

# **ELECTION PULSE OF GEORGIA:**

## **Exploring Voter Attitudes**

**2024**

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## Exploring Voter Attitudes

### Tbilisi, Georgia

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This research explores the key drivers of voter turnout in Georgia ahead of the October 2024 parliamentary elections. It observes the factors potentially driving or deterring citizen participation in the elections, such as attitudes toward elections, party support, civic engagement, and political polarization.

The study employed a mixed-methods approach, combining quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis. In July 2024, a nationally representative phone survey of around 2,000 Georgian citizens was conducted, complemented by five focus group discussions held in August 2024.

As the October 2024 elections approach, the study's findings suggest potential practical actions for crafting voter mobilization campaigns, especially for undecided voters and frequent abstainers.

- **Expected turnout for October 2024 parliamentary elections is high:** Approximately 63% of voters are likely to vote, according to the Gallup-Perry Likely Voter Index.
- **The primary motivation for voting is civic duty (37%),** while 32% cited a lack of hope for change as the primary reason for abstaining.
- **A plurality of voters are undecided about their party support:** while 34% do not know which party to support, 22% declined to answer. Among partisan voters, 29% reported voting for the Georgian Dream and 15% for other parties.
- **The most significant predictor of party support is TV consumption patterns:** those who watch Imedi TV, Rustavi 2, and POSTV are significantly more likely to support the Georgian Dream, whereas individuals who watch other channels are more likely to support opposition parties.
- **A significant share of voters is affectively polarized,** especially regarding attitudes to political parties (68%), and attitudes to party supporters (45%).
- Likely voting is positively related to attitudes to elections, partisanship, civic activism, and affective polarization:
  - Voters who believe that elections can change things in the country are 20 percentage points more likely to vote
  - Voters involved in civic activities are 16 percentage points more likely to vote
  - Partisan voters are more likely to vote than nonpartisans, the Georgian Dream supporters by 23 percentage points and other party supporters by 16 percentage points.
  - Polarized voters appeared 14-18 percentage points more likely to vote
  - Older individuals (55+), rural residents, voters with higher education, and public employees are more likely to vote than younger voters, urban residents, voters without higher education, and the unemployed, respectively.
- Turnout increased by 6-7 percentage points in the survey experiment when emphasizing civic duty and anticipated high turnout.

## INTRODUCTION

The recent enactment of the "Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence," which encroaches on independent NGOs and media organizations in Georgia, has intensified concerns about the country's democratic future and aspirations for European integration. With the October 2024 parliamentary elections on the horizon, many believe these elections serve as a decisive moment, potentially shaping the trajectory of Georgia's political landscape for years to come. To this end, high voter turnout, particularly mobilizing undecided voters to show up at the ballot stations, is seen not only as a pathway to possibly voting the incumbent Georgian Dream party out of office but also as a critical strategy to avoid manipulations using the votes of the voters who did not participate in the elections and therefore, to restrict the possibilities for election fraud.

Realizing the importance of voter mobilization, opposition political parties have devised tailored strategies for their election campaigns to galvanize a broader spectrum of the electorate. Civil society organizations (CSOs) are also stepping up with targeted information campaigns, emphasizing the significance of voter engagement in safeguarding democratic processes. However, despite these efforts, limited empirical evidence on which strategies or tactics are most effective in motivating Georgian voters to head to the polls remains a critically important challenge.

To address this gap, CRRC-Georgia has undertaken a comprehensive mixed-methods research study, incorporating both quantitative and qualitative approaches. The research seeks to uncover Georgian voters' attitudes toward elections and the factors that either drive or deter their participation in voting. The findings are timely and relevant, as we gathered data just before the election campaigns, and they could provide political parties and CSOs with actionable insights that can be used to refine their campaigning strategies.

The report is organized as follows: We describe the methodology, including the data collection process and the analytical approach. The findings section introduces the likely voter model and identifies a share of likely voters in the October 2024 parliamentary elections. Next, we describe public attitudes toward elections, including general outlook, expectations, voting motivations, and other concepts related to voter turnout, such as partisanship, civic engagement, and affective polarization. To address the core objective of this research, we present several models and discuss how attitudes to elections, partisanship, civic engagement, and polarization are related to the likelihood of voting. Lastly, we describe and analyze a survey experiment where we test the effects of various nudges on voter turnout.

