Грузини хочуть, щоби їхній уряд підтримав Україну
Війна Росії з Україною шокувала світ. Вона також шокувала Грузію, а нове опитування від CRRC Georgia викриває ступінь наявних політичних наслідків.
Наслідки війни, що стосуються зовнішньої та внутрішньої політики Грузії, виявилися доволі масштабними. Офіційна позиція Грузії щодо війни була суперечливою: в той час як прем’єр-міністр Іраклі Гарібашвілі категорично заявив, що Грузія не приєднається до санкцій, накладених Заходом проти Росії, президент Грузії Саломе Зурабішвілі почала медійний та дипломатичний бліц у Європі, висловлюючи рішучу підтримку Україні.
На відміну від реакції влади щодо війни, реакція суспільства була однозначною. Грузини виходять в підтримку України у всіх містах та селах.
З огляду на війну в Україні та навколишні потрясіння в Грузії, 7-10 березня CRRC Georgia провели опитування, яке охопило 1092 респондента. Результати опитування дозволили зробити висновки щодо того, кого грузини звинувачують у війні (Росію), яких дій грузини прагнуть від свого уряду (підтримати Україну), а також щодо внутрішніх політичних наслідків реакції влади (“Грузинська мрія” понесла значні втрати у підтримці виборців).
Грузини звинувачують Росію у війні
Переважна більшість грузинського суспільства покладає відповідальність за війну на Росію (43%) або на Володимира Путіна (37%). Інакше вважають 3% респондентів за винятком 9%, які не визначилися.
Chart 1
Громадськість також запитали про мотивацію Росії до війни. Отримані дані показали, що більшість вважає, що Росія почала війну аби захопити певні території (34%) чи Україну загалом (25%), щоб відновити Радянський Союз (20%), а також щоб запобігти вступу України в НАТО (17%). Інакше відповіли менш ніж 10% опитаних.
Chart 2
Суспільство хоче, щоб грузинська влада підтримала Україну
Респондентів запитали, чи вважають вони, що уряд Грузії має висловити більшу підтримку уряду України, має залишити наявний рівень підтримки, зменшити рівень підтримки чи не підтримувати взагалі. Значна більшість опитаних вважають, що підтримки має бути більше (61%) або що вона має залишатися на наявному рівні (32%). Лише 2% вважають, що підтримки має бути менше, 1% вважають, що її взагалі не має бути.
Chart 3
Окрім зазначеного вище, респондентів запитали, чи були на їхню думку прийнятними чи неприйнятними певні дії уряду у відповідь на кризу.
Переважна більшість грузин підтримує надання гуманітарної допомоги Україні (97%), прийняття українських біженців (96%), а також надання фінансової допомоги Україні.
Дві третини опитаних (66%) підтримують ідею надання дозволу грузинським добровольцям поїхати в Україну; уряд Грузії намагався завадити цьому.
Близько половини (52%) підтримали б грузинську владу у озброєнні України.
Chart 4
Суспільство хоче, щоб Грузія взяла участь у санкціях
Громадськість бажає, аби санкції проти Росії були сильнішими, а більшість хоче, щоб Грузія приєдналася до них. Це різко контрастує з відмовою прем’єр-міністра Іраклі Гарібашвілі приєднатися до санкцій або впровадити власні.
Опитуваних також запитали, чи вважають вони, що країни, які наклали санкції на Росію, мають посилити їх, утримувати на наявному рівні, зменшити силу санкцій чи не накладати їх на Росію взагалі.
Результати показали, що переважна більшість вважає, що санкції мають бути посилені (71%) або залишитися на наявному рівні (10%). Лише 4% вважає, що санкції мають бути пом’якшені, 3% відсотки вважають, що вони мають бути зняті взагалі.
Chart 5
На питання про те, чи уряд Грузії має приєднатися до санкцій, більшість респондентів відповіли ствердно (66%). Думки розділилися щодо того, чи Грузія має приєднатися до всіх санкцій (39%), чи до деяких (27%). Лише 19% відповіли, що Грузія не має приєднуватися до санкцій взагалі. 14% не були певні у цьому питанні.
Chart 6
Євроатлантичне майбутнє України та Грузії
З огляду на вторгнення Росії, Україна подала заявку до Європейського Союзу, і цей крок швидко наслідували Грузія та Молдова.
