non-displaced populations (Annex 1, Table 65). However, there are differences in other demographic variables. For example, a relatively large share of older generations (85-87%) give a positive answer compared to people aged 18-34 (79%). Also, compared to the capital (78%) and other cities (82%), a higher percentage of the rural population (90%) responded positively.

Respondents who said the government should hold dialogues selected issues (from the listed options) that, in their opinion, should be a priority in dialogue with de facto authorities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region. The following answers were most frequently mentioned: barrier-free movement between the Abkhazian and South Ossetian/Tskhinvali regions and Georgia (46%), returning displaced people to Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region (32%), and trade and economic relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region (28%). This last issue was mentioned by a lower percentage of the displaced population (16%) compared to the non-displaced population (28%).

In addition to these three issues, 17% also mentioned education of young people living in Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region, while 10% mentioned healthcare for the population in the occupied territories and compensation for lost property belonging to displaced persons (Diagram 10).

Diagram 10.



Respondents also discussed these issues in focus groups. Results demonstrate that a large proportion of respondents displaced from Abkhazia agree with the opinion that the Georgian government should hold direct dialogues with representatives of the de facto government of Abkhazia. At the same time, many of them express skepticism about how productive such dialogue would be. The skepticism is due to the fact that the de facto government is not considered a decision-making party and they say that, in reality, Russia decides everything.

As for the issues or questions that this dialogue should focus on, focus group participants mention the issue of IDP's return, although some believe that starting negotiations with this issue would be ineffective without some preliminary work:

*"Before starting the dialogue, there must be some kind of platform, with some preliminary preparations. At least a topic that is acceptable to both sides for starting the dialogue. For us, return is our dream, but if we start the conversation with that, the conversation will not take place. Then the second issue is that you must have a dialogue with the side that is the decision-maker, and here the Abkhazian side is not the decision-maker. Accordingly, I do not think that a dialogue with them at this stage, when they are not the decision-makers, is productive for the Georgian side. Russia will use this to say that the two sides [Georgian and Abkhazian] are talking without them interfering. Russian politicians will say that they're in the middle, they'll say talks are ongoing, let them decide themselves. Therefore, dialogue is good, but this dialogue should be beneficial and not the other way around, right? This requires appropriate preparation. This is politics, and now I am not so well-versed in politics and I can't tell you exactly how this dialogue should be conducted. However, I always support dialogue."* (Male, 58, IDP from Abkhazia, Samegrelo)

A somewhat similar opinion was expressed by IDPs from South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region, who believe that the central government of Georgia should not have any dialogue with the de facto administration of the region. This is due to the fact that they consider Russia to be the main participant in the conflict:

*"Of course, [the dialogue] shouldn't happen. All of that was directed by Russia, and if anything, the situation should be resolved with Russia. The de facto Tskhinvali government has no means to resolve [the conflict] or to sort something out with Georgia. All of this is directed from Russia."* (Male, 44, displaced during the war in 2008, Shida Kartli)

Again bringing quantitative results, a majority of the population (69%) agrees that the beginning of dialogue between Abkhazians/Ossetians and Georgia is primarily hindered by Russian politics. Only 9% identified "a lack of will from Abkhazia and South Ossetia" and 6% named "restraints of the Georgian side" as the reasons for barriers (Annex 1, Table 67). Russian politics is mentioned more by men (72%) than by women (67%). Also, this answer option is mentioned more often in Tbilisi (76%) than in other cities (63%) and in rural settlements (68%).

We also asked respondents how they see women's and IDP's roles in Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian relations. The majority of the population (73%) "completely agrees" (20%) or "agrees" (53%) with the opinion that "the participation of women in peace processes will change Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian relations for the better" (Annex 1, Table 68). It is noteworthy that compared to men (69%), women are more likely to agree with this opinion (76%).<sup>15</sup> Also, compared to young people aged 18-34 (69%), a relatively large share of the older generation (73-76%) agree with the statement. Finally, compared to rural settlements (70%), a larger share of Tbilisi residents (75%) and those in other cities (74%) agree with this notion.

Compared to the previous question, an even larger percentage (80%) "completely agree" (24%) or "agree" (56%) with the statement that "the participation of the displaced population in peace processes will

---

<sup>15</sup> Sum of the answer options "completely agree" and "agree."

change Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian relations for the better”. Compared to men (77%), women are more likely to agree with this statement (82%)<sup>16</sup>. Also, a larger share of the displaced population agrees with the statement compared to the non-IDP population (85%, compared to 80%) (Annex 1, Table 69).

Focus group participants who are displaced from Abkhazia also spoke about the importance of informal relationships and noted that since the displaced population still has friends and knows people in the occupied territories, these contacts can help improve relations at an unofficial level.

It is also noteworthy that IDPs from Abkhazia speak of their role and that no government has been interested in involving them in conflict resolution:

*“I would add one more thing, that during any government period, I don’t remember a time when they wanted displaced people to take part in these dialogues. Because among us IDPs, we have women doctors, professors, academics from Abkhazia, we have very smart people, you are doing research now and are interested in our opinion, but before no one was interested in the thoughts of those trying to resolve anything. The same goes for your questions on how relations could be improved, relations could warm, and some ways could be found and positive steps could be made. But no one is interested in the opinion of these people.”* (Male, 58, IDP from Abkhazia, Samegrelo)

On the other hand, in the focus groups, there were also respondents who believed that informal dialogues at the individual level would not bring any outcome.

As for IDPs from South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region, they believe that they will not have any role in resolving the conflict, because they do not have any relations with the population living there. Respondents note that there is no one left there with whom it is possible to communicate with. At this stage, they cannot even visit the graves of their family members and relatives.

## 7. The impact of outside factors and expectations

As for the impact of outside factors, a majority (61%) of the Georgian adult population believes that the country’s integration in the European Union can positively impact Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian relations. Ten percent say that this impact could be negative, 13% suggest it has no impact, while 17% found it difficult to answer (Annex 1, Table 70). There are no differences between the displaced and non-displaced population in this regard. However, there are differences in terms of other demographic characteristics. For instance, young people aged 18-34 (65%) are more likely to discuss European integration’s positive impact than those aged 35-54 (56%). Also, compared to rural settlements (58%) and other cities (60%), the capital is more likely to believe the impact is positive (65%).

The results are somewhat similar from respondents on the impact of Georgia’s integration into NATO. Fifty-six percent of the population believe that NATO integration will positively impact Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian relations. Twelve percent mentioned a negative impact and 12% expect no impact. Almost one-fifth of the population found it difficult to answer this question. Similarly to the

---

<sup>16</sup> Sum of the answer options “completely agree” and “agree.”

previous question, young people aged 18-34 (61%) mentioned a positive impact compared to the population aged 35-54 (52%). Also, compared to rural settlements (52%) and other cities (56%), a perceived positive influence is more common in the capital (62%).

It is noteworthy that compared to the non-displaced population (56%), a much larger share of the displaced population (69%) reports a positive impact (Annex 1, Table 71).

Focus group participants explained why EU integration would have a positive impact. Many mentioned that, in this case, Georgia would economically benefit, attract more tourists, and be more appealing to the population living in the occupied territories.

*“Look, when the country is developed and successful in general, those Abkhazians will see that we are not such bad people because Europe is with us, and we are with Europe, and if they want to be close to Europe, they will realize that they need to learn something from Georgia.”* (Female, 57, IDP from Abkhazia, Samegrelo)

Part of the displaced population from South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region notes that integration into the European Union may interest Abkhazia more than the Ossetian population because the former are more informed:

*“In my opinion, the Abkhazian population is more interested in joining the European Union than the Tskhinvali Region. They don't have as much information. Joining the European Union would be good for us, and they might join us, too. People who are progressive thinkers are tired of this conflict and war and I think these steps should be taken. The Americans dropped the atomic bomb on Japan, but today they are friends, neighbors and have good relations. Something needs to happen, changes need to happen. It won't work out any other way. As time goes by, estrangement is occurring between our nations, and this is very bad. Steps need to be taken to restore some kind of relationship.”* (Male, 36, displaced during the war in 2008, Shida Kartli)

On the other hand, some respondents believed that rapprochement with Europe would distance Georgians from the occupied territories. In their opinion, integration with the West would not do much to bring Georgia closer to the occupied territories. These respondents see the solution again in improving relations with Russia and finding a common language. Some displaced people from both Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region believe that only negotiations and talks with Russia will return the occupied territories.