## METHODOLOGY

This research is a synthesis of quantitative and qualitative evidence. To measure the attitudes of Georgian citizens towards the elections and what can be potential drivers for high voter turnout, CRRC-Georgia conducted a nationally representative phone survey. Overall, 2,074 interviews with adult (18+) Georgian citizens were administered from July 19 to July 24, 2024. The survey was conducted in Georgian language. The survey was complemented with five focus group discussions between August 12 and 16. The focus groups involved citizens who participated and did not participate in the last elections, representing different age groups, education levels, and regions of Georgia.

This report uses descriptive and inferential statistics based on the data weighted to approximate population proportions. While we use weighted frequencies to describe public opinion on different aspects of political behavior and attitudes, we apply multivariate and univariate regression models to identify significant correlates of key concepts such as voting, party support, polarization, and civic engagement. Regarding model outputs, we report both marginal effects and predictive probabilities.

Multivariate models are typically built using two steps: As a first step, we examine a range of demographic variables, including gender, age, settlement type, education, employment status, income, ethnicity, and religiosity. In the second stage, we add theoretically relevant covariates such as attitudes toward election outcomes, expectations regarding upcoming elections, television consumption habits, party support, affective polarization, and an index of civic engagement. While all base models include all demographic variables, when assessing relationships between the concepts that are the focus of this research, such as voting, party support, and polarization, we add variables measuring these concepts to the base model individually.

The research also involved a survey experiment comprising three experimental treatments designed to increase the likelihood of voting potentially. According to the experimental design, respondents were randomly assigned to one of four equally sized groups. The first group served as the control group and received no verbal intervention. The second group was exposed to a message emphasizing the anticipated higher voter turnout in the upcoming elections. The third group received a scenario highlighting the individual's civic duty to participate in voting. In contrast, the fourth group was exposed to a hypothetical nudge from the Georgian national football team, encouraging citizens to cast their votes. After receiving their respective treatments, all groups, including the control one, were asked a combination of questions assessing their likelihood of voting.

## FINDINGS

Voter turnout is undeniably one of the most vital elements of voter behavior and a key indicator of the legitimacy of free, fair, and democratic elections. The level of voter participation is often seen as a true sign of the public’s engagement in political processes, with higher turnout generally reflecting a greater sense of importance surrounding the election results.


Research on the drivers of voter turnout shows that, in addition to voters’ demographic characteristics, their attitudes to elections, civic engagement, partisanship, and political polarization also matter. Moreover, various tactics can increase voter participation, such as invoking social desirability and the moral duty of voting. Despite the wealth of research conducted in other contexts, there is a notable gap in testing these approaches in Georgia. Recent research indicates that every third voter in Georgia remains undecided just months before the October 2024 elections (Turmanidze, 2024), signaling the need for such research. Hence, opportunities for the voter mobilization discussed below could also prove effective in Georgia, particularly for targeting undecided voters.

### Likely Voter Model

To assess who is more or less likely to vote, we used the Gallup-Perry Likely Voter Index, which includes seven key questions (Pew Research Center 2009). These questions ask how often people think about elections, whether they know where to vote in their precinct, their past voting behavior, their plans to vote in upcoming elections, and the likelihood of voting on a 10-point scale.

Our findings show that while most think about elections rarely or never, 43% think about it at least some time. However, 85% of respondents know where to vote, and 91% have voted at least once in their lifetime. Additionally, 64% reported voting always whenever there were elections, 84% planned to vote in the upcoming election, and 67% reported they would vote in October 2024. To estimate the share of likely voters, we follow a deterministic or threshold approach, where a threshold score is determined for each question in the final estimate based on a pre-defined decision rule. This way, we estimate that 63% of voters will likely participate in the upcoming parliamentary elections in October. This estimate is adjusted for first-time voters who were not of voting age during previous elections.

Chart 1. Estimated percent of likely voters



## Attitudes toward Elections

When examining public attitudes toward elections, most respondents feel their vote is meaningful. People vote mainly because of civic duty, while disillusionment with the possibility of change is the primary reason for abstaining.

Most of the population believes elections are essential, with 59% stating that the outcome of elections matters for the country. In comparison, 27% believe the result will not lead to significant changes, and 15% remain unsure. Moreover, most expect the October 2024 elections to be free and fair - 27% completely agree, while another 40% agree to some extent. Additionally, around 80% of respondents believe their vote will remain secret, with a similar percentage indicating that their vote could be decisive under certain conditions.