Громадськість рішуче підтримує подання заявки Грузією та Україною на статус кандидата в ЄС. В той же час, відзначаються невеликі зміни думок щодо загальної підтримки членства Грузії в ЄС та НАТО (яка вже була високою) з початку війни.
Респондентів запитали, наскільки сильно вони підтримують або не підтримують надання Україні та Грузії членства в Європейському Союзі. Ці дані показали високу підтримку грузинським суспільством надання статусу кандидата до ЄС обидвом країнам.
Chart 7
Респондентів також запитали, чи підтримують вони інтеграцію Грузії в Європейський Союз, НАТО, а також в очолений Росією митний союз.
Дані опитування “Кавказький барометр 2020”, яке включало в себе подібне питання, показали, що 73% грузинів підтримували членство в ЄС, 71% підтримували членство в НАТО. Сьогодні, 75% підтримує членство в ЄС і 70% підтримує членство в НАТО, що статистично не відрізняється від даних за 2020 рік.
Заяви президента та прем’єр-міністра щодо війни
Прем’єр-міністр Грузії Іраклі Гарібашвілі зазнав значної критики щодо своєї реакції на війну. В той час як більшість світової спільноти запровадила санкції у відношенні до Росії, Гарібашвілі твердо заявив, що Грузія не буде брати участі у санкціях. Президент України Володимир Зеленський опублікував твіт з подякою грузинському народу за підтримку, та в той же час розкритикував грузинську владу за її відсутність.
На противагу заявам прем’єр-міністра, президент Грузії Саломе Зурабішвілі отримала широке схвалення за її реакцію відносно конфлікту. Зурабішвілі висловила рішучу підтримку Україні, а також здійснила дипломатичний та медіа-тур країнами Європи у підтримку України.
Зважаючи на зазначене вище, не дивно, що громадськість підтримує дії президента щодо війни значно більше, ніж дії прем’єр-міністра.
В той час як 64% погоджуються з діями Зурабішвілі відносно війни, лише 41% погодилися з діями Гарібашвілі, що показує розрив у 23%. Окрім цього, 15% не схвалили дії Зурабішвілі, а 39% не схвалили дій Гарібашвілі. Таким чином, рейтинг чистого схвалення Зурабішвілі складає +49%, а рейтинг чистого схвалення Гарібашвілі складає +2%.
Chart 8
Якщо розглядати дані, розбиті за партійними уподобаннями, вони демонструють, що вищий рівень ефективності Саломе Зурабішвілі порівняно з Гарібашвілі виходить з більшого рівня підтримки з боку опозиції: в той час як 61% опозиції підтримують дії та реакції Зурабішвілі відносно війни, лише 32% підтримали дії Гарібашвілі. На противагу, Гарібашвілі та Зурабішвілі мають доволі подібний рівень підтримки серед прихильників “Грузинської мрії”.
Chart 9
Політичні наслідки
З огляду на непопулярну реакцію Гарібашвілі щодо війни, не дивно, що підтримка “Грузинської мрії” скоротилася.
Щоб визначити політичні преференції респондентів, в ході опитування ставили такі питання: а) за кого вони б голосували, якщо б парламентські вибори проводилися завтра. Якщо респондент не був певний у своїх симпатіях, пропонувалося відповісти, якій з партій вони віддають перевагу.
Дані демонструють зниження у 10% в підтримці “Грузинської мрії”. Сьогодні, 22% респондентів підтримали б “Грузинську мрію” на виборах, якщо вони проходили б завтра. Для порівняння, у опитуванні в січні 2022 32% респондентів відповіли на це питання на користь влади.
Таким чином, “Грузинська мрія”, хоча б тимчасово, втратила близько третини своїх виборців.
Однак, незрозуміло, чи ця втрата буде перманентною. Дані не показують зростання підтримки опозиції порівняно до даних за січень. Радше, серед громадськості зросли показники невизначеності щодо того, кого б вони підтримали.
Опитування CRRC Omnibus у січні 2022 показало, що 27% респондентів відповіли, що вони були непевні щодо того, кого вони б підтримали на парламентських виборах, в той час як у березні в опитуванні, присвяченому Україні, 38% респондентів відповіли так само, що демонструє зростання на 12%.