These latter findings are also reflected in quantitative data: when asked what impact Georgia's political alignment with Russia would have on Georgian-Abkhazian relations on the one hand and Georgian-Ossetian relations on the other, almost one-third of the population believe the impact would be positive, one-fourth expect a negative impact, and one-fifth believe that there will be no impact at all. In addition, almost a quarter of the population found it difficult to answer these questions (Annex 1, Tables 72-73). Differences were observed in terms of settlement type: while approximately one-third of the population in Tbilisi speaks of a negative impact from political rapprochement with Russia on Georgian-Abkhazian/Georgian-Ossetian relations, this indicator is much lower in rural settlements (19%).


Finally, we also asked respondents what impact they think the outcome of the Russia- Ukraine war will have on Georgian-Abkhazian/Ossetian relations if the war: 1. ends in Russia's favor and 2. ends in Russia's failure. In the first case, 54% of the population said this impact would be negative. In addition, the share



of people who speak of a negative impact is highest among young people aged 18-34 (61%) and the population of Tbilisi (63%).

In the second question, when talking about Russia's failure in the war, the majority of the population — 42% — noted that such an outcome of the war would have a positive impact on Georgian-Abkhazian/Ossetian relations. It is noteworthy that young people aged 18-34 (46%) are more likely to mention a positive impact than the population aged 35-54 (38%). Also, compared to rural settlements (40%) and other cities (37%), the capital is more likely to believe the impact to be positive (48%). In addition, a larger part of the displaced population (57%, compared to 41%) believe the impact would be positive (Diagram 11).

Diagram 11.



## 8. Perceptions of conflict resolution/transformation

The study investigates public perceptions of conflict resolution or transformation. As part of the survey, we offered respondents several opinions and asked respondents how acceptable or unacceptable each of them was.

According to the survey results, for the majority of the population (75%) it is “completely acceptable” (56%) or “more acceptable than unacceptable” (19%) that Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali region should be part of Georgia, without autonomy. There is a statistically significant difference in this opinion between the displaced and non-displaced population, though the difference in opinions is quite small.

While 71% of the displaced population finds the opinion acceptable, 75% of the non-displaced population claims the same. It is noteworthy that a larger portion of the displaced population had difficulty answering this question compared to the non-displaced population (12%, compared to 5%) (Annex 1, Table 81). There are also small differences by settlement type: compared to the capital (80%) and rural settlements (76%), this opinion is less acceptable in other cities (68%).<sup>17</sup>

The opinion that “Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region should be part of Georgia with considerable autonomy” is “completely unacceptable” (20%) or “more unacceptable than acceptable” (14%) for about a third of the population (34%). This opinion is “completely acceptable” or “more acceptable than unacceptable” for 47% of the population (23% and 24%, respectively). No statistically significant differences were found between displaced and non-displaced populations regarding this question. (Annex 1, Table 82). However, there are differences by settlement type: this opinion was found to be more acceptable in rural settlements (53%) than in the capital (44%) and other cities (41%).<sup>18</sup>

As for the opinion that “Georgia should become a federal state, Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region will join as subjects with significant rights, having considerable freedoms regarding the local government, as, for example, individual states in the USA,” for almost half of the population (49%) this opinion is “completely unacceptable” (34%) or “more unacceptable than acceptable” (15%). The opinion is “completely acceptable” or “more acceptable than unacceptable” for 16% of the respondents (4% and 12%, respectively). The same share of the population (16%) states that this opinion is “neither acceptable nor unacceptable” for them (Annex 1, Table 83). In this case, too, there are differences by settlement type: this opinion was found to be more unacceptable in Tbilisi (57%) than in other cities (42%) and rural settlements (47%).<sup>19</sup>

The next idea that was proposed to respondents concerned the creation of a confederation consisting of Abkhazia, South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region, and Georgia. A confederation means the alliance of equal subjects that pursue a common foreign policy but maintain domestic governance separately. This idea is considered “completely unacceptable” (35%) or “more unacceptable than acceptable” (16%) by more than half (52%) of the population. Fifteen percent of the population has a neutral attitude towards this idea and states that this idea is “neither acceptable nor unacceptable” to them, while more than a fifth (21%) found it difficult to answer the question (Annex 1, Table 84). Similar to previous opinions, there are differences by settlement type: this opinion was found to be more unacceptable in Tbilisi (64%) than in other cities (41%) and rural settlements (50%).<sup>20</sup>

As for the opinion that Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region should be independent countries, the vast majority of the population (85%) found it “completely unacceptable” (74%) or “more unacceptable than acceptable” (11%). This opinion was found to be “completely acceptable” (2%) or “more acceptable than unacceptable” (4%) for only 6% of the population. No statistically significant differences were found between the displaced and non-displaced populations regarding this question.

---

<sup>17</sup> Sum of answer options “completely acceptable” and “more acceptable, than unacceptable”

<sup>18</sup> Sum of answer options “completely acceptable” and “more acceptable, than unacceptable”

<sup>19</sup> Sum of answer options “completely unacceptable” and “more unacceptable, than acceptable”

<sup>20</sup> Sum of answer options “completely unacceptable” and “more unacceptable, than acceptable”

(Annex 1, Table 85). However, statistically significant differences were found by type of settlement: this opinion is more unacceptable in Tbilisi (82%) than in other cities (64%) and in rural settlements (75%).<sup>21</sup>

Finally, the idea that Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region should be parts of Russia is considered by an even larger majority of the population (91%) to be “completely unacceptable” (85%) or “more unacceptable than acceptable” (6%). Similar to the previous idea, no statistically significant differences were observed between the displaced and non-displaced population in this opinion (Annex 1, Table 86). However, statistically significant differences were identifiable according to settlement type: this idea is more unacceptable in Tbilisi (90%) than in other cities (80%) and rural settlements (85%).<sup>22</sup>

Respondents were queried on the possibility of improving Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian relations before the restoration of Georgia’s territorial integrity. According to the results, the majority of the population thinks that Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian relations can be improved (59% and 58%, respectively). It is noteworthy that these opinions are shared less by people aged 55 and older than younger people (53-54%, compared to 60-62%). They are also shared less in the capital and other cities (53-56%) than in rural areas (63-64%).

It is noteworthy that the displaced population, compared to non-displaced people, is less likely to believe that improving these relations is possible. While 51% of the displaced population believes that improving Georgian-Abkhazian relations is possible before the restoration of Georgia’s territorial integrity, a relatively higher number of non-displaced people — 59% — believe so. Similarly, while 51% of the displaced population believes that improving Georgian-Ossetian relations is possible, 58% of the non-displaced population believes the same (Annex 1, Tables 76-77).

Focus group participants spoke about how they imagine improving Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian relations. As mentioned in previous chapters, and as reported by the participants, this is possible through contact and relations between the Georgian and Abkhaz/Ossetian populations. Those displaced remarked that meetings should be held and that people should be brought from the occupied territories to attend these meetings. One respondent mentioned a forum held years ago, which doctors from Abkhazia and Georgia attended, and many contacts were made. They also mentioned youth forums in neutral territory, which aim to connect young people living in the occupied territories and those living in territory controlled by Georgia.

*“We need to bring youth from both sides closer. They need to meet, start a dialogue, so that alienation does not occur, because the more alienated we become from each other, the more difficult it will be to restore the territories, and we need to be more involved. The youth from Ossetia must come to us and we must go to them. We need to do things step by step. Nothing will work out otherwise.”* (Male, 57, displaced during the war in 2008, Shida Kartli)

Some of the focus group participants, who are IDPs from Abkhazia, spoke on inequality in the occupied territories and said that until the problem of inequality is resolved in these regions, it is difficult to imagine improving relations:

---

<sup>21</sup> Answer options “completely unacceptable”

<sup>22</sup> Answer options “completely unacceptable”

*“Everyone living there [in Abkhazia], may it be Abkhaz, Georgian, Mingrelian, or anyone else, should have equal rights. Unless we have equal rights there, nothing will be fixed, nothing will be fixed. People there are divided like white, black, green, yellow; as if they are separate colors, that’s how people are divided there.”* (Female, 62, IDP from Abkhazia, Imereti)

Others mention economic cooperation and say that they imagine warming relations by initiating economic ties, which the state should take care of. However, given the current situation, when the work of international and non-governmental organizations is being restricted, this may be problematic:

*“Economic relations used to be allowed in the territory of Abkhazia, when international organizations, NGOs had the opportunity to work on joint projects, and so on. This was banned. It was banned in the territory of Abkhazia years ago. Now, it is banned here as well. Our government, with this new law, ‘the Russian law’, is already threatening the preservation of some relations that have survived to this day.”* (Male, 58, IDP from Abkhazia, Samegrelo)

Some respondents also noted that, first of all, democratic institutions should be developed on the territory of Georgia and the country should be strengthened economically, which could interest Abkhazians and Ossetians and encourage them to interact with Georgians. It is also necessary for the government to work more actively at the international level so that the country does not lose its “niche and attractiveness.”