While most voters are quite sure about their positive expectations about the elections, their views about motivating and demotivation factors are less well pronounced. When asked about motivations to vote, civic duty is the most frequently cited reason (37%). Other significant reasons include a motivation to support a particular political party and an abstract desire to improve the future. Conversely, the primary reason cited for not voting is a lack of hope for change, reported by 32% of respondents.


Discussions in the focus groups revealed that most respondents recognize the importance of voting. They frequently cited civic duty, the need for change, and the desire for a better future as their main reasons for casting a ballot. Even those who tend to abstain often mentioned these arguments. Nearly all participants were strongly motivated to vote in the upcoming 2024 parliamentary elections, with no one explicitly stating they would not participate. Many emphasized the significance of these elections, often comparing them to the 2012 parliamentary elections. However, reasons for abstention were also noted, such as a lack of trust in political parties, the absence of "new faces" in the political arena, and political nihilism, which were frequently mentioned as key factors.

Nearly all focus group participants, except for a few frequent abstainers, agreed that the elections could significantly impact Georgia's future. While many found it challenging to specify the exact changes they hoped for or expected, they were confident that change would occur, and their vote could be crucial in shaping it. Some respondents explicitly expressed a desire for Georgia to remain pro-European after the elections, emphasized the importance of securing peace in the country, and anticipated improvements in social policies.



Chart 2. Attitudes to elections

**Will the October 2024 elections be free and fair? (%)**




**Civic engagement**

In this research, we define civic engagement broadly and look at voluntary activities relevant to public affairs, such as participation in a protest rally, attending a public meeting, volunteering for some public action, and posting or commenting on political content on social media. The survey shows that people are not very active regarding these four actions. While only seven percent reported participation in a protest rally and eight percent attended a public meeting, almost twice as many (14%) volunteered for a public cause. Likewise, online protest activity is very low: 81% never wrote or commented on anything regarding politics, whereas only two percent did it often. When aggregating all four activities, one in every three respondents had engaged in at least one activity, while two-thirds had not

Chart 3. Civic engagement index

**Participated in any civic activity (%)**



## Party Support

Party identification in Georgia historically has been low, with a majority of voters either lacking party affiliation or choosing not to disclose it (CRRC 2019). In the present study, when asked which party is closest to voters, 32% named Georgian Dream, and 39% identified other parties. Meanwhile, 25% were unsure, and 17% refused to answer. When asked which party they would vote for in the October 2024 parliamentary elections, 29% named Georgian Dream, while 15% supported other parties, 34% were unsure, and 22% declined to answer.

To understand party support dynamics, we conducted a multinomial logistic regression, where correlates of party support are gender, age group, settlement type, employment status, education, income, religiosity, ethnicity, and TV channel consumption patterns. A key finding is that demographic characteristics are generally not strongly correlated with party support, with a few exceptions. For example, individuals aged 55 and older are eight percentage points more likely to support the Georgian Dream. In comparison, public employees are 12 percentage points more likely to be the ruling party's supporters. Moreover, religious individuals are seven percentage points more likely and those who watch pro-government television are 25 percentage points more likely to support the Georgian Dream.

The most significant predictor for those supporting other parties is TV channel preferences, with individuals who do not watch pro-government TV being 23 percentage points more likely to support opposition parties. Other variables showed limited correlation with party support.


Regarding nonpartisanship, the analysis shows a relatively uniform distribution across demographic groups, except for ethnic minorities and those employed in the private sector, who are more likely to be nonpartisan than ethnic Georgians and individuals not active in the labor force, respectively.

During the focus group discussions, most respondents refrained from clearly stating which party they intended to vote for, with only a few openly disclosing their support for either the Georgian Dream or the opposition. Many noted they would first observe the election campaigns conducted by the parties before making their final decision. Key issues like European integration, securing peace, and improving social and economic policies were highlighted as decisive factors in their eventual choice. Some respondents also voiced skepticism toward political parties, suggesting they would fail to present well-developed policy strategies or eventually abandon their promises after the elections.

In conclusion, most respondents are nonpartisan or do not reveal their party support. Demographic variables have limited influence on party support, with TV consumption patterns emerging as the most significant factor for predicting political allegiances.