Дані також демонструють невелике зниження підтримки опозиції: в січні 2022 підтримка опозиції становила 25%, а в березні 2022 вже 20%.
Доля респондентів, що відмовилися відповідати, яку партію вони б підтримали, змінилася в порівнянні двох опитувань в межах похибки (з 17% в січні до 20% в березні).
В той час як офіційна реакція на російську війну була апатичною, громадськість одностайно підтримала Україну та майже будь-які дії у допомогу країні в боротьбі проти Росії. Погляди суспільства на євроатлантичне майбутнє Грузії майже не змінилися. Тим не менш, погляди суспільства на владу змінилися, а “Грузинська мрія” втратила, щонайменше тимчасово, близько третини своїх прихильників.
Автори статті: Дастін Гілбрет, Давид Січінава, Крістіна Вачарадзе, Анано Кіпіані, Ніно Мжаванадзе, Махаре Ачаідзе, співробітники CRRC Georgia.
Переклад статті та матеріалів виконала Олександра Зур’ян - правозахисниця, співробітниця Центру участі та розвитку (Тбілісі).
Погляди, висловлені у статті не обов'язково відповідають поглядам CRRC Georgia або інших пов’язаних організацій.
Дані, на основі яких базується ця стаття, доступні тут.
Ця стаття була вперше опублікована в рубриці Data Blog від CRRC та OC Media.
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Do voters in less than democratic contexts matter or are elections simply facades used to create a veneer of democratic accountability for domestic and international actors? Within the Autocratic Response to Voter Preferences in Armenia and Georgia project, funded by Academic Swiss Caucasus Net, CRRC-Georgia and CRRC-Armenia aimed to help answer this question, at least for Georgia and Armenia. On October 27, Caucasus Survey published the results of the project in a special issue, available here.Was the population informed about the constitutional reform in Georgia?
After 10 months of discussions, the parliament of Georgia adopted amendments to the constitution of the country on September 29th and overrode the president’s veto on October 13th, 2017. The most widely discussed amendments are about rules for electing the president, self-governance principles, the definition of marriage, the sale of agricultural land to foreigners, the minimum age of judges and the country’s foreign policy orientation. Because of the importance of the amendments, one would expect a high level of awareness among the population. However, despite the public meetings held and media coverage of the issue, according to the CRRC/NDI survey from June 2017, a majority of the population of Georgia was not aware of the constitutional reform process.Gender (in)equality on TV
Stereotypes are an inseparable part of every society, and present in many parts of everyday life. Georgian society is no exception in this regard. For example, some professions like teaching are stereotypically thought of as “women’s professions” while others like being a soldier are considered “men’s professions”. The media is considered one of the strongest means through which stereotypes are strengthened or broken. In Georgia, TV is the most important media, given that according to CRRC/NDI data, 73% of the population of the country name television as their primary source of the information. In order to understand the dynamics around gender-based stereotypes on TV, CRRC-Georgia monitored the main evening news releases and political talk shows broadcast during prime time (from 18:00 to 00:00) on five national and three regional channels from September 11 to November 12, 2017 (Channel One of the Public Broadcaster, Adjara, Rustavi 2, Imedi, Maestro, Trialeti, Gurjaani, Odishi) with the support of the UN Joint Program for Gender Equality with support from UNDP Georgia and the Swedish government.As many Georgians think the West spreads propaganda as Russia
On 13 February, the United States released its Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community. In it, the significance of Russian influence operations in Georgia were highlighted. Just eight days earlier, on 5 February, a coalition of Georgia’s leading non-governmental organisations made an official offer to support the Government of Georgia, the EU, and NATO in their efforts to counter anti-Western propaganda.People in Georgia approve of doing business with Russians, despite interstate hostility
In the 2017 wave of CRRC’s Caucasus Barometer survey, 40% of the population of Georgia named Russia as the main enemy of the country. Turkey and the United States garnered the second highest share of responses with 3% each. Yet, no particular animosity towards ethnic Russians is observed in answers to a question about people’s (dis)approval of individuals of their ethnicity doing business with Russians. This blog post examines how answers differ by people’s opinions about whether or not Russia is the main enemy of Georgia.Which groups name Russia as Georgia’s main enemy?