In contrast, some of the focus group participants believe that without finding a common language with Russia, concessions and improvement in relations will not be possible since the fate of these territories is in Russia’s hands: *“The most important thing is to find a common language with Russia. There is no other option. [...] We can’t get rid of Russia and Russia will never give us up. Whether or not we want to be neighbors, in any case, the issue cannot be resolved without Russia”* (Male, 59, IDP from Abkhazia, Imereti).


This perspective is viewed skeptically by other displaced respondents, who say that negotiations with Russia have never been beneficial or productive for the country. Those that share this opinion voiced stronger support for direct dialogue with Abkhazians and Ossetians.

These findings are also linked with survey findings. According to a plurality (35%) of respondents, the Georgian government’s control over occupied regions should be established via talks/negotiations with Abkhazians and Ossetians, without intermediaries. About a fifth of the public (21%) believes that restoring control should be done through negotiations, but with the help of the West. It is noteworthy that about a tenth (12%) of the population imagines the restoration of control by the Georgian central government over occupied regions through talks/negotiations with Russia, without intermediaries. Almost the same proportion (12%) of the public finds it difficult to answer the question (or refuses to answer), and a small portion states that they cannot imagine the restoration of control of the Georgian government over the occupied regions (5%).

There are small differences in terms of age: for example, negotiations with Abkhazians or Ossetians without a mediator are more favored by older generations (36-37%) than by young people aged 18-34 (32%). This approach is more favored in Tbilisi (38%) and in rural areas (37%) than in other urban settlements (29%).

Notably, those that are displaced have differing opinions on the subject compared to those that are not. The displaced population is less likely to believe that restoring control by the central government of Georgia over occupied regions should be achieved through negotiations without intermediaries. While a quarter of the displaced population believes that restoring control should occur through negotiations without intermediaries, a relatively large share (36%) of the non-displaced population thinks the same. In contrast, those displaced, compared to the non-displaced population, are more likely to believe that restoring control should be done through negotiations with the Abkhazians and Ossetians, with the help of the West (26%; compared to 21%). Regarding the restoration of control through negotiations with Russia, a larger portion of the displaced population favors this option compared to those who are not displaced (19%; compared to 11%) (Annex 1, Table 78) (Diagram 12).

Diagram 12.



It is noteworthy that in focus groups, IDPs from South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region indicated that Russia plays a decisive role in negotiations and that an agreement cannot be reached without it.

*"At least we should try [to negotiate with Russia]. They are the occupiers, and other countries cannot solve anything for us if there is no communication with them. To find a solution, they [the Georgian government] should definitely discuss these challenges with Russia. I think it makes no sense to ignore them."* (Female, 53, displaced during the war in 2008, Shida Kartli)

Some respondents also note that if the West had been able to help, it would have taken appropriate steps and resolved this issue already. And since Georgia will not be able to return the occupied territories by

force, they consider dialogue with Russia to be the only realistic solution. In addition, some respondents also mention dialogue with Ossetians:

*“Of course, now everyone would agree that we cannot take back those territories by force, and without dialogue, I don’t think anything will work out. I think dialogue is necessary, both with Russia and with Ossetians. We can’t succeed otherwise. We should somehow set aside our pride.”* (Male, 57, displaced during the war in 2008, Shida Kartli)

Even though many studies conducted in Georgia confirm that European integration and NATO membership are quite important for a large portion of the Georgian population,<sup>23</sup> when we asked respondents what was more important for Georgia in the near future, European integration (or NATO membership) or the restoration of territorial integrity, a majority chose territorial integrity. More specifically, 55% of the population considers the restoration of territorial integrity to be more important than European integration. On the other hand, about one-fifth of the population (21%) considers European integration to be more important than the restoration of territorial integrity, while another 21% say that both are equally important (Annex 1, Table 79).

There are significant differences in this question by age group. For example, if 32% of young people aged 18 to 34 mention European integration, this percentage is much lower among those 35 to 54, as well as those over 55 (14% and 18%). Also, 34% of those in the capital mention European integration, while this figure is much lower in other cities (18%) and villages (12%).

Similar results were observed when comparing the issue of NATO membership and the restoration of territorial integrity. Fifty-seven percent of the population considers the restoration of territorial integrity more important than NATO membership, while, conversely, 19% prioritizes NATO membership over the restoration of territorial integrity. For 20%, both issues are equally important (Annex 1, Table 80). Similar to the previous question, differences were observed by age and settlement type. While 28% of 18-34 year olds say they want to join NATO, this percentage is much lower in the 35-54 and 55+ age groups (13% and 17%). Also, 31% in the capital say they want to join NATO, while this figure is much lower in other cities (15%) and rural areas (11%).

## 9. The time factor in conflict resolution

According to the survey results, about half of the population (51%) “fully agrees” (14%) or “agrees” (37%) with the opinion that “as more time passes, the chances of reconciliation between Georgians and Abkhazians, Georgians, and South Ossetians, decreases.” Almost a quarter (24%) of the population disagrees with this opinion. In addition, almost a fifth of the population (19%) has a neutral attitude and states that they neither agree nor disagree with the stated opinion. There are differences by age group. While 57% of young people aged 18-34 agree with the above opinion, this percentage is relatively lower among older age groups (48-49%).

It is noteworthy that there are also differences in the opinions of displaced and non-displaced individuals regarding this opinion. Compared to the displaced population, a larger share of the non-displaced

---

<sup>23</sup> <https://caucasusbarometer.org/en/eu2023ge/codebook/><sup>24</sup> Sum of answer options “fully agree” and “agree”

population agrees that as time passes, the chances of reconciliation between Georgians and Abkhazians and Georgians and South Ossetians decreases. While more than half (52%) of the non-displaced population agrees with the stated opinion, a relatively smaller share (42%) of the displaced population says the same (Annex 1, Table 87).

As for the opinion that “as time passes, the displaced population of Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region loses their desire to return to their own homes for permanent residency,” the opinions are almost evenly divided. More than a third (38%) “fully agree” (9%) or “agree” (29%) with this opinion, and about the same share (36%) “fully disagree” (12%) or “disagree” (25%) with it. A fifth (20%) of the population has a neutral position and states that they “neither agree nor disagree” with the stated opinion. Notably, there are differences between the displaced and non-displaced population regarding this opinion as well. Compared to the non-displaced population, a much larger share of the displaced population disagrees with the opinion that as time passes, the displaced population from Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region loses its desire to return to their homes for permanent residence. While about a third (35%) of the non-displaced population disagrees with the opinion, more than half (53%) of the displaced population disagrees with it (Annex 1, Table 88).

Additionally, survey participants were asked on the need for dialogue at an official level between Georgia and Abkhazia, and Georgia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region. According to the results, the vast majority of the population believes that dialogue at the official level between Georgia and Abkhazia and Georgia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region is necessary and must start soon. The survey results show that 83% of the population “fully agree” (37%) or “agree” (46%) with this opinion. Only 3% of the population disagree with the stated opinion. One-tenth of the population gave a neutral answer. There are certain differences depending on the type of settlement: compared to Tbilisi (80%) and other cities (81%), a slightly higher percentage (86%) in rural settlements say that they agree with the above-mentioned opinion.<sup>24</sup>

It is noteworthy that this opinion is agreed with by almost equal majorities of both the displaced and non-displaced population (81%; 83%, respectively), although it is interesting that, compared to the non-displaced population, a slightly higher share of the displaced population disagrees with this opinion. While 2% of the non-displaced population disagrees with the opinion that a dialogue at the official level between Georgia and Abkhazia is necessary and should begin soon, a relatively higher share of the displaced population, 8%, expresses the same position (Annex 1, Table 89).

As for dialogue between Georgia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region, almost the same share of the population (84%) “fully agrees” (36%) or “agrees” (47%) with the opinion that a dialogue at the official level between Georgia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region is necessary and should begin soon. A very small part of the population disagrees with this opinion (3%), while almost one-tenth (9%) have a neutral position regarding the opinion and state that they “neither agree nor disagree” with it. No statistically significant differences were identified between those displaced and the non-displaced regarding this question (Annex 1, Table 90).

---

<sup>24</sup> Sum of answer options “fully agree” and “agree”

However, there are still differences by settlement type: compared to Tbilisi (81%) and other cities (83%), a slightly higher percentage of people in rural settlements (87%) say they agree with the above statement.<sup>25</sup>

## 10. Readiness for new approaches; Supporting and hindering factors

Respondents were additionally queried on factors that could improve relations between Georgians, Abkhazians, and Ossetians. Respondents chose from factors they thought would most contribute to improving relations between Georgians, Abkhazians, and Ossetians. Respondents could choose a maximum of three factors.