Chart 4. Party support

**Will you vote GD or some other party in October 2024 parliamentary elections? (%)**



**Affective Polarization**

Previous research revealed that in Georgia, voters have little disagreement on policy issues and are not polarized on policy preferences (Gilbreath & Turmanidze, 2020). However, voters’ polarization is significant when considering emotional animosity (affective polarization) regarding the opposing political camps – the ruling party vs the opposition (Chkhetiani, 2022; Silagadze, 2022). This study also looks at affective polarization as a relevant factor for voter turnout. To measure polarization, we asked respondents about their attitudes towards parties and party supporters of the opposite camps, the ruling party, and the opposition. Specifically, we asked whether the ruling party and opposition were doing good things for the country, what the respondents’ attitudes to the ruling party and opposition supporters were, and how comfortable the respondent would be with a friend who was a ruling party or opposition supporter.


The majority agreed when asked whether the Georgian Dream is doing good things for the country, whereas only 22% expressed positive opinions about the opposition. Most respondents held neutral attitudes toward both Georgian Dream supporters and opposition supporters, although slightly more favorable attitudes were expressed toward Georgian Dream supporters. Regarding social interactions, 65% of respondents would feel comfortable if their friends supported the Georgian Dream or the opposition, with only a tiny minority indicating discomfort.

To quantify affective polarization, we constructed indices using attitudes toward the Georgian Dream versus opposition, attitudes toward party supporters of the two political forces, and feelings about friends supporting the ruling party or the opposition parties. Recoding do not know into a 0, we devised a 5-point scale on each question, where a higher score indicates a negative attitude. After subtracting the minimum

score from the maximum score for each pair of questions, we ended up with a polarization core ranging from 0 to 4. Since we only saw a qualitative difference between 0 and other scores, we transformed indices into dummy variables, where 0 is no polarization, and 1 denotes at least some level of polarization.

The analysis reveals that the highest levels of affective polarization occur around attitudes toward political parties (68%), followed by attitudes toward party supporters (45%). Social polarization regarding friends' political affiliations is lower, at 20%. When we analyzed the three polarization indices using logistic regression, we found notable differences only among age groups and partisan groups: older individuals (55+) are generally more polarized, as are party supporters, particularly those aligned with the Georgian Dream.

Chart 5. Affective polarization indices by party support



### Who are likely voters?

There is ample research examining the correlation of voter turnout with voters' demographic characteristics and a number of factors, such as expectations regarding elections, civic activism, partisanship, and polarization.

Based on previous scholarship, we hypothesize that expectations regarding free and fair elections and belief in the decisiveness of one's vote are positively related to turnout. As early as the 1960s, Anthony Downs (1957) laid the groundwork for understanding the factors influencing voter participation, suggesting that voters are more inclined to cast their ballots if they believe their vote has a greater chance of influencing the outcome. Moreover, voters' decision to participate in elections is also related to their

expectations regarding the quality of elections: as the analysis of the multi-election data confirms that when people believe elections are free and fair, they are more likely to vote (Birch, 2010).

While positive perceptions regarding elections contribute to the propensity to vote, voluntarily engaging in certain activities is even more likely to be associated with turnout. Indeed, research demonstrates that individuals who participate in protests, sign petitions, donate money, or are active on social media are more likely to vote (Sherif, 2022).

A strong link between partisanship and turnout has been established since the beginning of electoral studies (Downs, 1957; Campbell et al., 1960; Fiorina, 1976). A recent study even claims that partisanship is the cause of voting, not just a consequence of it (Rau, 2022).

While positive expectations, civic activism, and partisanship tend to increase turnout, political polarization may act as a double-edged sword for voter turnout when ideological or emotional animosity between parties grows sharper. Some studies argue that intensified party polarization makes party lines more distinct and the stakes of political contests more pronounced, making voters more likely to vote (Hetherington, 2008). However, competing evidence suggests that the growing divide between political parties alienates moderate voters and discourages them from voting (Fiorina et al., 2011).

Examining data from 23 elections in 17 European democracies (2017) also explored the effects of polarization, finding that increased polarization tends to spell out party identities, making the policy differences between parties more distinct. This more explicit "party menu" can energize voters, giving them a sharper sense of what is at stake in the election and motivating them to turn out in more significant numbers.