In 2017, 40% of the population of Georgia named Russia as the main enemy of Georgia. Yet the opinion that Russia is the main enemy of the country is not equally present in different demographic groups. This blog post uses data from CRRC’s 2017 Caucasus Barometer survey to gain a better understanding of the characteristics of those who report Russia is the country’s main enemy.Disinformation in the Georgian media: Different assessments for different media sources
In Georgia, supporters of the government and opposition often express contrasting opinions about the independence and reliability of specific news outlets. Based on the CRRC/NDI December, 2017 survey findings, this blog post looks at whether people think or not that the Georgian media spreads disinformation, which groups tend to think so, and how this opinion differs by type of media. “Disinformation” was defined in the questionnaire as “false information which is spread deliberately with the purpose to mislead and deceive people,” and the questions about it were asked separately about TV stations, online media, and print media.The EU, USA or Russia: Who is believed to be able to support Georgia best?
In recent years, Georgia has benefited from EU and US assistance, with around €400 million indicatively allocated for the EU’s projects in Georgia in 2017-2020, and the US government increasing assistance to Georgia in the 2018 Spending Bill. In contrast, Georgia’s relationships with Russia are tense, with diplomatic relations terminated in 2008.Budget priorities are similar to people's spending priorities
Georgia’s state budget amounted to GEL 12.5 billion in 2018. The Ministry of Labor, Health and Social Affairs; Ministry of Regional Development and Infrastructure; and Ministry of Education and Science had the largest appropriations at 28.2% (GEL 3.528 billion), 14.5% (GEL 1.815 billion), and 9.5% (GEL 1.186 billion) of the budget, respectively. In the 2018 June CRRC/NDI survey, respondents were asked, “What are your top three priorities for spending, understanding it means cutting elsewhere?” Respondents were provided with a show card and allowed to name up to three answers. This blog post looks at whether responses match up with actual spending, and how priorities vary among different demographic groups.NGOs in Georgia: Low trust, high expectations? (Part 1)
Over the last decade, people in Georgia have reported rather low levels of trust toward NGOs. At the same time, when asked during surveys to assess specific aspects of NGO activities, the answers have usually been positive. This blog post is based on the findings of a survey on attitudes toward NGOs collected by CRRC-Georgia in fall, 2017 for the Georgian Civil Society Sustainability Initiative (CSSIGE). The first part of this blog post looks at the most up-to-date data on knowledge of NGOs in Georgia and reported levels of trust toward them. The second part explores the inconsistency between low trust toward NGOs in Georgia, on the one hand, and quite positive assessments of their activities, on the other hand.NGOs in Georgia: Low trust, high expectations? (Part 2)
As discussed in the first part of this blog post, the results of CRRC-Georgia’s survey conducted for the Georgian Civil Society Sustainability Initiative (CSSIGE) project in fall 2017 confirmed that both knowledge about NGOs and trust toward them is quite low in Georgia. This blog post looks at the inconsistency between low trust toward NGOs, on the one hand, and quite positive assessments of their activities, on the other hand.Selection of Supreme Court judges: The public’s knowledge and attitudes about the process
On December 24th, 2018, High Council of Justice (HCoJ) of Georgia nominated ten candidates to the country’s Supreme Court. The nomination caused controversy among the representatives of civil society organizations as the nominated judges were either leaders or close associates of a group of judges (so called “clan”) exercising an informal power over Georgia’s judiciary. The HCoJ was enabled to make the nominations due to recent constitutional changes that shifted the right of nomination from the President to the HCoJ...Are there predictors of not knowing and refusing to answer on surveys in Georgia?
Are there variables that predict who is likely to report “Don’t know” or to refuse to answer survey questions more often in Georgia? This blog post looks at this question, using un-weighted Caucasus Barometer 2017 (CB) data for Georgia.Georgians are split over the Prosecutor’s Office in Georgia
On November 3, 2018 Rustavi 2 broadcasted an investigative film created by the Studio Monitor and Radio Liberty about a suspended investigation of the Prosecutor’s Office of Georgia. The film How to subjugate a judge? focused on accusations against prosecutors and judges related to the abuse of power, seizure of real estate, and giving of land to private individuals.Who doesn’t want democracy for Georgia?
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Georgia adopted western-style democratic institutions. They have never functioned in a fully democratic manner, fluctuating between more liberal and authoritarian tendencies. That is, Georgia is and has been a hybrid regime.But what do people want?