The most frequently mentioned factor that would improve relations between Georgians and Abkhazians/Ossetians is Russia's not interfering (30%). At the same time, almost the same share of the population believes that improved economic conditions and the development of new approaches and policies would be effective (29% and 28%, respectively).

For about a quarter of the population, the most conducive factor for the improvement of relations between Georgians, Abkhazians, and Ossetians is the establishment or improvement of economic ties and educating people (26% and 24%, respectively). In addition, for about a fifth of the population (18%), the most conducive factor for the improvement of relations would be finding compromise or making concessions. It is noteworthy that circumstances such as giving additional legal assurances on the non-use of force (15%), establishing or improving cultural ties (14%), the greater involvement of international forces (13%), and encouraging tolerance in society (8%) were also named as factors improving relations between Georgians and Abkhazians and Ossetians.

Notably, there are some differences according to demographic characteristics. For example, Russia not interfering was most often mentioned by young people: while 37% of young people aged 18-34 mention this factor, a relatively lower share of those aged 35-54 and those 55+ mentioned it (24% and 31%, respectively). Russia's non-interference as a factor that would most contribute to improving relations between Georgians and Abkhazians and Ossetians was more frequently mentioned in Tbilisi (34%) and other cities (32%) than in rural settlements (25%).

In addition, improving people's economic condition was mentioned more often by those 55+ (35%) compared to those 18-34 and 35-54 (24-26%). This factor was mentioned more often in rural settlements (32%) than in the capital (27%) and other cities (25%).

Developing new approaches and policies was mentioned more often in the capital (32%) and rural settlements (30%) than in other cities (22%).

Educating people was mentioned by a larger share of those 18-34 (29%) than among older age groups (21%). The issue of educating the people as a factor that would contribute to improving relations between Georgians and Abkhazians and Ossetians was mentioned about twice as often in the capital (36%) than in other cities (19%) and villages (17%).

---

<sup>25</sup> Sum of answer options "fully agree" and "agree"



Establishing or improving cultural ties was mentioned more often in the capital (20%) than in other cities (9%) and in rural settlements (13%).

Opinion differed among those displaced compared to those who are not. For example, establishing or improving cultural ties was mentioned by only 8% of the displaced, while this indicator is relatively higher among the non-displaced population (15%) (Annex 1, Table 91).

From a list of factors and requirements the public also identified which most need to be fulfilled by Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region in order to begin dialogue on their future status. A maximum of three factors were identified by respondents from a show card.

More than half (53%) of the population believe that if those that are displaced can return to Abkhazia or South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region with a complete guarantee of protections to their rights and safety, then can Georgian authorities start a dialogue on the future status of the occupied territories.

Notably, this answer option is more frequently mentioned by people 55+ (56%) than younger age groups (51-52%). In addition, this answer option was mentioned more often in Tbilisi (58%) and other cities (52%) than in rural settlements (49%). It is noteworthy that there are differences between the IDP and non-IDP population on this topic. Compared to the non-IDP population (53%), a larger share of the IDP population (57%) chose this answer option.

The second most frequently mentioned condition that, according to the population, should be fulfilled by Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region is the full withdrawal of the Russian army from the territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region (43%). Compared to other age groups, this issue is most often mentioned by young people aged 18-34 (47%). Also, compared to women (40%), men mention it more often (46%), and compared to urban areas, apart from Tbilisi, (32%), it is mentioned more often in the capital (48%) and in rural areas (47%).

In addition, 17% of the public believes that if the Georgian language is recognized as an official language in Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region, Georgian authorities may start a dialogue on their status. This answer option is mentioned more often by those living in the capital (23%) than those living in other cities (18%) and rural areas (13%).

Also, 17% of the population states that if Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region fulfill the property rights of those displaced (restitution), then Georgian authorities can begin a dialogue on their future status. Like the previous question, this answer option is mentioned more often in the capital (25%) than in other cities (17%) and rural settlements (12%), where approximately 1/5 of the public found it difficult to answer the question.

The remaining conditions on the show card included ending Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali region's alliance with Russia (16%), joining the Gali municipality of Abkhazia and the Akhagori municipality of South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region with Georgia (14%), and providing ethnic Georgians in Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region with the opportunity to study in their native language (13%), were mentioned less frequently. The latter preference was mentioned more often in the capital (20%) than in other cities (10%) and rural settlements (11%).

It is noteworthy that South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region ending its alliance with Russia was mentioned by 22% of young people aged 18-34, which is 10 percentage points lower in the case of people aged 35-54

(12%). Compared to women (13%), this answer option was more frequently given by men (19%). Additionally, while 21% of respondents in the capital gave this answer option, this indicator is lower in other cities (16%) and in the rural areas (12%).

As for joining the Gali municipality of Abkhazia and the Akhagori municipality of the South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region with Georgia, this answer option was more frequently given in Tbilisi (16%) and villages (17%) than in urban settlements of Georgia (7%).

Finally, it is worth noting that there were no differences in the approach of displaced and non-displaced people to this question (Annex 1, Table 92).

## Annex 1 – Quantitative data tables

Note: The percentages presented in each column of the tables add up to 100% if the respondent had the opportunity to choose only one answer from the answer options. If two or more answers are marked, the percentages presented in the column exceed 100%.

**Table 1.** Q1. How informed are you about current developments in Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region? (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
I'm fully informed	9	15	9
I'm partially informed	35	35	35
I'm less informed	37	34	37
I'm uninformed	19	16	19
Don't know	0	0	0

**Table 2.** Q2. Where do you get information about current developments in Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region? (%) Respondents could choose multiple answers.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
Georgian TV	76	70	77
Social media	31	36	31
Internet, excluding social media	30	29	30
Family members, coworkers, friends	12	20	11
People who live in Abkhazia and South Ossetia	3	11	3
Educational institutions (school, university) and their materials, literature	1	1	2
Russian TV	1	1	1
Other	0	2	0
I don't receive information	1	2	1

**Table 3.** Q3. Which specific Russian channels do you get your information from about current developments in Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region? (From 1% who named Russian-language television in Q2. Due to the low percentage, no division into displaced and non-displaced populations is made) Respondents could choose multiple answers.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
RTR	45		
ORT	26		
NTV	41		
TNT	22		
Russia 1 (Россия-1)	33		
Other	8		

**Table 4.** Q4. Out of the following, what type of information do you get about current developments in Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region? (%) Respondents could choose multiple answers.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
Information about political issues	64	61	64
Information about people's daily lives	39	53	38
Information about economic issues	26	34	25
Information about cultural issues	21	23	21
Getting very vague, limited information	13	10	14
Don't know	1	0	1

**Table 5.** Q5. [Show card 5] Using this card, please tell me how sufficient or insufficient the information provided by Georgian mass media about current developments in Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region is. (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
It's completely sufficient	5	3	5
It's relatively sufficient	33	26	33
It's insufficient	34	38	34
It's completely insufficient	24	33	23
Don't know/ Refuse to answer	4	0	5

**Table 6.** Q6. [Show card 6] How familiar are you with the socioeconomic programs and/or peace initiatives created by the Georgian government for the well-being of the population of Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region? (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
I'm very familiar	1	2	1
I'm relatively familiar	29	29	29
I'm almost unfamiliar	25	20	25
I'm completely unfamiliar	43	48	43
Don't know/ Refuse to answer	2	1	2

**Table 7.** Q7. [Show card 6] How familiar are you with the work done by non-governmental organizations or expert circles regarding issues in Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali? (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
I'm very familiar	1	3	1
I'm relatively familiar	20	15	20
I'm almost unfamiliar	25	21	25
I'm completely unfamiliar	51	58	51
Don't know/ Refuse to answer	3	2	3

**Table 8.** Q8.1 Have you heard of the following international formats (missions and mechanisms) - European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM). (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
Yes	74	82	74
No	25	17	26
Don't know/ Refuse to answer	1	1	1

**Table 9.** Q8.2 Have you heard of the following international formats (missions and mechanisms) - The Geneva International Discussions (GID). (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
Yes	55	65	54
No	44	33	44
Don't know/ Refuse to answer	1	2	1

**Table 10.** Q8.3 Have you heard of the following international formats (missions and mechanisms) - Incident Prevention and Response Mechanisms (IPRM). (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
Yes	32	34	32
No	65	60	65
Don't know/ Refuse to answer	3	6	3