Examining the survey data, we analyze voting likelihood with demographic variables. Notably, there are no significant differences between genders in voting likelihood, but older individuals (55 and above) are almost 20 percentage points more likely to vote than younger individuals (18-34). Urban and capital residents are less likely to vote than rural residents. Public employees, more educated individuals, and those who report their income are also more likely to vote than individuals outside the labor force, less educated individuals, and those who do not report their income, respectively.

Religiosity also plays a role, with people who attend religious services at least once a month being 70% likely to vote, compared to 63% of those who attend services less frequently. Ethnic Georgians are more likely to vote than ethnic minorities, and civic engagement is a strong predictor - active citizens are 16 percentage points more likely to vote than passive ones.


In addition to voters' demographic and behavioral characteristics, their attitudes are strongly related to voting. For instance, attitudes toward elections significantly influence the likelihood of voting. People who believe elections can change things in the country are 20 percentage points more likely to vote than those who believe that election results do not matter. Moreover, expectations that elections will be free and fair are associated with an 11 percentage points higher likelihood of voting. Similarly, belief in ballot secrecy raises the likelihood of voting by 23 percentage points, and belief in the decisiveness of vote boosts the likelihood of voting even more – by 29 percentage points.

Participation in civic activities, partisanship, and closely associated TV consumption patterns also matter. Citizens active in civic matters are 16 percentage points more likely to vote. Likewise, voters who watch television, regardless of whether it is pro-government or not, are more likely to vote than those who do not watch TV. Supporters of Georgian Dream are the most likely to vote (78%), followed by other party supporters (71%). As expected, those still deciding are less likely to vote (55%), followed by voters who refuse to disclose their party preferences (61%).

Affective polarization also plays a significant role in the likelihood of voting. Whether we look at the polarization index regarding parties, party supporters, or partisan friends, the picture is identical on all three measures of affective polarization: Polarized voters are 14-18 percentage points more likely to vote than non-polarized voters.

Overall, voters' demographic characteristics explain little about their propensity to vote. In contrast, attitudes to and expectations regarding elections, civic activism, partisanship, and affective polarizations are strongly related to the likelihood of voting. In the next section, we explore several low-cost interventions that have the potential to boost turnout based on existing research outside of Georgia.

Chart 6. Who are likely voters?



## How to boost Turnout?

Research in political behavior has identified a range of behavioral nudges that can help effectively mobilize voters. Such nudges are soft, often costless, or low-cost interventions that alter people's decisions (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). Regarding turnout studies, nudges typically take the form of an experiment in which one group receives no additional information. In contrast, other groups receive specific information through face-to-face contacts, phone calls, or online.

Research shows that even seemingly unrelated factors, such as declaring an intent to vote, increase the likelihood of following through. For example, Greenwald et al. (1987) demonstrated that asking students the day before an election to predict whether they would vote significantly increased voter turnout compared to a control group that was not asked. This result highlights the potential of prompting individuals to reflect on their voting intentions to increase participation.

Another critical direction to boosting voter turnout involves invoking emotional incentives to mobilize voters through prosocial motivation and norm compliance. For example, Panagopoulos (2010) conducted a field experiment in which participants were randomly assigned to receive nonpartisan messages reminding them that voting is a public action. One group was informed that the names of those who voted would be published in the local newspaper (the "pride" treatment), while another group was told that the names of those who failed to vote would be published (the "shame" treatment). Both treatments effectively increased voter turnout, with the shame condition proving more impactful, leading to a 6.3% increase compared to the 4.5% increase in the pride group.

A similar study in New Zealand (Allpress & Rangasivak, 2020) explored the impact of positive social norm messaging on voter turnout, emphasizing the decisive power of each vote, the importance of not missing out (loss aversion), civic duty, gratitude, relevance of local issues, and social norms. While emphasizing the power of an individual's vote, the messages appealing to civic duty and expressing gratitude in advance increased the turnout, referring to a highly declared turnout being the most efficient one.

The impact of "everyone else is voting" is also demonstrated in the experiments by Gerber and Rogers (2009), where participants were exposed to messages about either high or low expected turnout. The study found that emphasizing high turnout significantly increased voting intentions, particularly among infrequent and occasional voters.


Following the research tradition of testing potential interventions before using them in practice, we conducted a survey experiment and tested some nudges to boost voter turnout. These nudges included a control group, where no additional information was given, and three experimental groups that received different prompts. In all experimental groups, the idea was to invoke a sense of social pressure that would influence their decision to vote. All respondents answered the seven questions used in the likely voter model.