Does our algorithm still work?
Within the Russian Propaganda Barometer Project, funded by USAID through EWMI’s ACCESS program, CRRC-Georgia created a model, using a k-nearest neighbors algorithm, which attempts to predict whether a person falls into one of three groups: consistently pro-Western; anti-Western; or neither and potentially at-risk of being influenced towards an anti-Western foreign policy position. The model used data from NDI and CRRC’s polling between 2008 and July 2018. It included variables for age, education level, settlement type, and when the survey was conducted.It’s the economy stupid: An experiment on Georgian support for the European Union
Georgians are enthusiastic in supporting the country’s accession to the European Union. Since 2012, when the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and CRRC-Georgia started tracking attitudes, three quarters of Georgians approved of the government’s goal of joining the EU, on average. What motivates Georgians to support the Union, or alternatively, to abandon support? A survey experiment included in the latest CRRC/NDI poll suggests potential economic burdens have a modest yet significant effect on support for membership. Results do not support the common belief that a potential military threat from Russia dampens Georgians’ support for the EU.
Analysis | Who is afraid of the Lugar Centre?
CRRC-Georgia investigates who is more susceptible to Russian-pushed conspiracies surrounding Georgia’s US-funded Lugar Centre.
In Georgia, a conspiracy about the US-funded Richard Lugar Centre for Public Health Research in Tbilisi has recently gained traction. As CRRC-Georgia’s USAID-funded research shows, Georgia’s far-right groups eagerly picked up on this conspiracy and blamed the centre for the seasonal flu outbreak in early 2019.
The direction Georgia’s headed in
The most recent NDI polling showed a decline in the direction the country was heading. Though not the direct cause by any means, the growing sense that Georgia is going in the wrong direction was likely an enabling factor for the protests that erupted in June and have continued through July in Tbilisi. The CRRC-NDI survey has tracked the direction people think the country is headed over the last decade. While numerous factors affect people’s perceptions of where the country is going, a number of events including elections and the devaluation of the Georgian Lari against the US Dollar appear to show up in CRRC-Georgia and the National Democratic Institute’s data. This blog provides an overview of how views of the direction the country is headed in have changed over time.Perceived Threats to Georgia’s Security
Russian aggression is a key security issue for Georgia. In August 2008, a war broke out over the South Ossetia region with Russia party to the war. Since the war, there have been attempts to restore economic and diplomatic relations between the two countries. Some in Georgia support a policy of having closer ties with Russia. Still, the April CRRC/NDI 2019 survey shows that the public continues to see Russia as a threat.Attitudes toward politicians are related to evaluations of institutional performance
How citizens evaluate the performance of the state is often a reasonable proxy for its performance. In Georgia, evaluations of public institutions are mixed. While a number of social and demographic variables are associated with people’s perceptions of state performance, so too are people’s attitudes towards political parties and politicians. This shows once again how politics is personalized in Georgia.What divides and what unites Georgian society?
The last year has seen a number of conversations about polarization in Georgia. The President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, even commented on the issue in his Batumi speech. One of the components of polarization, though not the sole factor, is division in society over actors, issues, and institutions.While many things could divide the public, what do the people think and which groups report more and fewer sources of division? The April 2019 NDI-CRRC poll suggests that there are fewer perceived reasons for division in rural areas and among ethnic minorities.
Young people are learning English in Georgia
A common sentiment when discussing foreign languages in Georgia is that young people know some English, older people know Russian, and those in between are mixed. Previous CRRC Georgia analysis from 2014 supported this claim, showing that knowledge of English was on the rise among young people.The 2019 survey on Knowledge and Attitudes towards the European Union in Georgia which CRRC Georgia carried out for Europe Foundation suggests that this trend is continuing in Georgia.