**Table 11.** Q9. Which statement do you agree with most? (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
Abkhazia is the historic homeland of both Georgians and Abkhazians.	54	63	54
Abkhazia is the historic homeland of only Georgians.	44	37	44
Abkhazia is the historic homeland of only Abkhazians.	1	0	1
Don't know/ Refuse to answer	1	1	1

**Table 12.** Q10. Which statement do you agree with most? (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region is the historic homeland of both Ossetians and Georgians	47	51	47
South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region is the historic homeland of only Georgians	50	44	50
South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region is the historic homeland of only Ossetians	1	1	1
Don't know/ Refuse to answer	2	5	2

**Table 13.** Q11.1 Please tell me whether you would agree if a person of your ethnicity had a business relationship with Abkhazian, who lives in Abkhazia? (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
I would agree	85	78	85
I wouldn't agree	11	18	10
Don't know/ Refuse to answer	4	4	4

**Table 14.** Q11.2 Please tell me whether you would agree if a person of your ethnicity had a business relationship with Abkhazian who lives in Georgian controlled territory? (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
I would agree	88	86	88
I wouldn't agree	8	13	8
Don't know/ Refuse to answer	4	1	4

**Table 15.** Q11.3 Please tell me whether you would agree if a person of your ethnicity had a business relationship with Ossetian who lives in Ossetia? (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
I would agree	83	71	84
I wouldn't agree	13	27	12
Don't know/ Refuse to answer	4	2	4

**Table 16.** Q11.4 Please tell me whether you would agree if a person of your ethnicity had a business relationship with Ossetian who lives in Georgian controlled territory? (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
I would agree	87	81	87
I wouldn't agree	10	17	10
Don't know/ Refuse to answer	3	2	3

**Table 17.** Q12.1 Whether you would agree if a person of your ethnicity was friends with Abkhazian, who lives in Abkhazia? (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
I would agree	90	83	90
I wouldn't agree	8	13	8
Don't know/ Refuse to answer	2	3	2

**Table 18.** Q12.2 Whether you would agree if a person of your ethnicity was friends with Abkhazian who lives in Georgian controlled territory? (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
I would agree	91	89	91
I wouldn't agree	7	9	7
Don't know/ Refuse to answer	2	2	2

**Table 19.** Q12.3 Whether you would agree if a person of your ethnicity was friends with Ossetian who lives in Ossetia? (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
I would agree	89	81	89
I wouldn't agree	9	17	9
Don't know/ Refuse to answer	2	3	2

**Table 20.** Q12.4 Whether you would agree if a person of your ethnicity was friends with Ossetian who lives in Georgian controlled territory? (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
I would agree	90	85	91
I wouldn't agree	8	13	8
Don't know/ Refuse to answer	2	3	2

**Table 21.** Q13.1 Whether you would agree if a person of your ethnicity was married to Abkhazian, who lives in Abkhazia? (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
I would agree	78	74	78
I wouldn't agree	18	22	17
Don't know/ Refuse to answer	4	3	4

**Table 22.** Q13.2 Whether you would agree if a person of your ethnicity was married to an Abkhazian who lives in Georgian controlled territory? (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
I would agree	83	82	83
I wouldn't agree	14	17	14
Don't know/ Refuse to answer	3	1	4

**Table 23.** Q13.3 Whether you would agree if a person of your ethnicity was married to an Ossetian who lives in Ossetia? (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
I would agree	77	70	77
I wouldn't agree	19	26	18
Don't know/ Refuse to answer	4	5	4

**Table 24.** Q13.4 Whether you would agree if a person of your ethnicity was married to an Ossetian who lives in Georgian controlled territory? (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
I would agree	80	74	81
I wouldn't agree	16	21	16
Don't know/ Refuse to answer	4	5	3

**Table 25.** Q14. [Show card 14] To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: "Georgians and Abkhazians can peacefully coexist in one (shared) country?" (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
I completely agree	35	29	35
I agree	48	52	48
Neither agree nor disagree	8	9	8
I disagree	5	7	5
I completely disagree	2	2	2
Don't know/ Refuse to answer	2	1	2

**Table 26.** Q15. [Show card 14] To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following opinion: „Georgians and Ossetians can peacefully coexist in one (shared) country“? (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
I completely agree	34	26	35
I agree	49	56	48
Neither agree nor disagree	8	8	8
I disagree	5	7	5
I completely disagree	2	3	2
Don't know/ Refuse to answer	2	0	2



**Table 27.** Q16. Do you personally know at least one person who is currently living in Abkhazia (other than the people living in the Gali municipality)? (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
Yes	17	52	14
No	83	48	85
Don't know/ Refuse to answer	1	0	1

**Table 28.** Q17. Do you personally know at least one person currently living in South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region (other than the people living in Akhalgori)? (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
Yes	13	19	12
No	87	79	88
Don't know/ Refuse to answer	1	1	0

**Table 29.** Q18. In the past ten years, have you had any of the following interactions with a person or people who are currently living in Abkhazia (other than the Gali municipality)? (%) Respondents could choose several answers.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
Met them face to face	11	31	9
Contacted them through the internet (e.g. social media, using forums, etc.)	8	30	7
Talked to them on the phone	7	24	5

**Table 30.** Q19. In the past ten years, have you had any of the following interactions with a person or people who are currently living in the South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region (excluding the people living in Akhalgori)? (%) Respondents could choose several answers.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
Met them face to face	5	5	6
Contacted them through the internet (e.g. social media, using forums, etc.)	5	5	7
Talked to them on the phone	5	5	6

**Table 31.** Q20. Do you have an... (%) Respondents could choose several answers.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
Abkhazian friend, who is currently living in Abkhazia?	6	19	5
Abkhazian friend, who is currently living in Georgian-controlled territory?	13	30	12
Ossetian friend, who is currently living in South Ossetia?	6	11	5
Ossetian friend, who is currently living in Georgian controlled-territory?	13	21	12

**Table 32.** Q22-Q23. Please tell me which one of these two statement you agree with... [READ OUT] (%) Respondents could choose the one answer from 2 statements.

	Total		Displaced	Non-displaced
Statement 1: To me, an Abkhazian is a Georgian same as a Mingrelian, Kartlian, Kakhetian, Imeretian, Gurian, Adjarian, etc.	75		64	76
Statement 2: To me, an Abkhazian is a member of a different ethnic group.	22		30	22
Statement 1: To me, an Ossetian is a Georgian same as a Mingrelian, Kartliain, Kakhetian, Imeretian, Gurian, Adjarian, etc.	66		51	67
Statement 2: To me, an Ossetian is a member of a different ethnic group.	31		42	30

**Table 33.** Q24. Do you think the culture and traditions of Georgians and Abkhazians are very different, more different than similar, more similar than different, or very similar? (%) Respondents could choose the one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
Very similar	7	9	6
More similar than different	46	36	47
More different than similar	31	44	29
Very different	5	6	5
Don't know/ Refuse to answer	12	6	12

**Table 34.** Q25. Do you think the culture and traditions of Georgians and Ossetians are very different, more different than similar, more similar than different, or very similar? (%) Respondents could choose the one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
Very similar	5	3	6
More similar than different	40	24	41
More different than similar	34	47	33
Very different	6	7	6
Don't know/ Refuse to answer	14	19	14

**Table 35.** Q26. [Show card 26] What impact do you believe the unsettled Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts have on the Georgian economy? (%) Respondents could choose the one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
Very positive impact	0	0	0
Positive impact	2	1	2
Neither positive nor negative impact/no impact	19	13	19
Negative impact	51	61	50
Very negative impact	23	18	24
Don't know/ Refuse to answer	6	6	6

**Table 36.** Q27.1 [Show card 27] To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? The current unsettled Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts are halting integration with NATO. (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
I completely agree	19	26	18
I agree	47	47	47
Neither agree nor disagree	13	9	13
I disagree	9	7	9
I completely disagree	2	3	2
Don't know/ Refuse to answer	10	9	11

**Table 37.** Q27.2 [Show card 27] To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? The current unsettled Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts are halting integration with EU. (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
I completely agree	17	26	17
I agree	46	46	46
Neither agree nor disagree	13	9	13
I disagree	12	7	12
I completely disagree	3	3	3
Don't know/ Refuse to answer	9	9	9

**Table 38.** Q27.3 [Show card 27] To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? The current unsettled Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts are making it impossible to normalize/regulate relations with Russia. (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
I completely agree	10	16	10
I agree	41	47	41
Neither agree nor disagree	16	14	16
I disagree	14	10	14
I completely disagree	4	1	4
Don't know/ Refuse to answer	14	12	15