- **Public opinion:** In the parliamentary elections 2020, 56% of voters voted. Polls show that in 2024 parliamentary elections, more voters will vote - 65%. What do you expect the turnout to be: 65%, more than 65%, or less than 65%?

- **Civic duty:** Giorgi/Nino decided to vote but learned about the traffic jam in the city. Then friends called and asked them to go out. Giorgi/Nino thought, “Fun can wait; better to go and vote,” and headed to the polling station. How would you assess Giorgi/Nino's behavior, positively or negatively?
- **Footballers’ nudge:** Georgia's national football team called on the voters to participate in the 2024 parliamentary elections. Will this call increase, decrease, or not affect the turnout?

The experiment showed that public opinion and civic duty nudges significantly increased the likelihood of voting, raising turnout by 6-7 percentage points. However, the football team nudge had no statistically significant effect.

Chart 7. How to boost turnout?



The nudges had different effects depending on demographic groups. For instance, public opinion and civic duty nudges substantially impacted men, older voters, unemployed individuals, those with higher education, ethnic Georgians, more religious people, and those who are relatively poorer. Watching pro-government TV also amplified the effect of these nudges, while partisan affiliation did not significantly alter the response to the nudges.

Focus group discussions revealed that voters are skeptical of the ability of non-partisan actors to mobilize undecided voters and frequent abstainers. They suggested that only persuasive election campaigns from political parties, introducing “new faces” in the political arena, and consistent face-to-face interactions with political parties would be game changers.

Overall, voter turnout is analyzed when people have positive expectations about elections, with many viewing their vote as decisive. Civic duty is a strong motivation for voting, while disillusionment remains a barrier for some. Most people are not intensely partisan, but many are affectively polarized. When it comes to correlates of voter turnout, these contextual factors all matter: Voter turnout positively influences civic engagement, expectations of free and fair elections, belief in ballot secrecy, partisanship, and TV consumption patterns. Polarized individuals are also more likely to be voters. Finally, our experiment suggests that public opinion and civic duty nudges can increase voter turnout, particularly among certain demographic groups.



## CONCLUSIONS

This research, with its comprehensive analysis of voter turnout drivers in Georgia, offers significant findings for political parties and civil society. It focuses on public attitudes toward elections, partisanship, political polarization, and demographic factors, providing key insights that can help political parties understand voting behavior and party support ahead of the 2024 parliamentary elections.

Using the Gallup-Perry Likely Voter Index, we estimate that 63% of voters will likely participate in the upcoming October 2024 elections. The study's quantitative and qualitative components demonstrate that most respondents believe their vote is meaningful and can make a difference. Civic duty emerges as the most frequently cited motivation for voting, while the main reason for abstention is skepticism about the possibility of change.

This research also confirmed earlier observations about weak party identification and party support. When asked which party they plan to vote for in the October 2024 elections, almost one in every three indicated the Georgian Dream, and about one in six named other parties. Notably, most voters still decide or refuse to disclose their party of choice.

While demographic characteristics have a limited impact on party support, the influence of TV consumption patterns is significant. The Georgian Dream receives higher support among older voters (55 and above), public employees, and religious individuals. However, the strongest association is between party support and TV consumption patterns. Watching pro-governmental channels is linked to supporting the ruling party while watching other channels increases the likelihood of supporting an opposition party.

The research also highlighted high levels of affective polarization, especially regarding attitudes toward political parties and party supporters. While the Georgian Dream supporters exhibited higher levels of polarization, polarized voters are generally significantly more likely to vote than non-polarized voters, indicating that political division is a strong motivator for electoral participation.

Demographic characteristics play a moderate role in voter turnout, except for age, education, and employment status, which have more predictive power. Expectedly, older individuals (55 and above) are significantly more likely to vote than younger individuals (18-34), while rural residents are more likely to vote than those living in urban or capital areas. Moreover, public employees and more educated individuals are more likely to vote than those outside the labor force and less educated individuals.

The research also explored various strategies to increase voter turnout. Public opinion and civic duty nudges were effective, raising turnout by 6-7 percentage points. However, nudges from famous public figures like the national football team did not yield statistically significant effects.

The study suggests that strategies focusing on civic duty and addressing political nihilism could effectively increase voter turnout. As the 2024 parliamentary elections approach, understanding these dynamics will be critical for political parties aiming to engage a wide range of voters and address the concerns that currently fuel abstention.

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