Government employees assess the work of the government better than the general public
The outlook in Georgia continues to be increasingly pessimistic, with more people reporting that the country is heading in the wrong direction. Similarly, performance assessments of government institutions have been on the decline in recent years. As recent CRRC analyses have highlighted, party identification, attitudes towards individual politicians, ethnicity, and Georgian language proficiency among ethnic minorities are associated with attitudes towards government. Analysis of the July 2019 CRRC and NDI survey suggests that working for the state is also associated with performance assessments. However, government employees in poor households and those in Tbilisi rate government performance significantly worse.Knowledge of visa-free requirements falls since launch of scheme
Georgian citizens have been able to travel visa free within the Schengen zone for approaching three years, the result of several years of complex dialogue and policy reform. Despite the elapsed time, and a major EU-funded public information campaign, the results of the 2019 Survey on Knowledge of and Attitudes towards the European Union in Georgia (EU Survey) suggest that public knowledge of requirements for visa free travel have fallen since the scheme launched. Similarly, the same period has seen a large rise in the number of Georgian citizens being denied entry to EU countries, with Eurostat reporting over four thousand such cases in 2018 alone, up over a third since 2017.Optimism Regarding EU membership is decreasing
Georgia is not a candidate for membership in the European Union (EU), but the government has the stated goal of joining the EU when the country is ready for it. According to the Knowledge of and Attitudes towards the EU in Georgia survey (EU Survey) CRRC-Georgia conducted in spring 2019 for Europe Foundation, 71% of the population of Georgia would vote for EU membership if a referendum were held tomorrow. Only 10% would vote against it and 7% would not vote at all. While support for joining the EU is clearly high, people are increasingly pessimistic about how long it will take Georgia to join.Georgia’s Foreign Policy Trilemma: Balance, Bandwagon, or Hedge? Part 1
Georgia is a small, partly free democracy in a tough neighbourhood, and NATO membership remains an unfulfilled promise. While Russia is widely perceived as the main threat to Georgia’s security, the appropriate strategic or political response to the threat is not obvious. What options does Georgia have when faced with a powerful rival on its border, and what public support is there for these options?Georgia’s Foreign Policy Trilemma: Balance, Bandwagon, or Hedge? Part 2
The first part of this blog post discussed evidence of an association between perceiving Russia as the main threat to Georgia and a preference for a foreign policy that balances against that threat through alliances with the West. The relationship between threat perception and hedging, defined as attempting to maintain good relations with both Russia and the West, is less clear.The economic and educational consequences of child marriage in Georgia
Widely condemned as a violation of human rights, child marriage is associated with negative health outcomes — both physical and psychological. Aside from these clear issues, a growing body of research suggests child marriage also has economic consequences for both the women who marry under the age of 18 and society at large.In a sea of pessimism, who is optimistic about Georgia?
The CRRC and NDI survey released two weeks ago showed a pessimistic picture – half the public thinks Georgia is going in the wrong direction, 24% that nothing is changing, and only 19% think it is going in the right direction. A majority (59%) think the country is not a democracy for the first time since the question was asked on the survey in 2010. Moreover, performance assessments of government, parliament, the courts, and most ministries declined.What kind of electoral system do Georgians actually want?
On 8 March, Georgia’s political leaders agreed on a new electoral system under which 120 seats will be allocated via proportional elections and 30 seats will be allocated via direct election of candidates.The long-fought-over electoral reform was a compromise which represents two steps forward after three steps had been taken back.
As COVID-19 sends political campaigning to Facebook, will polarisation increase?
With Georgia in an election year and traditional face-to-face campaigning out of the question given the COVID-19 outbreak, the importance of Facebook in Georgian politics is only likely to grow.Facebook is an important part of Georgian politics. Political campaigns are fought, and public opinion thought to often be formed on the platform...
AI and Russian propaganda: it’s not what it looks like
In the think tank world, talk about artificial intelligence (AI) is common. Using it is less common. One of the underlying causes of this may be a perceived lack of familiarity with the methods. However, AI methods – including machine learning – are probably more familiar to many thinktankers than they realise. The Russian Propaganda Barometer project, recently conducted by the Caucasus Research Resource Centers (CRRC) Georgia, demonstrates the potential of these tools in think tanks for policy insight – particularly relating to discourse analysis, and developing targeting strategies.The most important issues facing Georgia, prior to the COVID-19 outbreak
Is Georgia really polarised?
Talk about political polarisation in Georgia is easy to find. Some have suggested that the recent United National Movement (UNM) announcement that Saakashvili will be their prime ministerial candidate will only make matters worse.