**Table 39.** Q28.1 [Show card 28] In your opinion, how concerned are the displaced populations from Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali region about the following issues? - Returning home (To Abkhazia or South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region). (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
Very concerned	61	74	59
More concerned	24	19	24
Somewhat concerned	8	3	8
Less concerned	3	1	3
Not concerned	1	1	1
Don't know/ Refuse to answer	4	1	4

**Table 40.** Q28.2 [Show card 28] In your opinion, how concerned are the displaced populations from Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region about the following issues? - Compensation for lost property. (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
Very concerned	65	69	64
More concerned	24	23	24
Somewhat concerned	5	8	5
Less concerned	2	0	2
Not concerned	0	0	0
Don't know/ Refuse to answer	4	0	4

**Table 41.** Q28.3 [Show card 28] In your opinion, how concerned are the displaced populations from Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region about the following issues? - Integration into Georgian society. (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
Very concerned	25	26	25
More concerned	20	20	20
Somewhat concerned	15	12	15
Less concerned	19	15	20
Not concerned	11	24	10
Don't know/ Refuse to answer	9	4	9

**Table 42.** Q28.4 [Show card 28] In your opinion, how concerned are the displaced populations from Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region about the following issues? - Current living conditions. (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
Very concerned	29	35	28
More concerned	27	24	27
Somewhat concerned	25	31	24
Less concerned	10	8	10
Not concerned	2	1	2
Don't know/ Refuse to answer	8	1	9

**Table 43.** Q28.5 [Show card 28] In your opinion, how concerned are the displaced populations from Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region about the following issues? - The traumatic post-conflict condition. (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
Very concerned	44	48	44
More concerned	34	37	33
Somewhat concerned	10	12	10
Less concerned	2	1	2
Not concerned	1	0	1
Don't know/ Refuse to answer	9	1	9

**Table 44.** Q28.6 [Show card 28] In your opinion, how concerned are the displaced populations from Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region about the following issues? - Being stigmatized by society/being labeled as different. (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
Very concerned	24	31	23
More concerned	25	27	25
Somewhat concerned	14	13	14
Less concerned	16	10	16
Not concerned	10	15	9
Don't know/ Refuse to answer	11	3	12

**Table 45.** Q28.7 [Show card 28] In your opinion, how concerned are the displaced populations from Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali region about the following issues? - Barriers to free movement to Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region. (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
Very concerned	58	71	57
More concerned	28	24	28
Somewhat concerned	8	3	8
Less concerned	2	1	2
Not concerned	0	0	0
Don't know/ Refuse to answer	5	1	5

**Table 46.** Q28.8 [Show card 28] In your opinion, how concerned are the displaced populations from Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali region about the following issues? - Trauma caused by losing friends/family. (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
Very concerned	71	78	70
More concerned	22	20	23
Somewhat concerned	3	1	3
Less concerned	1	0	1
Not concerned	0	0	0
Don't know/ Refuse to answer	3	1	4

**Table 47.** Q29.1 Please tell me, are you agree or not: People living in Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region are the victims of the conflict the same way Georgians are. (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
I completely agree	33	33	33
I agree more than I disagree	40	41	40
Neither agree nor disagree	13	8	13
I disagree more than I agree	8	14	7
I completely disagree	3	1	3
Don't know/ Refuse to answer	4	3	4

**Table 48.** Q29.2 Please tell me, are you agree or not: To improve the relationship with Abkhazians and Ossetians, it's necessary for Georgians, Abkhazians, and Ossetians to acknowledge mistakes made in the past. (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
I completely agree	46	59	45
I agree more than I disagree	36	32	36
Neither agree nor disagree	10	6	10
I disagree more than I agree	3	1	4
I completely disagree	2	0	2
Don't know/ Refuse to answer	3	3	3

**Table 49.** Q29.3 Please tell me, are you agree or not: To improve the relationship with Abkhazians and Ossetians, it's necessary for Georgians to acknowledge mistakes made in the past. (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
I completely agree	32	39	32
I agree more than I disagree	33	21	34
Neither agree nor disagree	12	10	13
I disagree more than I agree	9	13	9
I completely disagree	10	12	9
Don't know/ Refuse to answer	4	5	4

**Table 50.** Q29.4 Please tell me, are you agree or not: We need to start relations from a new page, only focused on the future. (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
I completely agree	45	49	45
I agree more than I disagree	35	32	35
Neither agree nor disagree	11	9	11
I disagree more than I agree	4	5	4
I completely disagree	2	1	2
Don't know/ Refuse to answer	2	5	2

**Table 51.** Q30. [Show card 30] In your opinion, who bears the responsibility for the armed conflict in Abkhazia in the 1990s? (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
Mostly the Georgian side	2	5	2
Mostly the Russian side	46	39	47
Mostly the Abkhazian side	1	2	1
Georgian and Abkhazian sides equally	2	5	2
Georgian and Russian sides equally	3	1	4
Russian and Abkhazian sides equally	11	15	10
All three sides equally	22	26	22
Other	1	1	1
Don't know/ Refuse to answer	12	6	12



**Table 52.** Q31. [Show card 31] In your opinion, who bears the responsibility for the armed conflict in South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region in the 1990s? (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
Mostly the Georgian side	1	1	1
Mostly the Russian side	48	38	48
Mostly the Ossetian side	1	1	1
Georgian and Ossetian sides equally	2	5	2
Georgian and Russian sides equally	3	2	3
Russian and Ossetian sides equally	10	14	9
All three sides equally	22	23	22
Other	1	1	1
Don't know/ Refuse to answer	13	14	13

**Table 53.** Q32. [Show card 31] In your opinion, who bears the responsibility for the armed conflict in South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region in 2008? (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
Mostly the Georgian side	4	2	4
Mostly the Russian side	55	58	55
Mostly the Ossetian side	0	1	0
Georgian and Ossetian sides equally	1	1	1
Georgian and Russian sides equally	5	5	5
Russian and Ossetian sides equally	6	3	6
All three sides equally	15	19	15
Other	1	1	1
Don't know/ Refuse to answer	13	10	13

**Table 54.** Q33. In your opinion, how long will it take to resolve the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian Ossetian conflicts? (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
A year	1	0	1
1-5 years	9	9	9
6-10 years	8	8	8
More than 10 years	24	22	24
These conflicts will never be resolved	10	13	10
Don't know/ Refuse to answer	48	49	48

**Table 55.** Q34. If Russia isn't a preventive factor, how long will it take to resolve the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts? (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
A year	13	21	12
1-5 years	28	33	28
6-10 years	7	4	7
More than 10 years	13	10	13
These conflicts will never be resolved	5	4	5
Don't know/ Refuse to answer	34	28	34

**Table 56.** Q35. [Show card 35] In your opinion, who is currently working actively on regulating the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts? (%) Respondents could choose several answers.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
Georgian government/ministries	38	28	39
International organizations, donors, and their programs and missions (e.g USAID, UN, EU and its monitoring mission – EUMM	26	24	26
Population	14	17	13
Civil society (e.g non-governmental organizations)	13	10	13
Businessmen	3	3	3
Mass media	4	3	4
Academic circles	3	2	3
Other	0	0	0
No one	20	26	19
Don't know/ Refuse to answer	18	22	17

**Table 57.** Q36. [Show card 35] Who do you trust the most to correctly carry out the peace process regarding Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region? (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
Georgian government/ministries	34	27	34
International organizations, donors, and their programs and missions (e.g USAID, UN, EU and its monitoring mission – EUMM	19	12	19
Population	11	13	11
Civil society (e.g non-governmental organizations)	5	2	5
Businessmen	0	1	0
Mass media	0	0	0

Academic circles	1	2	0
Other	1	0	1
No one	16	22	16
Don't know/ Refuse to answer	14	22	14

**Table 58.** Q37. [Show card 37] In your opinion, which governmental institution should be leading the process of regulating Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts? (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
The Office of the state minister of Georgia for reconciliation and civic equality	23	19	23
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs	14	9	15
The Temporary Parliamentary Commission on Restoration of Territorial Integrity and De-occupation	7	11	7
The Ministry of Internally Displaced Persons from the Occupied Territories, Labour, Health and Social Affairs of Georgia	7	6	7
State Security Service	3	2	3
THE Ministry of Internal Affairs	3	0	3
THE Ministry of Defense	2	3	2
The Temporary Administrations of the Autonomous Republics of Abkhazia/South Ossetia	2	3	2
Other	1	1	1
all of them together	24	32	23
Don't know/ Refuse to answer	14	14	14

**Table 59.** Q38.1 [Show card 38] How acceptable or unacceptable are the following: People living in Abkhazian and South Ossetian/Tskhinvali Region's territory receive free medical services in Georgia. (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
Completely acceptable	47	49	47
Rather acceptable than unacceptable	29	28	29
Neither acceptable, nor unacceptable	7	4	7
Rather unacceptable than acceptable	6	11	6
Completely unacceptable	6	7	6
Don't know/ Refuse to answer	4	1	4

**Table 60.** Q38.2 How acceptable or unacceptable are the following: Students living in Abkhazian and South Ossetian/Tskhinvali Region's territory have an opportunity to receive stipends in our universities. (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
Completely acceptable	52	53	51
Rather acceptable than unacceptable	27	25	28
Neither acceptable, nor unacceptable	6	6	6
Rather unacceptable than acceptable	5	6	5
Completely unacceptable	5	7	5
Don't know/ Refuse to answer	5	3	5

**Table 61.** Q38.3 How acceptable or unacceptable is the following: Opening of a transport corridor between Georgia and Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali region. (%) Respondents were asked to select one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
Completely acceptable	52	48	52
Rather acceptable than unacceptable	25	23	25
Neither acceptable nor unacceptable	6	5	6
Rather unacceptable than acceptable	7	10	7
Completely unacceptable	6	10	5
Don't know/Refuse to answer	5	5	5

**Table 62.** Q38.4 How acceptable or unacceptable is the following: The population of Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Regions travel without barriers in Georgia (whether or not Georgians have the ability to travel without barriers to Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region) (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
Completely acceptable	37	37	37
Rather acceptable than unacceptable	27	24	27
Neither acceptable nor unacceptable	8	5	8
Rather unacceptable than acceptable	10	17	10
Completely unacceptable	14	13	14
Don't know/Refuse to answer	3	5	3

**Table 63.** Q38.5 How acceptable or unacceptable is the following: Allowing to sell products produced in Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali region in Georgia (Whether or not Georgian products are sold there). (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
Completely acceptable	34	29	34
Rather acceptable than unacceptable	27	20	27
Neither acceptable nor unacceptable	9	10	9
Rather unacceptable than acceptable	11	18	11
Completely unacceptable	15	15	15
Don't know/Refuse to answer	4	8	4

**Table 64.** Q38.6 How acceptable or unacceptable is the following: People living in Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region's territory receive social and humanitarian aid from the Georgian government. (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
Completely acceptable	35	32	35
Rather acceptable than unacceptable	30	24	31
Neither acceptable nor unacceptable	9	8	9
Rather unacceptable than acceptable	10	19	9
Completely unacceptable	11	10	11
Don't know/Refuse to answer	6	7	6

**Table 65.** Q39. Do you think the Georgian government should hold direct dialogues with the representatives of the de facto governments of Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region. (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
Yes, they should	84	81	84
No they shouldn't	7	8	6
Don't know/Refuse to answer	10	12	10

**Table 66.** Q40. [Show card 40] Which topics should take priority during the dialogue with the representatives of the de facto governments of Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region? (%) Respondents could choose a maximum of two answers.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
Barrier-free movement between the Abkhazian and South Ossetian/Tskhinvali Regions and Georgia	46	40	46
Returning displaced people to Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region	32	38	31
Trade and economic relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region	28	16	28
Education of the young population of Abkhazia and South Ossetia	17	20	17
Providing healthcare for the population of Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region	10	9	10
Compensation of lost property of displaced people	10	12	10
Protecting the civil rights of people from the Gali and Akhagori regions, including ensuring their ability to receive education in their mother tongue	7	7	7
Barrier-free movement of the population of Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region to other countries	5	3	5
Coordinating efforts against organized crime with the de facto governments of Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region	3	2	3
Other (specify)	1	0	1
Don't know/Refuse to answer	12	14	12

**Table 67.** Q41. In your opinion, out of the indicated, what is preventing starting a dialogue between Abkhazians and Ossetians, on one hand, and Georgians, on the other? (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
Russian politics	69	78	69
The lack of will from Abkhazia and South Ossetia	9	7	9
The restraint of the Georgian side	6	1	6
Other (specify)	2	2	2
Don't know/Refuse to answer	15	11	15

**Table 68.** Q42. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “The participation of women in peace processes will change Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian relations for the better”. (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
I completely agree	20	22	19
I agree	53	54	53
I disagree	10	4	11
I completely disagree	4	3	4
Don't know/Refuse to answer	13	17	13

**Table 69.** Q43. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “The participation of the displaced population in peace processes will change the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian relations for the better”. (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
I completely agree	23	40	22
I agree	56	45	57
I disagree	7	6	7
I completely disagree	2	1	2
Don't know/Refuse to answer	11	8	12

**Table 70.** Q44. What impact do you think Georgia's integration in the EU would have on Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian relations? (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
Positive impact	61	67	60
Negative impact	10	8	10
No impact	13	12	13
Don't know/Refuse to answer	17	13	17

**Table 71.** Q45. What impact do you think Georgia's integration in NATO would have on Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian relations? (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
Positive impact	56	69	56
Negative impact	12	10	12
No impact	12	8	12
Don't know/Refuse to answer	20	12	20

**Table 72.** Q46. What impact do you think politically aligning with Russia would have on Georgian-Abkhazian relations? (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
Positive impact	32	29	32
Negative impact	25	30	25
No impact	20	16	20
Don't know/Refuse to answer	24	25	24

**Table 73.** Q47. What impact do you think politically aligning with Russia would have on Georgian-Ossetian relations? (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
Positive impact	31	27	31
Negative impact	25	31	25
No impact	19	14	20
Don't know/Refuse to answer	25	28	24

**Table 74.** Q48. What impact do you think the results of the Russo-Ukrainian war will have on Georgian-Abkhazian/Ossetian relations if the war ends in Russia's favor? (%) Respondents could choose one answer

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
Positive impact	6	6	6
Negative impact	54	63	54
No impact	17	9	17
Don't know/Refuse to answer	23	22	23

**Table 75.** Q49. What impact do you think the Russo-Ukrainian war will have on Georgian-Abkhazian/Ossetian relations if the war ends unsuccessfully for Russia? (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
Positive impact	42	57	41
Negative impact	16	15	16
No impact	17	8	18
Don't know/Refuse to answer	26	20	26



**Table 76.** Q50. Do you think it's possible to improve Georgian-Abkhazian relations before restoring the territorial integrity of Georgia? (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
Yes	59	51	59
No	30	41	30
Don't know/Refuse to answer	11	8	11

**Table 77.** Q51. Do you think it is possible to improve Georgian-Ossetian relations before restoring the territorial integrity of Georgia? (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
Yes	58	51	58
No	32	42	31
Don't know/Refuse to answer	11	7	11

**Table 78.** Q52. [Show card 52] Please tell me in what way you think Georgia's central government can restore control over occupied regions. (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
Talks with Abkhazians/Ossetians, without intermediaries	35	25	36
Talks with Abkhazians/Ossetians with the help of the West	21	26	21
Talks with Russia without intermediaries	12	19	11
Talks with Russia with the help of the West	9	5	9
Talks with Abkhazians/Ossetians with the help of Russia	5	4	5
Military action/use of force	1	2	1
Other (specify)	0	1	0
I can't think of a way to restore it	5	4	5
Don't know/Refuse to answer	12	14	11

**Table 79.** Q53. What do you think is most important for Georgia in the near future? (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
Euro integration	21	19	21
Or restoration of territorial integrity?	55	56	55
Don't read [Neither]	0	0	0
Don't read [Both equally]	21	23	21
Don't know/Refuse to answer	2	1	2

**Table 80.** Q54. What do you think is most important for Georgia in the near future? (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
Becoming a NATO member	19	21	19
Or restoration of territorial integrity?	57	58	57
Don't read [Neither]	0	0	0
Don't read [Both equally]	20	18	20
Don't know/Refuse to answer	3	3	3

**Table 81.** Q55.1 How acceptable or unacceptable is the following: Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region should be part of Georgia, without autonomy... (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
Completely acceptable	56	54	56
More acceptable than unacceptable	19	17	19
Neither acceptable nor unacceptable	9	10	9
More unacceptable than acceptable	5	6	5
Completely unacceptable	5	1	6
Don't know/Refuse to answer	6	12	5

**Table 82.** Q55.2 How acceptable or unacceptable is the following: - Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region should be part of Georgia with considerable autonomy. (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
Completely acceptable	23	24	23
More acceptable than unacceptable	24	31	23
Neither acceptable nor unacceptable	12	9	12
More unacceptable than acceptable	14	17	14
Completely unacceptable	20	15	20
Don't know/Refuse to answer	7	5	7