A new data analysis CRRC Georgia released on Tuesday suggests that this may in fact be the case. Data from several years of CRRC Georgia and NDI polling indicates that there are few ideological or policy issues that the supporters of Georgian Dream (GD) and the United National Movement (UNM) disagree about. Rather, attitudes towards politicians and political events are what divides, a fact the public intuitively recognises.
Georgian voters: personalities, policies, or a bit of both?
While personality in politics matters greatly for the Georgian public, data from this year shows that for Georgian Dream and United National Movement voters, policy is still important.
A recent CRRC Georgia policy brief argued that what was really dividing Georgians politically was personalities rather than policies. Data from the August 2020 CRRC and NDI survey provides further evidence for this idea.
However, the data also shows a difference between Georgian Dream (GD) and United National Movement (UNM) voters in terms of policy preferences and that economic policy is the most important issue for a plurality of voters.
UNM supporters are especially pessimistic about their economic future
With the pandemic still raging and accompanying economic restrictions still in force, Georgians are unsurprisingly pessimistic about their economic future. This holds true especially for supporters of the opposition United National Movement Party, above all other party supporters.
COVID-19 restrictions have impacted people’s economic activity heavily. This is reflected in key economic indicators such as GDP, which declined by 5.9% year on year between January and November 2020.
It is also reflected in employment, with fewer people reporting starting new jobs and more people reporting having lost one, according to the 2020 Caucasus Barometer.
How do Georgians feel about the influx of Russians?
Recent CRRC data shows that a large majority of the Georgian public is concerned about the migration of Russians to Georgia.Since Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, at least 1.2 million Russian citizens have entered Georgia, equivalent to roughly 30% of Georgia’s population. While the number of Russian citizens who have decided to stay in Georgia remains unclear, the impact of this mass migration is strongly felt in rising rents and concerns over the country’s security.
Is the Georgian government doing enough to secure EU membership?
CRRC Georgia data suggests that while the majority of Georgians want to join the EU, they are largely split along partisan lines on whether their government is doing enough to secure the country’s candidate status.Is People’s Power designed to make Georgian Dream look good?
A CRRC Georgia study found that positioning Georgian Dream as more moderate than its spin-off group, People’s Power, increased support for the ruling party.A popular study suggests that when a person goes for a date, they will be more liked if they take a similar, but slightly less attractive companion with them. Likewise, political parties often look better for their voters when they position themselves against a similar, but less appealing opponent.
რა სარგებლობა მოაქვს ხალხის ძალას მმართველი პარტიისათვის?
CRRC Georgia-ს კვლევამ აჩვენა, რომ ქართული ოცნების უფრო ზომიერად პოზიციონირებამ, ვიდრე მისი სპინ-ოფ ჯგუფი ხალხის ძალაა, მმართველი პარტიის მხარდაჭერა გაზარდა.Are individual Georgians politically polarised?
CRRC-Georgia data found that individual political polarisation — how committedly partisan a person is — is relatively low in Georgia, despite concerns about the country’s polarisation as a whole.Democratic hypocrisy in Tbilisi
A CRRC Georgia survey found that people living in Tbilisi were more willing to accept democracy-eroding policies if they believed that their preferred party was in power.Georgians’ attitudes and beliefs associated with polarised media preferences
A recent NDI/CRRC survey suggests that Georgians have markedly different beliefs about the present state and future of their country, regardless of their party sympathies, depending on whether the television channel they trust is pro-government or pro-opposition.Do Georgians feel like they are being spied on by the government?
Nearly half of the Georgian public think that they or their family members are under government surveillance at least some of the time.Georgia’s changing priorities at the UN General Assembly
A quantitative analysis of the speeches made by Georgia’s leaders at the annual UN General Assembly found that their themes and priorities changed after the change of government in 2012, with Georgian Dream leaders more positive and discussing Russia less negatively than their predecessors.Russian émigrés in Georgia
After the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, tens of thousands of Russian nationals moved to Georgia, with many choosing to stay. A CRRC survey found that Russian respondents in Georgia believe that Russia is not a democracy, have mixed views about Georgia’s political direction, and feel relatively secure in Georgia.Can political parties in Georgia survive abandonment by their leaders?
A year before Georgia’s general elections, a CRRC survey found that less than half of surveyed Georgian partisans would remain loyal to their favoured party if its leader were to establish a new party, with supporters of the ruling party more likely to stick with their party than supporters of the opposition.