**Table 83.** Q55.3 How acceptable or unacceptable is the following - Georgia should become a federal state, Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region will become members as subjects with important rights, having considerable freedoms regarding the local government, as e.g. U.S. states. (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
Completely acceptable	4	8	4
More acceptable than unacceptable	12	12	12
Neither acceptable nor unacceptable	16	14	17
More unacceptable than acceptable	15	17	15
Completely unacceptable	34	38	34
Don't know/Refuse to answer	19	11	19

**Table 84.** Q55.4 How acceptable or unacceptable is the following - Confederations of Georgia and of Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region should be created. Confederation means the alliance of two subjects with equal rights, who pursue the same foreign policy but keep domestic ruling separate. (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
Completely acceptable	3	4	3
More acceptable than unacceptable	9	9	9
Neither acceptable nor unacceptable	15	11	16
More unacceptable than acceptable	16	21	16
Completely unacceptable	35	39	35
Don't know/Refuse to answer	21	17	21

**Table 85.** Q55.5 How acceptable or unacceptable is the following - Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region should be independent countries. (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
Completely acceptable	2	1	2
More acceptable than unacceptable	4	1	4
Neither acceptable nor unacceptable	6	5	6
More unacceptable than acceptable	11	10	11
Completely unacceptable	74	78	74
Don't know/Refuse to answer	4	4	4

**Table 86.** Q55.6 How acceptable or unacceptable is the following - Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Regions should be parts of Russia. (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
Completely acceptable	1	0	1
More acceptable than unacceptable	2	1	2
Neither acceptable nor unacceptable	4	6	4
More unacceptable than acceptable	6	6	6
Completely unacceptable	85	85	85
Don't know/Refuse to answer	2	2	2

**Table 87.** [Show card 56] How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement: "As more time passes, the chances of reconciliation between Georgians and Abkhazians, Georgians and South Ossetians decreases"? (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
Fully agree	14	10	14
Agree	37	32	38
Neither agree, nor disagree	19	17	19
Disagree	18	25	18
Fully disagree	6	12	5
Don't know/Refuse to answer	6	4	6

**Table 88.** Q57. [Show card 56] How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement: "As more time passes, the displaced from Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region lose the desire to return to their own homes for permanent residency"? (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
Fully agree	9	8	9
agree	29	19	30
Neither agree, nor disagree	20	17	20
Disagree	25	30	24
Fully disagree	12	23	11
Don't know/Refuse to answer	6	2	6

**Table 89.** Q58. [Show card 56] How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “An official dialogue between Georgian and Abkhazian sides is necessary and must start soon”? (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
Fully agree	37	33	37
Agree	46	48	45
Neither agree, nor disagree	10	8	10
Disagree	2	6	2
Fully disagree	0	2	0
Don't know/Refuse to answer	5	3	5

**Table 90.** Q59. [Show card 56] How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “An official dialogue between Georgian and Ossetian sides is necessary and must start soon”? (%) Respondents could choose one answer.

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
Fully agree	36	34	37
Agree	47	50	47
Neither agree, nor disagree	9	7	9
Disagree	2	5	2
Fully disagree	0	1	0
Don't know/Refuse to answer	4	3	5

**Table 91.** Q60 [Show card 60] What do you think will improve relationships between Georgians and Abkhazians/South Ossetians the most? (%) respondents could choose max 3 answers

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
No interference from Russia	30	30	30
Improving people's economic conditions	29	21	29
Developing new approaches and policies	28	31	28
Establishing/Improving economic ties	26	24	26
Educating the people	24	27	23
Finding a compromise/ making a concession	18	24	17
Giving additional legal guarantees on non-use of force	15	20	14
Establishing/Improving cultural ties	14	8	15
More involvement from international forces	13	10	13
Encouraging society to be tolerant	8	4	9
Other	0	0	0
Nothing will help	1	3	1
Don't know/Refuse to answer	7	7	7

**Table 92.** Q61. [Show card 61] What requirements need to be fulfilled by Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region so the Georgian government can begin a dialogue with them about their future status? (%) respondents could choose max 3 answers

	Total	Displaced	Non-displaced
If the displaced can return to Abkhazia or South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region with the total guarantee of the protection of their rights and safety.	53	57	53
If the Russian Army fully leaves Abkhazian and South Ossetian/Tskhinvali Region territories	43	36	43
If the property rights of the displaced are fulfilled (restitution)	17	21	17
If the Georgian language is recognized as an official language alongside Abkhazian/Ossetian languages in Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region	17	15	18
If Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali quit their alliance with Russia	16	12	16
If the Gali municipality of Abkhazia and the Akhagori municipality of South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region join Georgia	14	10	14
If in Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region, ethnic Georgians are able to study in their native language	13	16	13
Other	0	0	0
Under no circumstance	2	5	2
Don't know/Refuse to answer	14	15	14

## Annex 2 – Detailed methodology

The study used a multi-stage stratified cluster sampling design. The study area was divided into 3 strata: the capital, other urban settlements (including towns), and rural settlements. The sample size in each stratum was distributed proportionally to the population (based on the most recent data available at the time, the 2020 voter lists of the Central Election Commission of Georgia).

The sample size in the urban and rural settlement strata was distributed into substrata according to geographical regions: Northwest, Southwest, Northeast, and Southeast. The sample size in the substrata was determined by the number of population (voters).

The primary sampling unit (cluster) in each substrata is the polling station or stations. Clusters were selected with a probability proportional to the size of the registered voters in them. We used the list of polling stations in Georgia (2020) as the sampling frame. In the capital, due to the relatively low response rate, 5 interviews were determined in each cluster; in other cities, 15; and in villages, 20 interviews (see Table 1).

**Table 1. Distribution of the sample across strata and substrata**

Strata	Population in Strata	Substrata	Number of voters in the substrata	Population share (%)	Target selection in Strata	Target selection in the substrate	Number of interviews in the cluster	Number of clusters
capital	999471	capital	999471	100%	625	625	5	125
cities	1003417	Northwestern cities	192463	19%	625	120	15	8
cities		Northeastern cities	440840	44%	625	275	15	18
cities		Southwestern cities	166830	17%	625	104	15	7
cities		Southeast cities	203284	20%	625	127	15	8
villages	1196094	North-West Villages	403709	34%	750	253	20	13
villages		North-Eastern villages	469897	39%	750	295	20	15

villages		South-West Villages	102935	9%	750	65	20	3
villages		Southeast Villages	219553	18%	750	138	20	7
total	3198982		3198982			2000		204

In the second stage of sampling, households in each cluster were selected using a systematic random walk method. The starting point was the building where the polling station was located during the last national election. The direction of movement and the number of steps were randomized within each cluster.

In each selected household, the interviewer selected one adult member using the Kish table method. Respondent substitution was not allowed, and the interviewer made three attempts to establish contact with a potential respondent.

The number and proportion of responses (the ratio of the number of successfully completed interviews to the number of selected respondents) are given in Table 2.

**Table 2. Response by strata**

Strata	Response	Response rate
capital	619	22%
cities	617	41%
villages	759	62%
total	1,995	35%

Before the fieldwork began, 30 test interviews were conducted as part of a pilot (pretest) to test the research instrument's questions and possible answer options. As a result of the pilot, questions that were unclear or confusing to respondents were changed and refined. As a result of the pretest, after updating the questionnaire, the main fieldwork (1995 interviews) was conducted. After the fieldwork was completed, a field check was conducted, during which 10% of the interviews were checked by other interviewers.

The data and percentages presented in the report are weighted, which allows us to generalize the data to the Georgian-speaking adult population of Georgia.

The data are weighted by respondent selection probability and demographic groups (settlement type, age, gender, education). The respondent selection probability component is calculated based on voters registered in polling stations, and the final correction of weighting coefficients was made based on the 2014 General Population Census.

In parallel with data weighting, data cleaning took place, which involves data processing, identifying logical errors, and assigning a final format.



During data cleaning, a new variable was generated, and the respondents were grouped into two categories: “Displaced” and “Non-displaced”. Respondents who answered “yes” to at least one of the following questions were included as “Displaced”:

- Did you have to leave your home for more than 6 months due to the armed conflict in 1992-1993? (F2 in the questionnaire)
- Did any of your parents or their parents have to leave their home for more than 6 months due to the armed conflict of 1992-1993? (F4 in the questionnaire)
- Did you have to leave your home for more than 6 months due to the August 2008 war? (F6 in the questionnaire)
- Did any of your parents or their parents have to leave their home for more than 6 months due to the August 2008 war? (F8 in the questionnaire)

All other respondents were classified as “Non-displaced.”